Gavin Cassar

Money, money, money? A longitudinal investigation of entrepreneur career reasons, growth preferences and achieved growth

This paper longitudinally examines the relationship between the career reasons of nascent entrepreneurs, their growth preferences and subsequent growth achieved. The longitudinal design allows for examination and control of both survivorship and recall bias upon career reason and growth linkages. Substantial recall bias was observed in the career reasons of entrepreneurs, with the reported importance of self-realization and financial success, as explanations for entering venturing activity, being significantly lower when responses were obtained once the venture was operational. Consistent with economic motives, the importance that the entrepreneur places on financial success was a key determinant to explain cross-sectional differences in growth preferences of the entrepreneur, the intended size of the venture, and achieved growth. Further, the importance of financial success was robust to the use of both prospective and retrospective career reasons. While independence was the most important factor to explain the career choices of nascent entrepreneurs, independence was also found to be negatively associated with intended and achieved employment growth. Overall, the findings demonstrate that nascent entrepreneur career reasons for self-employment are not homogeneous, vary by growth intentions and preferences, and are associated with subsequent venture growth achieved.

Planning Behavior Variables in Small Firms

Much of the empirical data that identifies the incidence of planning in small firms and the variables associated with that planning is based on small samples subject to geographic and industry constraints. The intent of this article is to partially overcome those limitations by testing relationships using results from a large Australian‐wide, multiple‐period sample. For each of three years, the frequency with which firms maintained documented business plans was determined and tested for associations with a range of traditional “business structure” demographic variables and a group of “management structure” variables. Results support expectations that size, volume, training, intention to change operations, and the major decision‐maker’s education are positively associated with business planning. Results also indicate that a significant number of firms change planning behavior states over time.

Industry and Startup Experience on Entrepreneur Forecast Performance in New Firms

I theoretically develop and empirically investigate the role of industry and startup experience on the forecast performance of 2304 entrepreneurs who have started new businesses. Using the Kauffman Firm Survey I show that industry experience is associated with more accurate and less biased entrepreneur expectations. Further, the benefit of industry experience on entrepreneurial forecast performance is greater in high-technology industries. These findings are consistent with knowledge of the setting informing entrepreneurial decision making, especially in highly uncertain environments. However, in contrast to the prevailing view in the literature, I find no significant evidence that startup experience improves entrepreneurial forecast performance.

Does Self-Efficacy Affect Entrepreneurial Investment?

We empirically examine the effect of self-efficacy on entrepreneurial investment choices. We identify various attributes of entrepreneurial investment and argue that higher self-efficacy is associated with more aggressive entrepreneurial investment decisions. We show that self-efficacy increases the likelihood of being a nascent entrepreneur and creating an operating business. Self-efficacy also increases the proportion of personal wealth invested in the venture and the amount of hours per week the entrepreneur devotes to the venture. These results are significant even when controlling for other known characteristics associated with entrepreneurial investment. Copyright

Determinants of Hedge Fund Internal Controls and Fees

We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial mis-

Do Risk Management Practices Work? Evidence from Hedge Funds

We examine hedge fund risk management practices and their association with left-tail risk during the 2008 financial crisis. Consistent with risk management practices reducing left-tail risk, funds in our sample that use formal risk models performed significantly better in the extreme down months of 2008. We find no evidence that having either position limits or a dedicated head of risk management is associated with reduced left-tail risk. Funds employing value at risk models had more accurate expectations of how they would perform in a short-term equity bear market.

Explicit and Implicit Incentives: Longitudinal Evidence from NCAA Football Head Coaches Employment Contracts

We study the role of explicit and implicit incentives in a competitive labor market with no internal promotion opportunities. We find that explicit incentives explain only a small fraction of the total incentives, as the likelihood of new employment and renegotiation of current employment on better terms increases following good performance. We also find the likelihood of renegotiation relative to changing employment on better terms is dependent on the labor market forces. Our findings demonstrate the role of renegotiation and the relative strength of labor market forces compared to ex-ante pay-for-performance in the presence of strong external labor market incentives. Further, our results suggest that conclusions regarding the optimal use of explicit incentives in pay-for-performance may be substantially overstated when not considering implicit incentives from the labor market.

Academics vs. Athletics: Career Concerns for NCAA Division I Coaches

We analyze the promotions and firings of NCAA Division 1 college basketball and college football coaches to assess whether these coaches are rewarded for the academic performance of their players in promotion and retention decisions. We find that an increase in Academic Progress Rate, as measured by the NCAA, for a college team in either sport significantly reduces the probability that the coach is fired at the end of the season. We find little to no evidence that an increase in the Academic Progress Rate enhances the chances of advancement (in the form of outside job offers) for these coaches.

A Theory of Firm Objectives and Performance Based on Owner Heterogeneity

All firm performance measurement requires knowledge of or assumptions about the firm’s objectives. I provide a framework for the firm’s objective function based on the extent to which owners differ in the utility derived from alternative firm actions and outcomes. I theorize as owner utility heterogeneity increases, the less likely the firm will pursue actions to satisfy owners’ nonpecuniary preferences. This framework provides an important reconciliation between the theory of the entrepreneur and the theory of the firm by showing how firms evolve from maximizing the financial and nonpecuniary benefits of specific owners to focusing primarily on value maximization as the firm objective. Owner utility heterogeneity also provides a framework to evaluate firm performance, providing theoretical guidance on firm performance measurement for researchers and practitioners.