Fred Gifford

Complex genetic causation of human disease: critiques of and rationales for heritability and path analysis.

This paper examines some criticisms that have been made of two standard genetic methodologies: heritability and path analysis. I conclude that the criticisms should be taken seriously, concerning both the accuracy of heritability measures and their significance. In light of the fact that such studies remain prominent in the literature, I consider what possible rationale they can retain consistent with these criticisms. In particular, I consider (1) a role in the identification of high-risk individuals and (2) a heuristic role in the planning of research strategy.

Philosophy of Medicine: Introduction

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the philosophy of medicine that encompasses the topics connected to the philosophy of science that arise in reflection upon medical science and practice. The collection begins with “Concepts of Health and Disease,” where Christopher Boorse takes up what is sometimes thought of as the central conceptual question for medicine. Boorse presents and evaluates his own nonnormative, “biostatistical” theory, according to which health is normal functioning, a matter of ones biological organs and systems functioning at or above species-typical efficiency. In his chapter, “Theories and Models in Medicine,” Paul Thompson describes and analyzes the construction and use, in medical science, of models (which provide descriptions, sometimes mathematical ones, of systems) and theories (large, general models that integrate submodels). Dan Steels chapter, “Causal Inference in Medical Experiments,” discusses causal inference in medicine, focusing on the context of medical experiments (as opposed, for instance, to observational studies). In “Frequentist vs. Bayesian Clinical Trials,” David Teira discusses a central debate concerning the proper methodology of clinical trials — that between the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to trial design and interpretation. Substantial historical detail in order to make their case: in particular, those on Bayesianism and frequentism, evidence-based medicine, consensus conferences, nursing, psychiatry and public health are also presented.

Understanding Genetic Causation and its Implications for Ethical Issues Concerning Medical Genetics

In this chapter, I explore some conceptual insights about genetic causation and consider their implications for ethical issues arising in medical genetics. As these insights are rather abstract, their most important implications will be indirect ones concerning the shaping of our general conceptions and tendencies of thought, serving as a curb on inappropriate geneticization of disease. I end by critiquing the idea that the scientific and practical successes resulting from the genetic point of view should convince us to accept such geneticization.

Beyond bioethics: the 5th International Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable

We are pleased to once again present to the readers of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics papers from the Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable. Previous issues have followed the 3rd and 4th Roundtables, and the current issue presents a selection from the more than 20 papers presented at the 5th Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable, which took place in New York, at Columbia University, in November 2013. Like its predecessors, held in Birmingham, AL, Rotterdam, and San Sebastian, this Roundtable attracted speakers from around the world. It also featured keynote presentations from Rita Charon of Columbia University and Ross Upshur of the University of Toronto. It may seem somewhat odd to feature a special issue on philosophy of medicine in a journal that effectively has philosophy of medicine in its title. However, a review of the contents of this journal and similar ones, such as the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, will quickly reveal such an issue’s purpose. The dominant content of these journals consists of medical ethics in all it forms and, to a lesser degree, philosophy of mind in the context of philosophy of psychiatry. Philosophy of medicine, as it is represented at the Roundtable, is much less

Sober's Use of Unanimity in the Units of Selection Problem

Sober argues that the units of selection problem in evolutionary biology is to be understood and solved by applying the general analysis of what it means for C to cause E in a population. The account he utilizes is the unanimity account, according to which C causes E in a population when C raises the probability of E in each causal context. I argue that he does not succeed here, both because the unanimity account is not well grounded in the general case, and because there are important differences between cases of population causation which do involve selection and those which do not.