Frédéric Chantreuil

Inequality Decomposition Values

This paper presents a general procedure inspired by the Shapley value for decomposing any inequality indices by factor components or by sub-populations. To do so we define an inequality game. Despite the fact that the characteristic function is not super-additive in general and that the linearity assumption of the space of inequality game does not hold, an axiomatization of the Shapley value is given in this context by using the Potential function pioneered by HART and MAS-COLELL [1989]. This result proves to be useful in illustrating a trade-off between the desirable properties of consistency and marginality. A comparison of such decomposition with the decomposition method investigated by SHORROCKS [1982] is provided in the case of factor component decomposition. Refinement of the Shapley decomposition is investigated when the set of income sources is nested. Furthermore, an application to the sub-population decomposition problem is also investigated.

The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections

Abstract A monotonicity paradox occurs when a voting system reacts in a perverse way to a change in individual opinions. The vulnerability of a voting system to monotonicity paradoxes is defined as the proportion of voting situations that can give rise to such paradoxes. In this paper we provide analytical representations of this vulnerability in the three-alternative case for two voting systems, i.e. plurality with run-off (f1) and anti-plurality with run-off (f2). Our results suggest that the vulnerability to monotonicity paradoxes is lower with f1 than with f2.

Model Structure and Parameterisation

This chapter provides a general description of the AGMEMOD model’s structure including its country and commodity coverage. We present the general form of a PE model and the AGMEMOD general form with specific examples of crops, livestock and dairy. Important features associated with the treatment of policy within the model are highlighted, in particular, market price support, direct payments and supply control. We describe how policy harmonisation addresses the incorporation of the diverse range of direct income supports and discuss the concept of key price and key price equations. The introduction of border protection and export competition measures in the model is also discussed.

The CAP Beyond 2013

The main purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate a policy analysis application of the AGMEMOD model and to provide an illustration of the range of policy scenarios that can be analysed using the AGMEMOD model. Specific results are provided for a scenario which looks at the impact of equalizing the level of direct payments per hectare across the EU. We thus present, in this chapter, the results for different alternate policy scenarios along the EU and individual Member States dimensions, illustrating the appropriateness of the policy harmonization approach for such analysis.

EU Market Outlook

A key objective of AGMEMOD is to generate 10 years forward baseline projections for the main agricultural commodity markets of the EU and its Member States. This chapter provides detail on the AGMEMOD 2010 baseline projections. The baseline projections in this chapter are illustrative of the type of output produced by the AGMEMOD model that should be of interest to policy makers, market analysts and academics. Baseline results are provided for crops, livestock, dairy, fruits and vegetables.