G. R. Berridge

Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger

Preface Acknowledgements Introduction Machiavelli G.R.Berridge Guicciardini G.R.Berridge Grotius G.R.Berridge Richelieu G.R.Berridge Wicquefort M.Keens-Soper Callieres M.Keens-Soper Satow T.G.Otte Nicolson T.G.Otte Kissinger T.G.Otte Index

Machiavelli: human nature, good faith, and diplomacy

Machiavelli believed that diplomacy, unlike military service, was of no significance for civic virtue, and that in foreign policy it was no substitute for arms and money. Nevertheless, it enhanced the virtu of even the strongest prince. It was for this and other reasons that Machiavelli also believed that the good faith on which negotiation depends was generally observed. His view that promises need not outlast the conditions that produce them is an escape clause that is equally necessary. Machiavelli does not deserve the charge, laid at his door by Harold Nicolson, of corrupting the art of diplomacy.

Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III

It was believed at the Sublime Porte during the early modern period, at least intermittently, that participation in the European balance of power was useful and perhaps sometimes even essential to the security of the Ottoman Empire, not least because of its virtually permanent military conflict with Shi’ite Persia. For their part the states of Europe were inclined to see Turkey as even more important to their own security, as well as providing valuable opportunities for trade.1 The Porte’s religious hostility to Europe was also by no means completely fanatical and, as is widely acknowledged, cultural toleration was a hallmark of the Empire. Furthermore, while communications between the Levant and Europe were generally slow and sometimes insecure they were by no means impossible.2 These were the key circumstances that provided both incentives and opportunity for the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the diplomatic system of Europe.

The counter-revolution in diplomacy and other essays

The Counter-Revolution in Diplomacy The Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Rome to Constantinople Diplomatic Education and Training: The British tradition A Political Consul in Nineteenth Century Armenia Specific Reciprocity and the 105 Soviet Spies Home or Away? Diplomacy after Death British Ambassadors and their Families in Constantinople Communicating with the Orient before the Twentieth Century Wartime Embassies

The Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Rome to Constantinople

It appears to have been about the middle of the eighteenth century before the term ‘diplomatic corps’ was used to refer to the body of diplomats resident in one capital and about the same time before the corporate existence of these envoys — by any name — was remarked upon in a general work on diplomacy.1 It was even later before individual courts began to issue diplomatic lists and thereby crystallize the group by formally identifying the boundaries of its membership.2 Nevertheless, according to Garrett Mattingly, the diplomatic corps originated in Rome a full three centuries earlier.3 This essay will begin by elaborating briefly on this but proceed swiftly to an emphasis on the development of the diplomatic corps in Ottoman Constantinople, especially during the early seventeenth century. Here many special circumstances caused the resident envoys to close ranks (however reluctantly in some cases), and it would be surprising if this did not strengthen the development of the diplomatic corps in the European states system as a whole. This is because vigorous and influential men were drawn to Constantinople, and many of them presumably took the lessons they learnt there to other posts.

South Africa, the colonial powers and "African defence" : the rise and fall of the white entente, 1948-60

List of Appendices - List of Acronyms - Acknowledgements - Introduction - Dreaming of a White Alliance, 1948-9 - Reluctantly to the Middle East, 1949-51 - The Cloak of Multilateralism, 1949-54 - The Churchill Factor, 1951-4 - The Simonstown Agreements, 1955 - Louw versus Erasmus, 1955-6 - The Hollowing of the Entente, 1957-60 - Conclusion - Appendices - Notes - Index

The Foreign Ministry

It is difficult to find a state today that does not have, in addition to a diplomatic service, a ministry dedicated to its administration and direction. This is usually known as the ministry of foreign affairs or, for short, foreign ministry. It is easy to forget that this ministry came relatively late onto the scene. In fact, its appearance in Europe post-dated the arrival of the resident diplomatic mission by nearly three centuries. This chapter will begin by looking briefly at the origins and development of the foreign ministry, and then examine its different roles.

Economic and Commercial Diplomacy

Economic diplomacy, narrowly defined, is concerned with international economic policy questions, such as how to preserve global financial stability without indefensible levels of youth unemployment and unmanageable levels of wholly defensible levels of civil unrest; and how to stimulate economic growth, particularly in the poorest countries, while arresting or at least slowing down climate change. Commercial diplomacy, on the other hand, consists mainly of assistance to the promotion of exports and foreign direct investment (FDI), and access to raw materials. This chapter will show how modern diplomacy was influenced by commerce from its earliest days, but how the priority given to economic as well as commercial diplomacy has risen more in recent years. What is the role of foreign ministries and especially embassies in this work, and how are the latter set up to cope with its varied demands? These are the questions guiding the remainder of the chapter.

Cooper, A. F., Heine, J., and Thakur, R. (Eds.) (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy

This sprawling work contains almost a thousand pages and 49 chapters, almost all extensively endnoted; it weighs a fraction under 4lbs 2oz (1.9 kilos). To call it a handbook, therefore, is stretching matters a bit. It certainly has a few sparkling essays but most are at best workmanlike. Apart from its bulk, however, the most immediately striking feature of this work is its uncertain structure. It begins with an “Introduction” by the three editors; so far so good, in principle. But then we have an entire Part I devoted to “Setting the Scene,” that is, a further introduction by another name. In this the three editors now go their separate ways, as if each were writing a minority report on the nominal introduction. Part II focuses on “The Main Actors” and Part III on “Modes of Practice,” so we are back on track. But then the editors lose their way again and the OUP’s own editor is evidently out to lunch, for in Part IV we find that we are asked to consider “Tools and Instruments.” Passing over the troubled distinction between a “tool” and an “instrument,” what, I feel obliged to ask, is the difference between a diplomatic tool and/or instrument and a mode of diplomatic practice? No explanation is offered by the editors, which is hardly surprising, for the answer, obviously, is none. As a result, any essay in one part could have easily swapped places with one in the other without anyone noticing. The most glaring cases of this are the chapters on “Defence Diplomacy” in Part III (Modes of Practice) and “Economic Diplomacy” in Part IV (Tools and Instruments); the author of the first, the former commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army General Cheyre, actually concludes his essay by saying that defence diplomacy has “emerged as a key component within the 21st-century diplomatic toolkit” (p. 381, emphasis added). The plan does not get any better. Part V’s title is “Issue Areas” and that of the final part, Part VI, “Case Studies.” There is certainly an important distinction here, for there can and certainly should be case studies designed to test extant general propositions about issues—and the effectiveness of tools and/or instruments and/or modes of practice for that matter. Unfortunately, as was perhaps inevitable with a multi-authored

Otte, T. G. (2011). The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865–1914

A key point about this ambitious book is made on the first page, although only in a footnote. This is that the nineteenth century term “Foreign Office mind” which it employs means not only the outlook of the senior clerks at headquarters (with the permanent under-secretary at their apex) but also that of the diplomats serving abroad—despite the fact that the men playing these quite different roles occupied separate branches of the civil service until 1919 and that until the turn of the century there was little interchange between them. (The author’s approach thus stands in strong contrast to that of Zara Steiner, for example, in her long essay on “the Foreign Office view” which appeared in F. H. Hinsley’s edited collection British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey published by CUP in 1977, in which the Foreign Office meant just the senior clerks in “the Office.”) The broad focus of the book is better understood, therefore, as an analysis of the outlook of what the author alternatively calls the British “foreign policy-making élite.” Each of its six chapters is presented in chronological order and usefully follows the same pattern, beginning with an account of the members of the elite in the period in question and how they were chosen; then proceeding to an analysis of its attitude on the main issues of the day and its influence upon them. An awesome knowledge of the private thinking of the individuals concerned is marshalled, with the diplomats among them inevitably receiving more attention than the clerks, presumably because they were more numerous and wrote at greater length and because of the reasonable prima facie assumption that on policy on the bilateral relationships in which they were planted they carried more weight. Professor Otte concludes that while different political generations brought different ingredients to the Foreign Office (FO) mind, these were no more than “nuances within a broader stream of continuity within foreign policy thinking.” In this stream the main elements were a tendency to be reactive rather than proactive, a concern for prestige, a marked insularity (especially in regard to the precepts of classic economic liberalism), an assumption of British supremacy in international affairs predicated on an equilibrium between the great powers that the FO