Gabriel J. Zanotti

Implications Of Machlup’S Interpretation Of Mises’S Epistemology

We argue that Fritz Machlup’s (1995) interpretation of Mises’s epistemology is at least as, if not more, plausible than Murray N. Rothbard’s (1957) interpretation. The implications of Machlup’s interpretation of Mises and of Austrian epistemology affect Austrians and non-Austrians in their academic interaction. Machlup’s interpretation shows that Austrian epistemology is well grounded in post-Popperian epistemology and that most criticisms of Austrian economics based on its aprioristic character are misplaced. Furthermore, Machlup’s interpretation provides us with a setting to rebuild the academic interaction between Austrians and non-Austrians that was characteristic of the early twentieth century.

The Epistemological Implications of Machlup's Interpretation of Mises's Epistemology

We argue that Machlups (1955) interpretation of Mises’s epistemology is at least, if not more, plausible than Rothbards (1957). The implications of Machlup’s interpretation of Mises and Austrian epistemology affect Austrians, non-Austrians and how they relate to each other. Machlup’s interpretation shows that Austrian’s epistemology is well grounded and that most criticisms of Austrian economics based on their aprioristic characteristic are misplaced. Furthermore, Machlup’s interpretation provides a potential road to re-built the academic interaction between Austrians and non-Austrians that was characteristic of the early twentieth century.

Filosofía de la ciencia y realismo: los límites del método

The purpose of this paper is to outline an important limit of the hypotheticaldeductive method for trying to solve the “realism/anti-realism” problem. In order to do it, I make a critical commentary on the “status questions” in the current philosophy of science, suggesting at the same time a line of research to be enhanced.