G.A. den Hartogh

Self-determination and compassion in the Dutch euthanasia-debate

Geographic variations and combining abilities of three fitness traits: the mean number of offspring, and the mean number and proportion of female offspring, in the two‐spotted spider mite were investigated using four widely separated strains of Tetranychus urticae Koch. Analyses of data obtained from a complete set of diallel crosses, involving the four strains, revealed large and highly significant specific combining abilities and reciprocal effects in all the fitness characteristics examined. It was concluded that the whole chain of reproductive events, from egg production of parental females to the fertility of hybrid daughters could be severely affected by incompatibility between parental populations.

Tacitly consenting to donate one's organs

The common objection to opt-out systems of postmortal organ procurement is that they allow removal of a deceased persons organs without their actual consent. However, under certain conditions it is possible for ‘silence’—failure to register any objection—conventionally and/or legally to count as genuine consent. Prominent conditions are that the consenter should be fully informed about the meaning of his or her silence and that the costs of registering dissent should be insignificant. This paper explicates this thesis and discusses some possible objections to it: (1) it cannot possibly be guaranteed that each citizen is aware of the meaning of silence; and (2) the system is slightly manipulative because it exploits a common defect in autonomous decision-making.

The Values of Life

In Life’s Dominion Dworkin aims at defusing the controversy about abortion and euthanasia by redefining its terms. Basically it is not a dispute about the right to life, but about its value. Liberals should grant that human life has not only a personal, but also an intrinsic value; conservatives should accept the principle of toleration which requires to let people decide for themselves about matters of intrinsic value. Dworkin fails, however, to distinguish between two kinds of personal value: (1) the value of something to a person, when he actually or dispositionally desires it, or finds it pleasant; and (2) the value of something to a person, when it ‘objectively’ contributes to his well-being, as defined by reference to his personal point of view, whether or not he ever perceives it as so contributing. He also fails to distinguish between two meanings of the concept of ‘intrinsic value’: (3) ultimate, i.e. non-instrumental personal value of kind (2); (4) the impersonal value of something which is not good-for-anybody, but simply good, i.e. not a constituent of someone’s well-being. Dworkin argues that the human fetus from conception onwards has a value, that it is not a personal value of kind (1), and therefore must be an intrinsic value. But the value of the life of the fetus is not a personal value of kind (2) either and therefore not an intrinsic value of kind (3): it is normally a constituent of the well-being of the pregnant woman, but that doesn’t constitute its value, and it is not good ‘for’ the fetus itself in the relevant sense, because it doesn’t have a personal point of view. If, however, the fetus’ life is allowed to have an intrinsic value of kind (4), the conservative cannot be refuted by appeal to the principle of toleration, for this only concerns intrinsic value of kind (3). The liberal, indeed, should recognize that the fetus’ life has a value, but it is neither a personal value (1) or (2), nor an impersonal value (4), but rather a relational value which gradually develops from some point substantially later than conception.

Tully's Locke

In the state of nature, preceding the institution of a civil or political society, the world is, by divine ordinance, the common property of humanity. How can this collective entity be a property owner? It cannot mean that all people are incorporated into one cooperative venture, organized for the disposal of material goods. The necessary organization is not naturally given. Nor can it mean that everyone has some right to claim absolutely everything: In that case, no appropriation would be possible without the unanimous consent of all. Community of ownership means, rather, that everyone has an inclusive right, a right to be included in the list of rightholders. Everyone included will, in due time, get ones share for subsistence and enjoyment. But divine ordinance did not provide for the distribution of the shares. So we have a problem. Everyone has a right to a share, but which share? (Every citizen has a right to make use of the public transport system, but which seat may one lawfully occupy?) When Locke begins his chapter on property, he has already established that the state of nature does know exclusive property rights, for Gods purposes for humanity require them. The only problem is to decide how they are apportioned. Labor is the answer. Whatever someone mixes ones labor with, one appropriates. That is to say, by tilling, hammering, or processing, a person procures an exclusive right to the product of ones labor, a right to exclude others from the use of it. The reason for this is that without labor, nothing which nature gives can be of any use to people. (Even the fruits of the forest

Express Consent and Full Membership in Locke

It seems mysterious why Locke required express consent as a condition of full membership of civil society. It is suggested this requirement be interpreted as a political programme. In a draft of a pamphlet of 1690 Locke criticizes the oath of allegiance required after the Glorious Revolution for not demanding the recognition of William and Mary de jure. So perhaps he does not want to exclude the greater part of the natives from citizenship; he wants to establish Williams throne on a full and universal recognition of his legitimacy.

The rationality of conditional cooperation

InMorals by Agreement, David Gauthier (1986) argues that it is rational to intend to cooperate, even in single-play Prisoners Dilemma games, provided (1) your co-player has a similar intention; (2) both intentions can be revealed to the other player. To this thesis four objections are made. (a) In a strategic decision the parameters on which the argument relies cannot be supposed to be given. (b) Of each pair ofa-symmetric intentions at least one is not rational. But it is impossible to form symmetric intentions to cooperate conditionally. For the condition on which the decision depends cannot be fulfilled without deciding. (c) If ones intention has to be ascertained on the basis of information about ones past performance, it is straightforwardly rational to intend to cooperate, but there is no reason to do so in a single-play PD. (d) The argument cannot be extended ton-person games which are Gauthiers principal concern.

The regulation of euthanasia: how successful is the Dutch system?

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Palliatieve sedatie en euthanasie. Commentaar op een richtlijn

SamenvattingIn het derde landelijke onderzoek naar medische beslissingen rond het levenseinde,is voor het eerst informatie verzameld over terminale sedatie. De uitkomsten waren opzienbarend. Uit de interviews met artsen die in het kader van het onderzoek werden gehouden kwam naar voren dat in ongeveer 12% van de ruim 140.000 jaarlijkse sterfgevallen in Nederland een beslissing om de patiënt diep te sederen of in coma te houden aan het overlijden vooraf ging. In de grote meerderheid van die gevallen (10% van de sterfgevallen) werd vervolgens afgezien van het toedienen van voeding en/of vocht. Slechts in 23% van alle gevallen meenden artsen dat de beslissing tot sedatie, eventueel gevolgd door de beslissing af te zien van vochttoediening, geen levensbekortend effect had gehad, in 26% van de gevallen werd dit effect geschat op meer dan een week, in 2% zelfs op meer dan zes maanden.

Leeftijdsdiscriminatie, bestaat dat? Over leeftijdsgrenzen in de gezondheidszorg.

SamenvattingJanuari 1990. De cardiologen van drie Nederlandse transplantatiecentra (Rotterdam, Utrecht en Groningen) stellen in een gezamenlijk protocol dat mensen van 55 jaar en ouder niet meer in aanmerking komen voor een harttransplantatie. De noodzaak tot selectie komt voort uit de schaarste aan donororganen; de keuze voor een leeftijdsgrens uit de overweging dat jongeren van de ingreep langer profijt zullen hebben.

Hobbes, Locke, and Spinoza. §§ 4.1-4.2

Chapter 4 traces the development of the notion of the social contract in the thinking of Hobbes and Locke, and looks at the way in which Spinoza attempted to resolve political and religious pluralism. With the theories of Hobbes and Locke, modern legal philosophy developed two different versions of the social-contract model as legitimation of state and law. They both put the individual at the centre of their political theories. The social contract serves here as metaphor for the view that an individual is bound to a central authority only if he could have voluntarily agreed to it. In the case of both philosophers, this leads to a narrow account of legal morality: the law should restrict itself to safeguarding the conditions for fair and peaceful coexistence, and refrain from enforcing ideals of moral perfection. The difference between Hobbes and Locke lies primarily in the fact that Hobbes bases his argument on a completely amoral point of view: the self-interest of the individual man in light of his instinct for survival. Locke, on the other hand, adopts a moral perspective: the right to freedom of an individual. These different points of departure lead to dissimilar views of the role of the state. While Hobbes emphasises the importance of law and order, Locke also advocates freedom. Hobbes propagates an absolutist state, aimed at the maintenance of order so as to pacify the imminent war of all against all. Locke arrives at a liberal constitutional state which in a neutral manner has to protect the freedom and property rights of everyone. Spinoza, in his turn, attempts to overcome the pluralism in worldviews by showing that at their core all worldviews boil down to the same. Differing from Hobbes, and closer to Locke, Spinoza contends that the granting of freedom not only does not harm public peace, but is essential for the thriving of piety and for securing public peace.