Frank M. Keane

Repo market effects of the Term Securities Lending Facility

The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was introduced by the Federal Reserve to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral. We evaluate one aspect of the program--the extent to which it has narrowed repo spreads between Treasury collateral and less liquid collateral. We find that TSLF operations have precipitated a significant narrowing of repo spreads. More refined tests indicate the market conditions and types of operations associated with the programs effectiveness. Various additional tests, including a split-sample test, suggest that our findings are robust.

Securities loans collateralized by cash: reinvestment risk, run risk, and incentive issues

Securities loans collateralized by cash are by far the most popular form of securities-lending transaction. But when the cash collateral associated with these transactions is actively reinvested by a lender?s agent, potential risks emerge. This study argues that the standard compensation scheme for securities-lending agents, which typically provides for agents to share in gains but not losses, creates incentives for them to take excessive risk. It also highlights the need for greater scrutiny and understanding of cash reinvestment practices?especially in light of the AIG experience, which showed that risks related to cash reinvestment, by even a single participant, could have destabilizing effects.

Anomalous Bidding in Short-Term Treasury Bill Auctions

We show that Treasury bill auction procedures create classes of price-equivalent discount rates for bills with fewer than seventy-two days to maturity. We argue that it is inefficient for market participants to bid at a discount rate that is not the minimum rate in its class. The inefficiency of bidding at a rate other than the minimum is related to a quantity shortfall rather than an unexploited profit opportunity. Auction results for weekly offerings of four-week bills and occasional offerings of cash management bills show that market participants frequently bid at inefficient rates. However, they are more likely to bid at efficient rates than chance would suggest.

Unlocking the Treasury Market through TRACE

This joint FEDS Note and Liberty Street Economics blog post from staff at the Board of Governors and Federal Reserve Bank of New York aims to share initial insights on the Treasury cash transactions data reported to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE).