Gary M. Pecquet

Special Versus General Elections and Composition of the Voters: Evidence From Louisiana School Tax Elections

Using Louisiana school board property tax elections from the past decade, the authors study the question of whether or not special elections tend to produce lower turnout and a greater percentage of yes votes than do general elections. With the problem focusing on the choice of voting yes, voting no, or abstaining from voting, modified minimum chi-square methods are used in the analysis. The authors find that opposition to local school taxes increases with turnout. They also find that turnout is affected by the size of the tax, by the presence or absence of other taxes on the ballot, and by the presence or absence of state or federal matters on the same ballot. Both the inclusion of state or federal issues (or candidates) on the ballot and a higher tax rate lead to increased relative opposition at the polls.

The effect of opening up ANWR to drilling on the current price of oil

The Effect of Opening up ANWR to Drilling on the Current Price of Oil R. Morris Coats and Gary M. Pecquet

A Fallacy in the ANWR Drilling Debate: A Lesson on Scarcity Rents and Intertemporal Pricing under Different Market Structures

It is common knowledge that oil discovered today, or that is newly allowed to be developed, has no effect on prices until reaching the market. However, economic theory does not support common knowledge on this issue. By lowering the value of holding oil for future sale, a future oil supply increase makes it more profitable for firms to produce and sell oil presently. Under three distinct market structures, we use a two-period model to show students that the resulting increase in present supply decreases the present price of oil. Production decisions in the absence of scarcity rents are also discussed.

The effects of voter mobility on agenda controllers

Concluding remarksThis paper has examined the effects of resident voter mobility upon the behavior of budget maximizing agenda controllers. From the restrictive model that was developed, the Pareto benefits of the migratory option have been discussed. They appear to be unambiguously positive.Agenda controllers, however, can increase their budgets with collusive, joint budget maximizing behavior. This is where the political constraints which involve the voter approval or agenda requirement becomes crucially important. The most restrictive constraint determines the equilibrium level for all communities.This politically feasible set, however, can also be altered by constitutional tax and/or spending limitations. These constitutional measures may also provide a method by which the public can control or regulate the excesses of agenda manipulation even in the migratory version of the model. Moreover, since a tax or spending referendum imposed upon the community with the most binding agenda constraint tends to force down the budgetary levels of all colluding communities; the case for further political subdivision and federalism might be strengthened. The features of public sector collusion among agenda controllers, the effects of tax and spending limits upon their behavior, and the implications of these factors upon the argument for federalism all deserve further study and analysis. This task will require a different formulation of the model.