Gail Fine

On Ideas—Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms

The Peri ideon (On Ideas) is the only work in which Aristotle systematically sets out and criticizes arguments for the existence of Platonic forms. Gail Fine presents the first full-length treatment in English of this important but neglected work . She asks how, and how well, and why and with what justification he favours an alternative metaphysical scheme. She also examines the significance of the Peri ideon for some central questions about Platos theory of forms - whether, for example, there are forms corresponding to every property or only to some, then to which ones; whether forms are universals, particulars, or both; and whether they are meanings, properties, or both. In addition to discussing the Peri ideon and its sources in Platos dialogues, Fine also provides a general discussion of Platos theory of forms, and of our evidence about the date, scope, and aims of the Peri ideon. While she pays careful attention to the details of the text, she also relates the issues to current philosophical concerns. The book will be valuable for anyone interested in metaphysics ancient or modern.

Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's 'Types of Definition in the Meno'

According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno’s paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn’t conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno’s paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.

Plato and Aristotle on Form and Substance

Plato and Aristotle give different answers to the question ‘What are the substances ( ousiai )?’. One way Aristotle defends his answer is by arguing that his candidate substances – particulars such as Socrates or Callias – better satisfy the criteria for substance than do Platos candidates – eternal, unchanging, nonsensible universals called ‘Forms’. This defense goes along with another. For Aristotle disagrees with Plato, not only about the candidates, but also about the criteria, for substance: one reason Plato fastens on to the wrong candidates is that he focuses on some of the wrong criteria. Aristotle mounts his defense in different ways in the Categories and Metaphysics . In both works he defends the priority of particulars. In the Cat ., however, their nature is left unanalysed; and their priority is defended largely by appeal to unPlatonic criteria. In the Met ., by contrast, Aristotle analyzes particulars into compound, form, and matter. Socrates, for example, may be viewed as a compound of his form (his soul) and his matter (his body); or he may be viewed as his form or soul. Further, Aristotle now invokes additional, Platonic criteria for substance; and this leads him to argue that it is Socrates as form that counts as primary substance; the primary substances are individual forms.

The Object of Thought Argument: Forms and Thoughts

In Metaphysics A 9, Aristotle mentions several Platonic arguments for the existence of Forms. The arguments, along with Aristotles criticisms of them, were set out in detail in Aristotles Pen Ideon, portions of which are preserved in Alexanders commentary on Metaph A 9. In this paper I examine one of these arguments, the Object of Thought argument (OT). I also examine Aristotles objections to OT and its Platonic sources. Aristotle alleges that Plato argued for the existence of Forms based on considerations about thinking (νοεΐν). He levels two familiar criticisms against the argument: first, that if it generated any Forms at all, it would generate them in cases where the Platonists do not want them in particular, for perishable particulars and for fictional entities; and, second, that the argument is anyway invalid, and so does not generate any Forms at all. I shall suggest that the argument Aristotle records can be read in a variety of ways. On all of its readings, the argument is invalid; but it generates too many Forms only on some of its readings. On those readings, Plato is uncommitted to the conclusion of the argument. On other readings, Plato may accept both the premisses and conclusion of the argument; but since he does not infer the conclusion from those premisses (alone), he does not reason invalidly, at least not in the way Aristotle describes. Though Plato is thus invulnerable to Aristotles objections, we should not conclude too hastily that Aristotle is simply confused or unfair. For showing that Plato is not vulnerable to his objections takes some work; Aristotle forces us to draw distinctions that may be implicit in the dialogues, but that Plato is not himself always careful to draw explicitly.

The ‘Two Worlds’ Theory in the Phaedo

ABSTRACT At least in some dialogues, Plato has been thought to hold the so-called Two Worlds Theory (TW), according to which there can be belief but not knowledge about sensibles, and knowledge but not belief about forms. The Phaedo is one such dialogue. In this paper, I explore some key passages that might be thought to support TW, and ask whether they in fact do so. I also consider the related issue of whether the Phaedo argues that, if knowledge is possible at all, we can have it only when discarnate.

Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato

Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato. By Katja Maria Vogt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 224. ISBN: 978-0-19-991681-8.