Genoveva Martí

General terms, rigidity and the trivialization problem

We defend the view that defines the rigidity of general terms as sameness of designated universal across possible worlds from the objection that such a characterization is incapable of distinguishing rigid from non-rigid readings of general terms and, thus, that it trivializes the notion of rigidity. We also argue that previous attempts to offer a solution to the trivialization problem do no succeed.

The Significance of the Distinction between Concept Mastery and Concept Possession

In this paper, Prof. Higginbotham invites us to tear apart three notions. On the one hand, he observes, it is possible to master a concept, i.e, to have a conception of something in ones mind that is complete and accurate, without that conception being conscious. Thus, our mastery of concepts, to use traditional terminology, may involve an implicit conception or a conscious one. On the other hand, he argues, it is possible to possess a concept and yet lack a conception that is complete and accurate (which, I submit, means that it is possible to possess a concept and have a conception associated to the concept in question which is incomplete or inaccurate). Thus, we need to distinguish possession of concepts from mastery. In these comments I will make a couple of essentially interpretive remarks and I will then move on to pose a question. First, what I think is a purely terminological clarification. As I read the paper, Prof. Higginbotham is claiming that it is possible to possess a concept, say for instance the concept CHAIR without hav-

Tolerance, flexibility and the application of kind terms

We explore two ways of distinguishing the semantic operation of kind terms. First, we focus on a distinction between terms with a flexible versus terms with an inflexible semantics. Flexibility depends on whether some changes in the domain of application are taken to be possible while being consistent with past usage and what is intuitively the same meaning. On the other hand we discuss terms whose mode of operation is tolerant, in that the cohabitation in the speakers’ community of more than one use or practice of use of the term in question is accepted. Those terms contrast with terms that operate in a strict way restricting severely the legitimacy of different uses that cut the domain of application in different ways. Among the latter we include terms with an ethical component and terms whose correct application involves high stakes. These distinctions are not new, since the phenomena that we identify as flexibility and tolerance have been observed, although in our view they have not been properly systematized and assessed. We argue that the two distinctions throw light on the bases of some disputes and on some legal disagreements.

Legal Disagreements and Theories of Reference

According to Hartian positivists, law is a conventional practice that requires a convergence that includes not only the regularity of behavior but also of certain beliefs and attitudes. It is easy to conclude that in this framework the meaning of terms is determined by shared criteria that are transparent to all parties, a form of semantic descriptivism. This, at least, is the way in which Dworkin and his followers have interpreted Hart’s positivist stance. The problem is that disagreements often arise on how to interpret the words of the law, and this fact seems to conflict with the emphasis of positivism on the idea of agreement, or so it is argued. If the meaning of legal terms depends on shared criteria, why do individuals disagree? And if they disagree, what does their disagreement consist in?