Gaetano Fiorin

Person Features and Pronominal Anaphora

This article aims at clarifying the role of person at the interface between syntax and the interpretive systems. We argue that first person interpretations of third person pronouns (de se readings) stem from the option of leaving the referential index underspecified on the pronoun, thus accounting for the interplay of this phenomenon with the anaphoric usage of first person indexicals (pronoun shifting) and logophoric pronouns. The results include proposals on the connection between the semantics of first person and the syntax of the left periphery, a neo-Davidsonian treatment of the semantics of first person indexicals, and a novel view of pronominal anaphora according to which Higginbothams (1983) asymmetric relation of linking involves a mechanism of -role inheritance tied to the semantics of first person.

Immunity to Error through Misidentification and (Direct and Indirect) Experience Reports

In this contribution, we address the issues concerning the semantic value of Wittgenstein’s subject “I”, as in (i) “I have a toothache”, resulting from the use of predicates that involve first-person knowledge of the mental states to which they refer. As is well-known, these contexts give rise to the phenomenon of ‘immunity to error through misidentification’ (IEM): the utterer of (i) cannot be mistaken as to whether he is the person having a toothache. We provide a series of arguments in favor of a principled distinction between a de facto IEM, grounded in perceptual and proprioceptive judgments, and a de iure IEM, grounded in experience reports whereby the experience wears the experiencer on its sleeve. From this perspective, the no-referent account of subject “I” advocated by Wittgenstein/Anscombe is correct. In fact, we show how this analysis can be made compatible with a Kaplanian account of first-person indexicals, by identifying the speaker in the context of utterance with the person who has access to the reported private experience.

Difficulties in Comprehending Affirmative and Negative Sentences: Evidence From Chinese Children With Reading Difficulties:

Recent experimental results suggest that negation is particularly challenging for children with reading difficulties. This study looks at how young poor readers, speakers of Mandarin Chinese, comprehend affirmative and negative sentences as compared with a group of age-matched typical readers. Forty-four Chinese children were tested with a truth value judgment task. The results reveal that negative sentences were harder to process than affirmative ones, irrespective of the distinction between poor and typical readers. Moreover, poor readers performed worse than typical readers in comprehending sentences, regardless of whether they were affirmative or negative sentences. We interpret the results as (a) confirming the two-step simulation hypothesis, based on the result that the difficulty in processing negation has a general validity (persisting in pragmatically felicitous contexts), and (b) disconfirming that negation, as far as behavioral data are concerned, can be used as a reliable linguistic predictor of reading difficulties.

Where syntax meets pragmatics: varieties of de se and control structures

Abstract In this contribution, we offer an original analysis of the relation between control structures, de se readings and Immunity to Error through Misidentification. We propose that control structures are the result of an operation of Thematic Overwriting (TO), which conflates two thematic roles into one and delivers a logical representation whereby two properties are predicated of a unique argument. The account we propose explains a number of facts concerning control structures: (i) The fact that control structures are bound to the expression of de se attitudes; (ii) that fact that some control structures – more precisely, those control structures involving an Experiencer subject – are bound to the expression of implicit de se attitudes, that is, de se propositional attitudes that are immune to error through misidentification; (iii) the contrast between optional and non-optional control; (iv) the contrast between partial and exhaustive control. The account we propose also predicts a diachronic constraint on the emergence of control structures, whereby TO first emerges in the context of implicit de se attitudes and only later is extended to other de se contexts. This prediction is supported by the attested development of control structures from Old English (OE) through early Modern English (ENE) and Middle English (ME) to Modern English.

No evidence for cerebellar abnormality in adults with developmental dyslexia

Developmental dyslexia is commonly believed to result from a deficiency in the recognition and processing of speech sounds. According to the cerebellar deficit hypothesis, this phonological deficit is caused by deficient cerebellar function. In the current study, 26 adults with developmental dyslexia and 25 non-dyslexic participants underwent testing of reading-related skills, cerebellar functions, and MRI scanning of the brain. Anatomical assessment of the cerebellum was conducted with voxel-based morphometry. Behavioural evidence, that was indicative of impaired cerebellar function, was found to co-occur with reading impairments in the dyslexic subjects, but a causal relation between the two was not observed. No differences in local grey matter volume, nor in structure–function relationships within the cerebellum were found between the two groups. Possibly, the observed behavioural pattern is due to aberrant white matter connectivity. In conclusion, no support for the cerebellar deficit hypothesis or the presence of anatomical differences of the cerebellum in adults with developmental dyslexia was found.

The semantics of person and de se effects in free indirect discourse

In this contribution we will address the main puzzling empirical issues that have been formulated around Free Indirect Discourse (FID): the constraints on the use of first person pronouns and of proper names (as well as of definite descriptions), the reasons why different grammatical features (person, gender, number) give rise to presuppositions that must be resolved at different levels of interpretation in FID, the factors that account for the observation that person and tense behave similarly in FID. At the same time, we will also discuss the main controversies to which the ongoing debate on FID has given rise in the literature, showing that Schlenker (Mind Lang 19(3):279–304, 2004)’s distinction between a Context of Thought (CT) and a Context of Utterance (CU) still provides a fundamentally valid insight into the nature of FID, in spite of many qualifications that are necessary and some well-motivated criticism. However, our main task here is more ambitious than simply taking a stand on the many unsettled controversies surrounding FID. In fact, we claim that Schlenker’s split between CU and CT can be derived in a principled way from the inner nature of FID as a linguistic process of ‘phenomenal identification’, whereby a Higher Experiencer attempts at reproducing (at a distinct time) the phenomenal experience proper to a Lower Experiencer. This distinction between qualitatively identified but numerically distinct experiences provides the conceptual basis for the derivation of virtually all remarkable properties of FID (including its somehow intermediate status between Direct and Indirect Discourse), while connecting, at the same time, with some intriguing semantic properties of first-person pronouns, such as the different varieties of de se readings.