Frantisek Slanina

Inelastically scattering particles and wealth distribution in an open economy

Using the analogy with inelastic granular gases we introduce a model for wealth exchange in society. The dynamics is governed by a kinetic equation, which allows for self-similar solutions. The scaling function has a power-law tail, the exponent being given by a transcendental equation. In the limit of continuous trading, a closed form of the wealth distribution is calculated analytically.

Analytical results for the Sznajd model of opinion formation

Abstract.The Sznajd model, which describes opinion formation and social influence, is treated analytically on a complete graph. We prove the existence of the phase transition in the original formulation of the model, while for the Ochrombel modification we find smooth behaviour without transition. We calculate the average time to reach the stationary state as well as the exponential tail of its probability distribution. An analytical argument for the observed 1/n dependence in the distribution of votes in Brazilian elections is provided.

Mean-field approximation for a limit order driven market model

A mean-field variant of the model of limit order driven market introduced recently by Maslov is formulated and solved. The agents do not have any strategies and the memory of the system is kept within the order book. We show that the evolution of the order book is governed by a matrix multiplicative process. The resulting stationary distribution of step-to-step price changes is calculated. It exhibits a power-law tail with exponent 2. We obtain also the price autocorrelation function, which agrees qualitatively with the experimentally observed negative autocorrelation for short times.

Critical comparison of several order-book models for stock-market fluctuations

Abstract.Far-from-equilibrium models of interacting particles in one dimension are used as a basis for modelling the stock-market fluctuations. Particle types and their positions are interpreted as buy and sel orders placed on a price axis in the order book. We revisit some modifications of well-known models, starting with the Bak-Paczuski-Shubik model. We look at the four decades old Stigler model and investigate its variants. One of them is the simplified version of the Genoa artificial market. The list of studied models is completed by the models of Maslov and Daniels et al. Generically, in all cases we compare the return distribution, absolute return autocorrelation and the value of the Hurst exponent. It turns out that none of the models reproduces satisfactorily all the empirical data, but the most promising candidates for further development are the Genoa artificial market and the Maslov model with moderate order evaporation.

Social organization in the Minority Game model

We study the role of imitation within the Minority Game model of market. The players can exchange information locally, which leads to formation of groups which act as if they were single players. Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor agents result. We found that the global effectivity is optimized at certain value of the imitation probability, which decreases with increasing memory length. The social tensions are suppressed for large imitation probability, but generally the requirements of high global effectivity and low social tensions are in conflict.

Loop expansion around the Bethe-Peierls approximation for lattice models

We develop an effective field theory for lattice models, in which the only non-vanishing diagrams exactly reproduce the topology of the lattice. The Bethe–Peierls approximation appears naturally as the saddle-point approximation. The corrections to the saddle-point result can be obtained systematically. We calculate the lowest loop corrections for magnetization and correlation function.

Toy model for the mean-field theory of hard-sphere liquids

We investigate a toy model of liquid, based on simplified hypernetted chain equations in very large spatial dimension D. The model does not exhibit a phase transition, but several regimes of behavior when D-->infinity can be observed in different intervals of the density.

Capital flow in a two-component dynamical system

A model of open economics composed of producers and speculators is investigated by numerical simulations. The capital flows from the environment to the producers and from them to the speculators. The price fluctuations are suppressed by the speculators. When the aggressivity of the speculators grows, there is a transition from the regime with almost sure profit to a very risky regime in which very small fraction of speculators have stable gain. The minimum of price fluctuations occurs close to the transition.

Harms and benefits from social imitation

We study the role of imitation within a model of economics with adaptive agents. The basic ingredients are those of the minority game. We add the possibility of local information exchange and imitation of the neighbours strategy. Imitators should pay a fee to the imitated. Connected groups are formed, which act as if they were single players. Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor agents result, leading to the decrease of local social tensions. Size and stability of these areas depends on the parameters of the model. Global performance measured by the attendance volatility is optimised at certain value of the imitation probability. The social tensions are suppressed for large imitation probability, but due to the price paid by the imitators the requirements of high global effectivity and low social tensions are in conflict, as well as the requirements of low global and low local wealth differences.

Dynamical spin-glass-like behavior in an evolutionary game

We study a new evolutionary game, where players are tempted to take part by the premium, but compete for being the first who take a specific move. Those, who manage to escape the bulk of players, are the winners. While for large premium the game is very similar to the Minority game studied earlier, significant new behavior, reminiscent of spin glasses is observed for premium below certain level.