Frans P. de Vries

Innovation and Environmental Stringency: The Case of Sulfur Dioxide Abatement

A weak version of the Porter hypothesis claims that strict environmental policy provides positive innovation incentives, hence triggering improved competitiveness and securing environmental quality. In a comparative way, this paper empirically tests this hypothesis across countries by linking environmental stringency to innovation proxied by patents in the field of SO2 abatement over the period 1970-2000. Three different models of environmental stringency are examined. Two of these models do not reveal a positive significant effect on innovation as a result of increased stringency. In the theoretically preferred model, however, a positive relationship between environmental stringency and innovation is obtained.

Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Lessons on Effectiveness, Efficiency and Spillover Potential

Voluntary agreements (VAs) have been widely used in environmental policymaking over the past 20 years. This paper reviews relevant theoretical and empirical literature on VAs, assessing their performance in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness is evaluated on three criteria: (i) effectiveness in setting the pollution abatement target, (ii) effectiveness in incentivising participation , and (iii) effectiveness in realizing the abatement target. Both static efficiency, in particular the allocation of abatement among participants in the VA, and dynamic efficiency, in particular the role of technology and informational spillovers, are evaluated. Finally, we identify gaps in the literature that provide opportunities for future research.

Technology Diffusion, Product Differentiation and Environmental Subsidies

Abstract This paper explores the relationship between environmental subsidies, the diffusion of a clean technology, and the degree of product differentiation in an imperfectly competitive market. Like others, we show that the subsidy succeeds in reducing environmental damage only when the substitution effect (the reduction in pollution associated with the clean technology) exceeds the output effect (the extent that the subsidy increases output). Here, we add product differentiation and diffusion dynamics. When the substitution effect dominates, environmental damage decreases monotonically during the diffusion process. The extent of technology diffusion (the degree to which clean technology replaces dirty) is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation. Further, as products become closer substitutes, it is more likely that the subsidy will reduce environmental damage. Finally, the subsidy for clean technology will spill over to the remaining dirty producers, increasing their profit as well. In a free-entry equilibrium, the subsidy decreases pollution when product differentiation is low compared to the relative pollution intensity of the clean technology.