Gabriela Borz

Models of Party Democracy : Patterns of Party Regulation in Post-War European Constitutions

This article investigates the ways in which political parties are codified in modern democratic constitutions, providing a unique cross-sectional and longitudinal overview of the patterns of party constitutionalization in post-war Europe. Although the constitutions of western liberal democracies traditionally have paid little attention to the role of parties, evidence suggests that in contemporary democracies, both old and new, they are increasingly accorded a formal constitutional status. Little is known, however, about the substantive content of their constitutional position or about the normative connotations of their constitutional codification. In this article, we demonstrate that there is a clear correlation between the nature and the intensity of party constitutionalization and the newness and historical experience of democracy and that, with time, the constitutional regulation of the extra-parliamentary organization and the parties’ rights and duties has gained in importance at the expense of their parliamentary and electoral roles. The analysis furthermore suggests that three distinct models of party constitutionalization can be identified – Defending Democracy, Parties in Public Office, and Parties as Public Utilities – each of which is related to a particular conception of party democracy.

Aggregation and Representation in the European Parliament Party Groups

While members of the European Parliament are elected in national constituencies, their votes are determined by the aggregation of MEPs in multinational party groups. The uncoordinated aggregation of national party programmes in multinational EP party groups challenges theories of representation based on national parties and parliaments. This article provides a theoretical means of understanding representation by linking the aggregation of dozens of national party programmes in different EP party groups to the aggregation of groups to produce the parliamentary majority needed to enact policies. Drawing on an original data source of national party programmes, the EU Profiler, the article shows that the EP majorities created by aggregating MEP votes in party groups are best explained by cartel theories. These give priority to strengthening the EP’s collective capacity to enact policies rather than voting in accord with the programmes they were nationally elected to represent.

Evaluating competing criteria for allocating parliamentary seats

In an established parliament any proposal for the allocation of seats will affect sitting members and their parties and is therefore likely to be evaluated by incumbents in terms of its effects on the seats that they hold. This paper evaluates the Cambridge Compromise’s formula in relation to compromises between big and small states that have characterised the EU since its foundation. It also evaluates the formula by the degree to which the Compromise departs from normative standards of equality among citizens and its distribution of seats creates more anxiety about the risks of losses as against hypothetical gains. These political criteria explain the objections to the Cambridge Compromise. However, the pressure to change the allocation of seats is continuing with EU enlargement and the arbitrary ceiling of 751 seats imposed by the Lisbon Treaty.

What Determines Demand for European Union Referendums

Abstract Notwithstanding elite opposition to referendums as inconsistent with theories of representative democracy, the 27-nation European Election Study finds that 63 per cent of EU citizens want a vote on EU treaties. One explanation is that the majority want more popular participation in politics; another is that referendums are demanded by those negative about the performance of their governors at national and EU levels; a third is that demand is higher where referendums are part of the national context. Multi-level statistical analysis shows greater support for the hypotheses that citizens dissatisfied with government performance are more likely to want referendums to check their governors and that national context matters. However, dissatisfied EU citizens are a minority; most who endorse EU referendums are actually pro-EU. This lowers the risk of defeat if the EU consulted its citizens in a pan-European referendum.

Institutional stimuli and individual response as explanations of turnout: the 2009 EP election

This article sets out a social psychological theory of voting behaviour that integrates stimuli from institutions; perceptions of stimuli from such institutions as the media and government; and individual predispositions to respond. It thus clarifies the confusion caused in the classic Michigan model, which treats perceptions as individual attributes without regard to institutional stimuli. Multi-level statistical analysis of turnout at the 2009 European Parliament election shows that, after controlling for individual predispositions, institutional stimuli have a substantial effect on behaviour both contextually and by shaping individual perceptions.

Organizational and ideological strategies for nationalization: evidence from European parties

How does a partys organizational structure affect its chances of becoming a national party? While existing explanations of party nationalization focus on country-level institutional and societal variables, we argue that aspects of party organization such as the degree of centralization of authority, ideological unity and leadership factionalism are very important. By bringing the analysis to the party level, this article provides a multilevel analysis of institutional and party organization variables and disentangles the effect of each set of influences. We use original data on party organization and party nationalization for 142 parties across 20 European countries. We bring a significant contribution to the literature on nationalization and party development by advancing organizational strategies which parties could adopt in different social and institutional environments.

Justifying the constitutional regulation of political parties: A framework for analysis

What are the main reasons behind the regulation of political parties by contemporary constitutional practices? This article presents a framework for analysis which identifies types of justifications and actors involved in the process of regulation and their further influence on the outcomes of constitutionalisation. The empirical focus is on the revelatory case of Luxembourg, which amended the constitution for the sole reason of giving parties constitutional status. The analysis suggests that the constitutional regulation of political parties depends on their current interests and power status. Additionally, the paper draws attention to the involvement of external actors and to the changing nature of contemporary constitutionalism.

Contemporary trends in party organization: revisiting intra-party democracy

Party organization has regained a new momentum in the party literature over the past decade. In this context, we review the most important advances in the literature and critically examine issues such as: the link between party organization literature and organizational theory literature, party organization and intra-party democracy, and between party organization on paper and in reality. We ascertain the need for more conceptual clarifications in the field and raise questions for debate. We further outline the contribution of this special issue to the theme of intra-party democracy in representative democracies.