G. Glas

Idem, Ipse, and Loss of the Self

THE CASE HISTORIES of Dr. Wells and the comments on them require first of all more conceptual clarity. In this article I will first introduce, with Paul Ricoeur, a distinction between idem identity and ipse identity. Then, I will discuss the merits and pitfalls of applying narrative theory to pathologies of the self. Behind the discussion on the breakdown of narrative unity, deep questions loom, most notably about conceivability and meaning of the notion of breakdown of self-relatedness as such; and about the moral basis for clinical action given the lack of a self to treat. These questions amount to the acknowledgment of a normative component in the concept of self and personhood, which can not be accounted for by idem identity solely.

Churchland, Kandel, and Dooyeweerd on the reducibility of mind states

This article is devoted to the conceptual analysis of two texts of leading scholars in cognitive neuroscience and its philosophy, Patricia Churchland and Eric Kandel. After a short introduction about the notion of reduction, I give a detailed account of the way both scientists view the relationship between theories about brain functioning on the one hand and consciousness and psychopathology, respectively, on the other hand. The analysis not only reveals underlying philosophical mind/brain conceptions and their inner tensions, but also the conceptual relevance of distinctions that are fundamental in the work of Dooyeweerd, such as the distinction between modes and entities, between law and subject and between subject function and object function. After a brief clarification of the way these distinctions function in Dooyeweerd’s theory of the body as an ‘enkaptic structural whole’, I try to explain how the conceptual framework, developed here, could be applied to brain functioning and leads to greater clarity in neuroscientific theorizing.

Philosophical aspects of neurobiological research on anxiety and anxiety disorders

Purpose of review Neurobiological research literature on anxiety and anxiety disorders of the previous year (April 2003-June 2004) is investigated from the perspective of four conceptual questions: (1) is pathological anxiety an animal, a human or a layered phenomenon with aspects of both? (2) Is anxiety a unitary or a nonunitary phenomenon? (3) What is the relationship between different aspects, or ‘components’, of anxiety? (4) What is the relationship between scientific and clinical concepts of anxiety? Recent findings These questions are investigated in research papers in the areas of fear conditioning, delineation of neural pathways underlying aspects of anxiety (and anxiety disorder), and developmental plasticity. Most authors are inclined to a view in which both animal and human aspects are recognized and combined in some way (ad 1). Investigators are predominantly inclined to a nonunitary view, against the background model of multiple overlapping brain circuits (ad 2). The language of causal interaction between reified subsystems is avoided, leaving undiscussed the issue of the unity of brain functioning and the relationship of neural function and subjective experience (ad 3). The dominant framework seems to be noneliminative physicalist. There is a widely acknowledged conceptual gap between clinical and scientific understanding; however, newer methodologies enable a broader understanding, by taking into account that environmental factors play an important role in brain development and that study of regional circuitry is needed above study of neural loci (ad 4). Summary There is a paucity of papers on purely conceptual issues. The rich phenomenology of anxiety should serve as an incentive to deeper understanding. Conceptual rigor and refinement may have an important impact upon fundamental empirical research.

Dimensions of the self in emotion and psychopathology: Consequences for self-management in anxiety and depression

Abstract:In the emerging literature on self-management within psychiatry the role of emotion is still hardly addressed. This article describes a conceptual framework that elucidates how emotions can inform strategies for improving self-management. The first section describes four different ways of speaking about the self in psychopathology: in terms of self-relatedness, self-referentiality, self-awareness, and self-interpretation. The following section focuses on emotion by addressing its self-referential features. These features play a pivotal role in self-management. The next section argues that the evaluation of emotion appeals to an implicit normative framework, which enables us to distinguish between realistic and non-realistic references to the self and the situation. What follows is a section devoted to the layeredness of emotions in the context of psychopathology. It will be argued that a further distinction is needed to make sense of this layeredness, i.e. between primary self-referentiality (immediate referring to an aspect of the self); secondary self-referentiality (implicit self-referring in the way the patient deals with her emotions and moods); and tertiary self-referentiality (self-referring in the way the relation to these emotions and moods has become internalized). Insights into the interplay between these forms of self-referentiality can be put to use in strategies of self-management.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY. A REFORMATION PERSPECTIVE

No question seems more intensely bound up with the search for the ultimate meaning and significance of existence than the question of man. In the rush of daily life people are inclined to by-pass the question — until illness or accident befalls them or the suffering of others becomes inescapable fact. It is not without reason that the question of man, of who he is, arises in situations where, in one way or another, evil is manifest. That’s how it was when history began, when the first human couple hid, revealing awareness of themselves — naked and vulnerable for each other and towards the Creator. That’s how it still is today, when people find that ‘ordinary folk’ are capable of hating and killing one another.

Heeft Het Theïsme Eigen Gronden? Alvin Plantinga Over de ‘Proper Basicality’ van Religieus Geloof

The title of this article is ambiguous in the sense that it may direct the attention to either (a) theism as a system of beliefs of persons who are referring to particular facts that serve as external grounds for the foundation of theist beliefs (the foundationalist approach) or (b) to theism as a system of beliefs of persons who are convinced of theism’s truth on grounds that are intrinsic to their belief (the Pascalian approach). Traces of both conceptions of theism can be found in Alvin Plantinga’s thesis of the ‛proper basicality’ of religious belief, for instance in the distinction between evidence of the ‛on the basis of …’- type and evidence of the ‛inclination’- type. However, these two types of evidence do only lead to doxastic experience. In order to be warranted with respect to a particular knowledge claim, beliefs must be produced by noetic capacities that function properly, i.e. according to their design plan and in contexts that are appropriate to these capacities. This externalist epistemology exerts its greatest power in the criticism of the ‛evidentialist objection to belief in God’. However, it raises a number of objections with respect to its positive account of theism. When every community of thinkers creates its own relevant set of examples in order to establish criteria of proper basicality, does this not lead to skepticism? And, can doxastic experience not be honoured as a proper response to being called by divine discourse and, correspondingly, be seen as the relational foundation of theist belief?

Leegte en autisme

SamenvattingIn de psychiatrische praktijk wordt het begrip leegte meestal in verband gebracht met borderline-persoonlijkheidsproblematiek of met depressie. In dit artikel betrekken de auteurs het begrip leegte echter op de structuur van de autistische ervaring. Vanuit een fenomenologie van de autistische tijdsbeleving wordt het begrip leegte in verband gebracht met het onvermogen om zich op een betekenisvolle wijze af te stemmen op de wereld. Deze stelling wordt geïllustreerd aan de hand van een vignet.Emptiness and autismIn clinical practice, the term emptiness is usually associated with a borderline personality disorder or major depression. In this paper, the authors explore whether and how emptiness relates to autism. By approaching time experience in people with autism from a phenomenological point of view, the concept of emptiness can be explained in terms of an impaired ability to adequately attune to the world. This hypothesis is illustrated by a vignette.

PERSONS AND THEIR LIVES REFORMATIONAL PHILOSOPHY ON MAN, ETHICS, AND BEYOND

My view on what I see as the predicament of Christian philosophy in ethics has been shaped by a number of experiences. I will first share with you some of these experiences, to give you an impression of the background against which this article has been written.

Emotie, neurobiologie en de toekomst van de psychotherapie

De sterke groei van de cognitieve neurowetenschap raakt ook de psychotherapie als professie. Hoe verhoudt de toenemende kennis over neuronale processen zich tot de psychotherapeutische praktijk? Omdat deze vraag de grondslagen van de psychotherapie raakt, wordt eerst een schets gegeven van de relatie tussen wetenschappelijke kennis en professionaliteit. Vervolgens wordt aan de hand van het werk van Damasio en LeDoux ingegaan op de betekenis van neurowetenschappelijk onderzoek voor het begrijpen van emoties en van het psychotherapeutische proces. Die betekenis kan worden samengevat in een aantal termen: erkenning van de betekenis van embodiment, van de gelaagdheid van emoties en van de betekenis van het innerlijk en de fantasie. Daarnaast suggereert neurowetenschappelijk onderzoek dat er grenzen zijn aan de veranderbaarheid. Aan het slot van het artikel wordt gesteld dat de potentieel reductionistische implicaties van neurowetenschappelijk onderzoek de psychotherapeut er niet van moeten weerhouden met de neurowetenschapper een constructieve dialoog aan te gaan.

IS DOOYEWEERD A PANENTHEIST? -COMMENTS ON FRIESEN'S '95 THESES ON HERMAN DOOYEWEERD'

What is the purpose of Friesen’s 95 theses and what is the audience he has in mind? The title refers to a major church historical event and suggests that — like in 1517 — we are dealing with a concise statement of a new and radical doctrine that is unfolded in opposition to an established canon. But who is the opponent in this case? What is the established canon that is rejected? And what is new or radical in the summary? Dooyeweerd’s philosophy was definitely new and radical at the time of its conception. It still has an enormous potential for the special sciences. It offers important resources for any (transcendental) critique of ‘immanence’ philosophies. However, on first reading and without knowledge of the context, Friesen does not seem to aim at offering a new or radical interpretation of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. I read the 95 theses as an attempt to wipe off the dust, to provide the overall picture, doing justice to aspects that (maybe) were neglected or (maybe) were wrongly understood in the reformational tradition. However, the audience he has in mind seems to be one that is already familiar with the basic concepts and the thrust of Dooyeweerdian thinking; not an audience that is opposed to reformational philosophical thinking, but one that might be helped by a succinct summary in order to encourage further study and discussion.