Frederick C. Cuny

Refugee camps and cAMP planning: the state of the art.

In 1971, a group of engineers and planners formed a team to undertake a detailed study and analysis of refugee camps how they operated, how they could be made more manageable, and how they could be designed to be more cost-effective. The studies included an examination of social and health problems, an analysis of the economic constraints encountered by relief organizations and local governmental authorities, and a review of administrative and organizational factors which affect the management of camps. The results of the studies, which are continuing under the auspices of INTERTECT, emphasize several important points: First, refugee camps are manageable. If properly laid-out and organized from the outset, problemscan be substantially reduced. Second, camps can be cost-effective. If properly planned, and if adequate resources are committed at the outset, refugee camps can be run with a minimum of administrative cost, with the refugees operating most if not all of the camp subsystems. Furthermore, the total costs of designing and installing a livable refugee camp are less than the continuing operational costs of a sub-standard camp. Third, in high exposure environments such as the tropics, good physical layouts or plans can save lives. Designs which facilitate sanitation and encourage refugee organization reduce the incidence of disease and promote participation by the site occupants in activities ultimately leading to self-dependence. The conclusions drawn thus far can be illustrated by examining the major case studies which were conducted by members of the team. The methodology employed in each case was to study fxst-hand problems of existing camps in various disasters and to examine to the greatest extent possible the following factors: Physical factors ( I ) Layout or design of the camp, planned and actual. (2) Physical components of the camp, such as housing, sanitation, water distribution, etc. (3) Land use how facilities such as housing, clinics, etc., were grouped and how well they functioned in their area. (4) Land tenure who owned the land, how did it become available for a camp? SociaI factors (1) Demographic information who were the refugees, what was their life-style before they came to the camp, what was the make-up of the population by age, family, etc.? (2) Organizational factors what was the organizational-labor potential, what types of organizations were successful, how well did the refugee labor perform? Health factors (1) Incidence of disease what diseaseswere prevalent, how were they most often spread, how were they affected by the layout and environment of the camp? (2) Health Programs -what programs were successful, how did the layout of the camp affect the manner in which they were conducted? Administrative factors ( I ) Administration how was the camp run, by whom, and who made the real decisions? (2) Refugee organization were the refugees organized, if so, how, how did the organization work, to what extent did they participate in the running of the camp? (3) VOLAG Contributions to what extent did voluntary agencies participate in camp administration, where were they most useful, and where was their money best spent? (4) Costs -who spent what, when, where and how much, were expenditures cost-effective? In the research program the team relied heavily on the personal experience not only of our awn staff but also of the field staff of the various governments and relief agencies.

What has to be done to increase the effectiveness of disaster interventions

Editors Note: What follows is drawn from a session at the Institute on Education for Development in the Context of Disasters that focused on factors that limit effective response to disaster situations. In that session Frederick Cuny, author of Disasters and Development (Oxford University Press, 19831, outlined the conditions in preand post-disaster situations that affect possible responses. He also raised several important challenges and dilemmas for consideration by those who work in disaster response and long-lerm development. The following is a partial summary of his remarks, and a distillation of his points that require further exploration.

THE LICE EARTHQUAKE

Sir, I am amazed at the review of my report, The Lice Earthquake in South-eastem Turkey: A Geography of the Disaster, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, December 1976, by Ian Davis, inDisasters, 2, (1) 85-87 (1978). What amazes me is how a disaster specialist with theoretical and some field experience in foreign countries, along with his admission of a “cursory study of the Lice disaster” (p. 85) , would assume that another academician with a different disciplinary orientation, has made a “minimal contribution” because he chose to write something which did not address issues that he (Davis) deemed appropriate. Does Mr Davis’ brief visit to the Lice area with Ankara officials qualify him as the authority on Turkish disasters? Does one know about the human geography of Turkey and the local area when he confuses Ramazan with “Ramadan?” And the “Butlis” mountains, Lice’s original site, for the Bitlis (p. 85)? MI Davis sadly assumes that military academicians cannot address politically controversial subjects. He is sadly misinformed; indeed, his obsession with th is point perpetuates the myth. Evidently he is not familiar with the contemporary military. I suggest that he read carefully the following controversial articles, each written by military academicians: William B. Brundage and Willam A. Mitchell, “Toward an Understanding of Opium Poppy Production in Turkey,” Joum~l of African and Asian Studies, Vol. XII, No. 3 4 , October 1977; William A. Mitchell, “ Partial Recovery and Reconstruction After Disaster: The Lice Case,” Mars Emergencies, Vol 2 , pp. 233-247,1977; and Richard Wolniewicz, “In Whose. Image? Church Symbols and World Views,”Joumal of Popuhr Glture, Vol XI (4) (Spring 1978). My comment that Turkey faces extreme difficulty in coping with the events following an earthquake disaster is subjective and my own, based on many discussions with Turkish officials at national, regional, and local levels, and perhaps more importantly, with hundreds of villagers involved in disasters. My 3 months living in Gediz area villages and over 4 years living in Turkey give me a basis for my statements. I agree that Turkey is probably one of the best-prepared countries in coping with earthquakes. Anyone intimate with Turkey, however, knows that coping is difficult. I briefly noted the OXFAM issue on page 44 and included a photograph of one on page 69. Mr Davis was correct in his comment on the failure of the project. I, along with thousands of Turks, agree that the shelters are undesirable, impractical, and unsuitable for animals, much less people. It is axiomatic that he who writes, writes for or against something. It would be interesting to know why MI Davis is overly concerned with this project. Mr Davis grossly misrepresented a prime focus of my study. That is, on page 57 where I suggest that my recommendations for Gediz housing in terms of human needs, were not met for Lice. I specifically identify problems with the new houses, including physical arrangements and the restoration of traditional homes. MI Davis’s review makes one wonder what kind of axe he is