Gabriel Wollner

Critical notice of Aaron James,Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy

Nobody has offered such a comprehensive philosophical approach to trade. Nonetheless, Jamess approach does not succeed. First, we explore Jamess constructivist method, which does less work than he suggests. The second topic is Jamess take on the different ‘grounds’ of justice. We explore the shortcomings of approaches that focus exclusively on trade. Our third topic is why James thinks trade is such a ground. The fourth topic is how James argues for his proposed ‘structural equity.’ This proposal remains under-argued. Our fifth topic is to explore why structural equity would generate several specific principles. Finally, we discuss Jamess notion of autarky. Autarky sets the benchmark for Jamess ideas about how to divide gains of trade. We doubt that it can do so.

Three Images of Trade: On the Place of Trade in a Theory of Global Justice

Abstract Economic theory teaches that it is in every country’s interest to trade. Trade is a voluntary activity among consenting parties. On this view, considerations of justice have little bearing on trade, and political philosophers concerned with global justice should stay largely silent on trade. According to a very different view that has recently gained prominence, international trade can only occur before the background of an international market reliance practice shaped by states. Trade is a shared activity among states, and all participating states have in principle equal claims to gains from trade. Trade then becomes a central topic for political philosophers. Both views are problematic. A third view about the role of trade in a theory of global justice is then presented, which gives pride of place to a (non-Marxian) notion of exploitation. The other two views should be abandoned.

Egalitarianism, Numbers and the Dreaded Conclusion

Some contractualist egalitarians try to accommodate a concern for numbers by embracing a pluralist strategy. They incorporate the belief that the number of people affected matters for what distribution one ought to bring about by arguing that their primary contractualist concern for justifiability to each may be outweighed by aggregative considerations. The present contribution offers two arguments against such a pluralist strategy. First, I argue that advocates of the pluralist strategy are forced to abandon the rationale behind the criterion of universal acceptability. Second, I show that pluralist contractualists will be unable to avoid the dreaded conclusion that originally motivated their contractualism. Ultimately, these arguments matter for the nature of egalitarianism. They should give those in search of sound distributive principles a reason to make sense of their egalitarian commitment in a non-contractualist way. If a sound set of distributive principles includes comparative and relational principles, while contractualist egalitarianism does not lend itself to being pluralistically combined with non-individualist principles, telic egalitarianism may after all be part of the truth in distributive ethics.