Frans Stokman

The European Union Decides

European legislation affects countless aspects of daily life in modern Europe but just how does the European Union make such significant legislative decisions? How important are the formal decision-making procedures in defining decision outcomes and how important is the bargaining that takes place among the actors involved? Using a combination of detailed evidence and theoretical rigour, this 2006 volume addresses these questions and others that are central to understanding how the EU works in practice. It focuses on the practice of day-to-day decision-making in Brussels and the interactions that take place among the Member States in the Council and among the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. A unique data set of actual Commission proposals are examined against which the authors develop, apply and test a range of explanatory models of decision-making, exemplifying how to study decision-making in other political systems using advanced theoretical tools and appropriate research design.

Network exchange theory

Preface Network Exchange Theory: Issues and Directions Actors in Relations Relations in Structures Power Relations Preface Power Relations in Exchange Networks by Markovsky, Willer and Patton The Discovery of Weak Power Exclusion and Power Preface Exclusion and Power: A Test of Four Theories of Power in Exchange Networks by Skvoretz and Willer Negotiated Exchanges Preface Negotiated Exchanges in Social Networks by Lovaglia et al. An Alternative for Predicting Weak Power by Lovaglia and Willer Network Connections Preface Network Connections and Exchange Ratios: Theory, Predictions and Experimental Tests by Willer and Skvoretz Power and Influence Preface Power and Influence: A Theoretical Bridge by Willer, Lovaglia and Markovsky Status Influence and Status Value by Thye Recent Problems and Solutions in Network Exchange Theory Preface An Automated Approach to the Theoretical Analysis of Difficult Problems by Lovaglia et al. A New Method for Finding Power Structures by Simpson and Willer Developing Network Exchange Theory

Is politics power or policy oriented? A comparative analysis of dynamic access models in policy networks

We will show that these base models and some intermediate ones result in fundamentally different network structures and predicted outcomes. Moreover, we will show that the policy driven models do fundamentally better than the power driven models. In policy networks actors use access relations to influence preferences of other actors. Establishment and shifts of access relations and their consequences for outcomes of decisions are the main focal points in this paper. Unlike most policy network studies, we therefore do not take the network and its relations as given and constant. Instead we device computer simulation models to account for the dynamics in policy networks. We compare different models and investigate the resulting network structures and predicted outcomes of decisions. The choice among the alternative models is made by their correspondence with empirical network structures and actual outcomes of decisions. In our models, we assume that all relevant actors aim at policy outcomes as close as pos...

Winners and Losers in the European Union

This special issue examines legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU). By focusing on specific examples of legislative decision-making and actors’ preferences in those situations, we aim to address questions of interest to mainstream Europeanists.

The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making

Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results. Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum, Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data — a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of member states, but only in the final stages of decision-making.

Strategic decision making

This paper introduces a methodology for strategic intervention in collective decision making. The methodology is based on (1) a decomposition of the problem into a few main controversial issues, (2) systematic interviews of subject area specialists to obtain a specification of the decision setting, consisting of a list of stakeholders with their capabilities, positions, and salience on each of the issues; (3) computer simulation. The computer simulation models incorporate only the main processes through which differences in positions and salience are accommodated in binding decisions: management of meaning through the provision of convincing information, challenges, and exchanges. The methodology generates insights into the likely outcomes of the process, the amount of conflict involved, and the stability of the outcomes. These insights and the investigation of the effects of strategic moves provide major strategic advantages to the user. This is likely to lead to a better representation of the users own position in the decision outcome and the creation of a broader political and social support behind the decision outcome.

The Emergence Of Groups In The Evolution Of Friendship Networks

Friendship networks usually show a certain degree of segmentation: subgroups of friends. The explanation of the emergence of such groups from initially dyadic pair friendships is a difficult but important problem. In this paper we attempt to provide a first contribution to the explanation of subgroup formation in friendship networks by using the LS set as a definition for a friendship group. We construct a dynamic individual oriented model of friendship formation and provide preliminary simulation results that give an idea of how to continue the process of explaining group formation.

Interlocks in The Netherlands : Stability and careers in the period 1960-1980

Abstract The article is oriented towards the dynamics behind the network of interlocking directorates. In the interorganizational perspective the stability of different types of interlocks/lines between corporations is of strategic importance; in the intraclass perspective, the carriers of persons. The article therefore analyzes both. It shows that particularly primary interlocks (interlocks between the corporation in which the multiple director has an inside position and the other corporations in which he has outside positions) as well as multiple interlocks between corporations are considerably more stable than other interlocks. They are most likely being used for interorganizational purposes. Most of the interlocks however are generated by a very specific career pattern in which an executive position in a large corporation is almost a prerequisite to obtain many directorships.

Dynamic Modeling of Policy Networks in Amsterdam

This article evaluates two competing dynamic policy-network models and one static network model by applying them to local politics in Amsterdam. In the dynamic models an influence relation results from the acceptance of an influence request. The first model, Control Maximization, represents the view that politics are primarily power driven, and the second, Policy Maximization, policy driven. In the static model (the Two-Stage), network relations are empirically investigated as in other policy-network models and used as a benchmark for evaluating the dynamic models. Policy Maximization is shown to be the most accurate predictor of decision outcomes, better even than the static model, and to generate richer networks. However, both dynamic models generate networks that are too hierarchical.

Bargaining In The European Union And Shifts In Actors' Policy Positions

Although shifts in policy positions are a fundamental feature of the European Union (EU) bargaining process they have not yet been studied systematically. This article provides evidence on the extent to which position shifts occur and tests alternative models of the bargaining process that predict such shifts. We examine a subset of the DEU data set that contains information on shifts in actors’ positions on issues raised by 28 Commission proposals. The three bargaining models presented here posit alternative mechanisms that drive actors’ position shifts during the EU bargaining process. Our research shows that position shifts occur frequently during the EU bargaining process and these shifts in actors’ policy positions are best understood in terms of compromise and exchange among actors.