Fumitoshi Mizutani

The Post Office vs. Parcel Delivery Companies: Competition Effects on Costs and Productivity

The main purpose of this study is to evaluate whether the competition factor affects cost reduction or TFP growth, even when ownership is maintained by the public sector. For empirical investigation, we selected the parcel delivery market in Japan. Formerly monopolized by the Post Office, the parcel delivery market was dramatically affected by the entry of the privately owned Yamato in 1976, an event which saw the share of the Post Office begin its decline to only 14.9% by 1998. In this study, we estimate the total cost function of goods transported by using a pooled data set, and the hedonic specification of output is formulated in order to consider output characteristics. Our conclusion is that competition has contributed to cost reduction and TFP growth in the case of private companies but not in the case of the Post Office.

Privately Owned Railways' Cost Function, Organization Size and Ownership

This paper aims to find the optimal size of an urban private rail organization as well as to evaluate cost difference by ownership. First, after selecting privately owned rail companies, we explore explanatory variables which affect the cost of rail service. Second, keeping in mind previous cost studies of the urban passenger rail industry, we estimate variable cost function with the translog cost function and we construct the total cost function. Third, based on the average cost function, conditions are pinpointed which attain minimum average cost. Finally, based on estimated results, we calculate the size of an urban private rail company and the ownership effects on cost. We conclude that optimal size is about 231 million vehicle-km per year, with a network of 63.8 km length. In terms of total costs, public railways have higher costs than private railways. There is no cost difference, however, in terms of variable costs.

A Private-Public comparison of bus service operators.

Due to the steady increase in the use of private autos in Japan, the bus business is facing hard times. In particular, bus services owned by public organizations have been struggling with increases in operating deficits and subsidies, so that recently in many cities there has been a call for restructuring. Publicly and privately owned bus operators co-exist in the Japanese market. Although their financial situation is not completely healthy, privately owned bus operators have performed better than their publicly owned counterparts. The main purpose of this study is to find the key factors causing the differences in efficiency between private and public bus operators, especially in these areas: efficiency in service production, wage, utilization of vehicles, and cost. In this study, we will make an analysis using observations of both private and public bus operators in the Kansai region in Japan for the five years from 1996 to 2000. After we examine the performance differences between the two sectors, we will estimate with econometric methods certain functions such as the production function of bus services and the wage function. Based on these functions, we will evaluate the differences in efficiency between private and public bus operators.

Estimation of Social Costs of Transport in Japan

Using a dataset of 111 Japanese cities in 2005, the article estimates the social costs of car transport and analyses the structure of the components of and the relationship between social costs and city size. The following major results are obtained. First, the social costs of vehicular transport increase at an accelerated pace as city size becomes larger. Secondly, while the construction of roads does not work to decrease the social costs of vehicular transport, public transport has a tendency to decrease such costs, although with minimal effect. Thirdly, the traffic congestion component represents more than 45 per cent of the total social cost of vehicular transport. Cost due to global warming accounts for 5–11 per cent of the total. Fourthly, the social costs of vehicular transport are about 8 per cent of GDP. Fuel tax for cars covers only 16.3 per cent of the social costs of regular car use.

Privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation: Focusing on Organizational Structure Change

Abstract In October 2005, the Japan Highway Public Corporation was privatized and separated into three expressway companies. Three other public corporations were privatized as well: the Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation, the Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation and the Honshu‐Shikoku Bridge Authority. The main purpose of this study is to overview the privatization policy taken by the government and to assess the preliminary organizational reforms. We will focus especially on policy issues such as horizontal separation, vertical (management‐holding) separation and regulatory changes, comparing the before‐privatization and after‐privatization periods of the Japan Highway Public Corporation. Evaluations will be based on empirical investigation and theory, as well as on lessons learned from the privatization of the Japan National Railway. † The previous version of this paper was presented at the 46th Congress for the European Regional Science Association, held at the University of Thessaly, 30 August–3 September 2006.

The Effect of Privatization on Productivity and Capital Adjustment

A JR is one of several freight and passenger railway companies created in 1987 after Japan National Railway (JNR) was privatized and separated. The authors use econometric techniques to examine total factor productivity (TFP) increases and to analyze how performance has changed among the JRs. The authors also examine whether, before privatization, capital input overcapitalization existed. Privatization raised annual TFP growth by 1.62%, bringing total annual TFP growth to 2.97% after privatization. Privatization has largely corrected the former JNRs over-capitalization.

How Does Market Size Affect Vertical Structure When Considering Vertical Coordination? Application to the Railway Industry

We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between market size and vertical structure in the railway industry. The framework is based on a simple downstream monopoly model with two input suppliers: the labour force and the rail infrastructure firm. The operation of the downstream firm (i.e. the train operating firm) imposes costs on the rail infrastructure firm. We show that the downstream firm with a larger market size is more likely to integrate with the rail infrastructure firm. This is consistent with the phenomenon in the railway industry.

Regulatory Reform of Public Utilities

Covering issues such as deregulation, privatization, organizational reforms, and competition policy, Regulatory Reform of Public Utilities provides a comprehensive summary of regulatory reforms in Japanese public utility industries.

Structural reform of the electricity industry and economic growth

Using 782 panel data from 34 OECD countries from 1991 to 2013, this study aims to evaluate how structural reform affects GDP growth rate. We use the Barro-type GDP growth rate regression model and apply both fixed and random effect models. Eight structural reform variables are selected: (i) third party access, (ii) wholesale market dummy, (iii) choice of supplier, (iv) private ownership, (v) generation-others separation, (vi) transmission-others separation, (vii) distribution-others separation and (viii) overall vertical separation. Major finding results are as follows: (i) third party access can positively contribute to GDP growth rate, (ii) wholesale market and overall vertical separation might have a small negative effect, and (iii) other variables have no significant effect.

Market Size and Vertical Structure in the Railway Industry

We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between market size and vertical structure in the railway industry. The framework is based on a simple downstream monopoly model with two input suppliers, labor forces and the rail infrastructure firm. The operation of the downstream firm (i.e., the train operating firm) generates costs on the rail infrastructure firm. We show that the downstream firm with a larger market size is more likely to integrate with the rail infrastructure firm. This is consistent with the phenomenon in the railway industry.