Gamal Atallah

Indirect patent citations

Patent citations are extensively used as a measure of patent quality. However, counting citations does not account for the fact that citations come from patents of different qualities, and that citations are of variable qualities. We develop a citation index which takes into account the cumulative quality of the citing patents. We apply this index to the 2,139,314 utility patents granted in the U.S. between 1975 and 1999. We study the properties of this index by year and by technological category, and analyse the links between patents.

US Foreign Affiliates, Technology Diffusion and Host Country Human Development: Human Development Index versus Human Capital

In this study, we use a cross-sectionally correlated and timewise autoregressive model and panel data for the period 1966–2000 to investigate human development as a measure of host country absorptive capacity in 30 developed and developing countries. The results suggest that technology diffusion from US foreign affiliates has a positive and significant impact on labor productivity only if host countries have a minimum level of human development. This condition may partially explain why previous studies show mixed support for the hypothesis that foreign affiliates have a positive effect on productivity in developing countries. Although the results have to be interpreted with caution, the policy implication is that human development enhances the capacity of countries to reap the benefits of foreign direct investments.

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.

The Protection of Innovations

This paper proposes a model where firms invest in secrecy to limit technological spillovers accruing to their competitors, in addition to investing in cost-reducing R&D. The main result of the paper is that increases in spillovers increase secrecy, suggesting that legal and strategic protection are substitutes. Higher product differentiation is associated with higher levels of innovation and lower levels of secrecy. An increase in the size of the market, a reduction in the cost of secrecy,or a reduction in the cost of R&D, all lead to an increase in secrecy. As for the effect of spillovers on effective cost reduction, it is positive when products are sufficiently differentiated, and has an inverted-U shape with low product differentiation. Compared to price competition, quantity competition yield higher levels of R&D, secrecy and effective cost reduction.

DEFECTING FROM R&D COOPERATION

This paper introduces defection into the strategic RD and RJV cartelisation, where firms coordinate RD whereas under RJV cartelisation, defection always entails a decrease in RD they also increase with the size of the market, but decline with production costs and R&D costs. Moreover, the incentives for defection are higher under RJV cartelisation. With low spillovers under RJV cartelisation, a firm prefers to be subject to defection by the other firm, to not cooperating at all. Punishment for defection is considered, under the form of abstaining from information sharing.

Vertical Linkages and Innovation

It has long been suspected that the organization and ownership of firms could affect the innovation performance of industries in Canada by influencing economic incentives to generate new products and processes. This paper provides a general overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between the organization of firms and industries and their performance in terms of innovation. To this end, the paper examines the evidence of vertical linkages across the supply chain from the points of view of innovation, research and development collaboration, and knowledge flows. In doing so, the paper reviews the evidence on the effects of ownership and concentration, the importance of the nature of the vertical relationship between upstream and downstream firms, and the role played by appropriability and knowledge spillovers in the organization for the performance of innovation activities, among others. The paper also looks at the role of multinationals and the extent to which this type of organization benefits host countries in terms of innovation activities. Although no unifying policy conclusions emerge from this literature, the paper offers broad micro-economic policy recommendations such as the importance of good micro-economic policy for innovation activities, a sound micro-economic environment for research and skills development, and the importance of facilitating collaborative arrangements between firms in innovation related activities. Finally, the paper indicates that institutional differences between countries should be taken into consideration for the identification of comparative technological, organizational, and institutional advantages.

Migration and Democracy

This paper investigates the effect of democracy on migration using a dynamic panel model. Our model controls for the network effects of migration and country fixed effects. We construct a binary measure of democracy indicating a precise transition of political regimes and reducing measurement error. The baseline results show that democracy can increase migration by 29% in the long-run. Using the waves of democratizations and reversals as instruments for democracy, we find comparable estimates. Our findings suggest that democracy can increase migration by permitting dual citizenship, allowing sending remittances, providing better health, improving human development and human capital.

Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares

This paper studies the effect of differences in the rate of technological progress between sectors on the relative sizes of those sectors in terms of revenues. There are two sectors: a stagnant sector, where productivity does not change over time, and a progressive sector, where costs decrease over time due to exogenous technological progress. We consider a conjectural variation approach to competition in the progressive sector which encompasses perfect competition, Cournot oligopoly and monopoly. The main result of the paper is that the share of the stagnant sector increases over time when demand in the progressive sector is inelastic. Under perfect competition, when initial production costs in the progressive sector are sufficiently low (so that demand is inelastic), the share of the stagnant sector rises over time. Whereas, when initial production costs are sufficiently high (so that demand is elastic), the relative size of the stagnant sector is U-shaped with respect to time. Under monopoly, the share of the stagnant sector always decreases over time. However, the decline in that share is much more rapid the higher are initial costs in the progressive sector. The interaction of market structure and price elasticity (or initial costs) determines how the relative sizes of sectors differing in productivity growth evolve over time. The relationship with the cost disease literature is discussed.

Endogenous Efficiency Gains from Mergers with and without Product Differentiation

This paper analyzes endogenous efficiency gains from mergers. It considers oligopolistic homogeneous good markets and duopolistic and triopolistic markets under product differentiation (quantity and price competition). In a two-stage game, firms invest in cost-reducing innovation (with and without mergers) and then compete in output/prices. It is found that in homogeneous good markets, all possible mergers generate efficiency gains, and that these are most significant when spillovers are very low or very high. Efficiency gains increase with the number of insiders and generally decrease with the number of outsiders. With product differentiation, under quantity competition, and under price competition with outsiders to the merger, the merger generates efficiency gains when R&D spillovers and/or product differentiation are sufficiently high. Under price competition with a merger to monopoly, the merger induces efficiency gains except when spillovers are very low. With product differentiation, efficiency gains increase with R&D spillovers, but may increase or decrease with the level of product differentiation. Innovation incentives and the likelihood of efficiency gains are compared between quantity and price competition. The implications of the results for the relationship between competition and innovation outputs and for merger policy are discussed.