Geoffrey Warner

Lyndon Johnson's War? Part 1: Escalation

At the beginning of 1964 there were around 20,000 US military ‘advisers’ in South Vietnam, working alongside the South Vietnamese army in the latters campaign against the communist guerrillas, led and supplied by the government of North Vietnam. By the summer of 1965 there were 125,000 American troops in the country, with more pledged for future deployment. Most of these were not ‘advisers’, but combat forces openly engaged in fighting the communists. In addition, since March 1965, a sustained American bombing campaign had been waged against targets in North Vietnam. This transformation in the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam had been brought about by two factors: the continued weakness of South Vietnamese governments as military and civilians struggled for control; and the growing strength and success of the communist guerrillas. South Vietnam was regarded as a vital American interest for two reasons: it was perceived as a test of US resolution throughout the rest of the world; and, following the famous ‘domino theory’, it was believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would precipitate the weakening and eventual collapse of other non-communist states in the region. Although there was opposition to the escalation of the war, both in Congress and the administration, there were also voices notably in the military, who wished to press on further and faster. The administration adopted a middle course, gradually increasing its commitment and continually planning for the next step. Although political motives undoubtedly played a part in this more measured approach—there was a presidential election in November 1964—it is clear that President Johnson was not at all convinced that any policy he chose would save South Vietnam. At the same time, he feared the consequences of withdrawal, both at home and abroad. A deeply insecure man, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his principal advisers, to whom he felt indebted for personal as well as political reasons.

Eisenhower and Castro: US‐Cuban relations, 1958‐60

Books reviewed in this article: n nUnited States Government Printing Office, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Vol. V. American Republics n nUnited States Government Printing Office, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Vol. VI. Cuba

The Cambridge history of the Second World War

Following on from earlier three-volume histories of the Cold War and the First World War, Cambridge University Press completes a trilogy with this detailed treatment of the Second World War. Multi-authored in the Cambridge tradition, the individual chapters cover a wide range of events and topics and the 81 contributors, mainly but not exclusively from the United Kingdom and the United States, include both scholars who have already established a reputation in the subject as well as those who are in the process of doing so. Perhaps the greatest strength of the volumes is the treatment given to what may be loosely referred to as the Pacific War. No one who uses them properly is going to have any doubts about the nature and importance of the struggle between Japan and its opponents between 1937 and 1945, and it is particularly encouraging to note the use of Chinese and Japanese sources by the authors, when so many English-language books on the subject cite none. The principal weakness of the enterprise is its division into an unnecessarily complicated series of topics, which is not always adhered to by the authors and which often compels the unfortunate reader to skip backwards and forwards, not only within but between volumes. Despite this flaw, however, this remains an important contribution to the history of the Second World War and will need to be consulted by any serious student of the subject for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975 Part three: January 1973–July 1975

The final volume of the Foreign relations series of documents on Indochina during the Nixon and Ford presidencies is not as detailed as those which preceded it. However, the documents do not support the view that, once the January 1973 Agreement between the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the United States had been concluded, the US was prepared to accept DRVs hegemony over the rest of Indochina, provided only that there was a �decent interval� before it occurred. In fact, both the Nixon and Ford administrations did seek to prevent this from happening, but found their hands tied by congressional opposition. In the case of Cambodia, the United States also found itself the victim of its own illusions about the willingness of the Peoples Republic of China to support an alternative government led by the former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the more or less total collapse of American policy in April 1975, some interesting �post-mortems� from various government departments on the history of US involvement in Indochina are also printed in the volume under review.

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with detente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the USs credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixons prospects for re-election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieus reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.