Franz Schwiebacher

Complementary Assets, Patent Thickets and Hold-Up Threats – Do Transaction Costs Undermine Investments in Innovation?

Innovation is commercialization of technology. Imperfections in markets for technology should leave marks on physical investments for innovation. Two types of transaction costs could affect innovative investments: royality stacking and hold-up threats. Backward references in firms patent portfolio indicate potential technology suppliers. I find a negative effect of ownership fragmentation on investments related to innovation for firms with small patent portfolios. Hold-up threats are credible when upstream patentees have less specific capital sunk than innovating firms. Differences in fixed capital stocks between downstream firms and upstream patentees negatively affect investments in innovation for firms with large patent portfolios. These effects are specific to investments in innovation. There are no comparable effects on investments in R&D or residual physical investments. The effects of patent thickets on innovation are thus not uniform. They depend on the characteristics of the downstream firm.

The Market Value of Technology Disclosures to Standard Setting Organizations

In light of the increased demand for interoperability, fragmented ownership of intellectual property and high costs for communicating new technologies, open standard-setting activities emerged as an important coordination and diffusion mechanism. Little is known about the value of contributions to standard setting organizations (SSOs) for technology providers. This paper provides a large-scale empirical assessment of the value of disclosures to SSOs for technology sponsors. Our findings show that disclosures referring explicitly to patents are evaluated positively by the market while this is not the case for blanket disclosures. This indicates that the expected benefits of participating in SSOs outweigh potential disadvantages from making patented technologies available to the market under SSO licensing conditions. The market does not appreciate disclosures to SSOs if there is uncertainty about the associated technologies.

Do Trademarks Diminish the Substitutability of Products in Innovative Knowledge-Intensive Services?

Trademarks are often supposed to reduce substitutability and imitability of product innovations. Using German CIS data for 2010, we provide empirical evidence that trademarking firms assess easy product substitutability as less characteristic for their competitive environment. This is particularly the case for knowledge-intensive service providers, product innovators and firms which consider trademarks as important intellectual property rights. This suggests that trademarks are an important supplementary mechanism to protect innovations in knowledge-intensive services.

Does Fragmented or Heterogeneous IP Ownership Stifle Investments in Innovation

Thickets of partially overlapping patent rights raise costs to secure IPR for innovation. Fragmented IP ownership raises coordination costs to resolve mutual blockades. Inadvertent patent infringement poses the risk of fruits from investments to be exploited. A gap in economic commitment levels may be exploited if capital-intensive innovators have more invested application-specifically than inadvertently infringed IPR owners. I study whether fragmentation or heterogeneous capital-intensities among owners of overlapping patents affect propensities to invest in innovation. I find that firms with small patent portfolios are less likely to invest in innovation if IPR is fragmented. Firms with large patent portfolios are less likely to invest in innovation if cited patent owners have smaller stocks of fixed capital. This suggests that effects of patent thickets on innovation are not evenly spread among innovating firms.