G.J.M. Otten

Compromise values in cooperative game theory

SummaryThe aim of this paper is to give a survey on several well-known compromise values in cooperative game theory and its applications. Special attention is paid to the τ-value for TU-games, the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems, and the compromise value for NTU-games.

Characterizations of a Game Theoretical Cost Allocation Method

In the 1930s the Tennessee Valley Authority developed several methods to allocate the costs of multipurpose water projects. One of these methods is the alternate cost avoided method. This paper provides two characterizations of the alternate cost avoided method, one on a class of cost games with a fixed player set, the other on a class of cost games with a variable player set using a reduced game property.

IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFECTIVITY FUNCTIONS BY GAME CORRESPONDENCES

Effectivity functions, introduced by Moulin and Peleg (1982), describe the power distribution among a group of people. In this paper we discuss an implementation of upper cycle free effectivity functions by special game correspondences, called claim game correspondences. The idea of claim game correspondences is derived from Borm and Tijs (1989) who introduced strategic claim games corresponding to NTU-games. We show that these claim game correspondences are tight and furthermore, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the effectivity function such that it coincides with the α- and β-effectivity function of the associated claim game correspondence. Finally we establish relationships between solution concepts for effectivity functions and solution concepts of the associated claim game correspondences.