Gary Colbert

A multi-case investigation of a theory of the transfer pricing process

Abstract Drawing on published work by Williamson [Journal of Law and Economics (October 1979) pp. 233–261; The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985)], Spicer [Accounting, Organizations and Society (1988) pp. 302–322], and Walker [Interfaces (May–June 1988) pp. 62–73] this paper first develops a theory of the sourcing and transfer pricing process from a transaction costs perspective. The paper then reports on an empirical investigation of the theory using a multi-case research design involving internal transfers in four large, vertically integrated high-technology companies in the electronics industry in the U.S.A. The ways in which these firms manage internal transfers and set transfer prices are found to be positively related to the reported degree of transaction-specific investment (asset specificity) associated with each transfer and to the strategic importance of the transferred component and the nature of the component divisions production capabilities. Suggestions are made for future research.

THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION AND SUNSET REVIEWS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY LAWS: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Abstract The economic theory of regulation (ETR) holds that various groups will attempt to influence the regulatory process to promote their self-interest, and that politicians respond most favorably to those groups that can assist them in their careers. Prior research has used ETR to explain the variation in accounting regulations across states. This paper extends that work by examining, in depth, a recently completed sunset review process in one state. Various parties, including government officials, the State Board of Accountancy, the State Society of CPAs, and educators, were involved in this process. We conclude, as indicated by ETR, that the positions of these groups appear to be consistent with their respective self-interests. Also consistent with ETR, several factors suggest that the regulated profession (CPAs) has successfully captured the first level regulators (the State Board). In addition, we conclude that the political ideology of the governor was an important determinant of the sunset review’s outcome.

Do Colleges Get What They Pay For? Evidence on Football Coach Pay and Team Performance

We use a data set of Football Bowl Subdivision (Division-IA) universities to investigate the hypothesis that higher coach pay leads to improved team performance. Our analysis finds that pay and team performance are positively correlated and that, when schools change coaches, higher pay is associated with improved performance. The evidence suggests that additional rating points are increasingly valuable, perhaps over US

The Association between Auditor Quality and Auditor Size: An Analysis of Small CPA Firms

1 million for top teams. Our descriptive analysis reveals the median 2011 head coach pay of US

State Accountancy Regulations, Audit Firm Size, and Auditor Quality: An Empirical Investigation

1.2 million, significant increases over our 2006-2011 study period, and large disparities among schools and conferences. We conclude that administrators perceive highly ranked football teams have significant value.