George A. Waters

Interest rate pass through and asymmetric adjustment: evidence from the federal funds rate operating target period

This study examines the long-run interest rate pass through of the federal funds rate to the prime rate and whether there is asymmetric adjustment in the prime rate using the Enders–Siklos (2001) momentum threshold autoregressive model over the period February 1987 to October 2005. Once allowance is made for the endogenously determined structural break in the cointegrating relationship in April 1996, the adjustment of the prime rate to changes in the federal funds rate appears asymmetric with upward rigidity, a result contrary to previous studies which found that the prime rate exhibits downward rigidity. The finding of upward rigidity in the prime rate lends support for the customer reaction and adverse selection hypotheses. Moreover, the empirical evidence seems to support the observation of increased pass through as a result of heightened competition in the banking industry as well as the Federal Reserves enhanced transparency in monetary policy during the 1990s.

Quantity rationing of credit

Quantity rationing of credit, when ?firms are denied loans, has greater potential to explain macroeconomics ?fluctuations than borrowing costs. This paper develops a DSGE model with both types of financial frictions. A deterioration in credit market con?fidence leads to a temporary change in the interest rate, but a persistent change in the fraction of ?firms receiving ?financing, which leads to a persistent fall in real activity. Empirical evidence confi?rms that credit market con?fidence, measured by the survey of loan officers, is a signi?cant leading indicator for capacity utilization and output, while borrowing costs, measured by interest rate spreads, is not.

REIT markets: periodically collapsing negative bubbles?

This study tests for the presence of negative bubbles in the REIT markets over the period 1972:01 to 2004:05 using the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) model. There is evidence of asymmetric adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium between REIT prices and dividends indicative of negative bubbles for mortgage and hybrid REITs.

REIT Markets and Rational Speculative Bubbles: An Empirical Investigation

This study uses the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) model and the residuals-augmented Dickey–Fuller (RADF) approach to test for the presence of Evans’ (1991) periodically collapsing bubbles in four real estate investment trusts (REIT) classifications. The RADF test shows evidence of bubbles, but the results of the MTAR test are mixed. The MTAR test shows asymmetric adjustment for each REIT market with the exception of hybrid REITs, but only mortgage REITs show evidence of bubbles, which turn out to be negative meaning the price falls substantially below the level warranted by fundamentals.

Careful Price Level Targeting

This paper examines a class of interest rate rules that respond to public expectations and to lagged variables. Varying levels of commitment correspond to varying degrees of response to lagged output and targeting of the price level. If the response rises (unintentionally) above the optimal level, the outcome deteriorates severely. Hence, the optimal level of commitment is sensitive to the method of expectations formation and partial commitment is the robust, optimal policy.

LEARNING, COMMITMENT, AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper examines a class of interest rate rules, studied in Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006), that respond to public expectations and to lagged variables. Their work is extended by considering varying levels of commitment that correspond to varying degrees of response to lagged output. Under commitment the policymaker adjusts the nominal rate with lagged output to impact public expectations. Within this class of rules, I provide a condition for non-explosive and determinate solutions. Expecatational stability obtains for any non-negative response to lagged output. Simulation results show that modified commitment, as advocated by Blake (2001), is best under least squares learning. However, in the presence of parameter uncertainty and/or measurement error in the policymaker’s data on public expectations, the best policy is one of partial commitment, where the response to lagged output is less than under modified commitment. The case for partial commitment is strengthened if the gain parameter in the learning mechanism is high, which can be interpreted as the use of few lags by public agents in the formation of expectations or as an indication of low credibility of the policymaker. The appointment of a conservative central banker ameliorates these concerns about modified commitment.

The dangers of commitment: Monetary policy with adaptive learning

This paper studies a class of interest rate rules, introduced by Evans and Honkapohja (2001a, 2004), that respond to public expectations and to lagged variables. The policymaker commits to the extent that the interest rate responds to lagged output in an effort to influence public expectations. Simulation results show that full commitment, the commitment optimum under rational expectations, is not optimal under adaptive learning for any reasonable parameter values.

ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS

Evolutionary game theory provides a fresh perspective on the prospects that agents with heterogeneous expectations might eventually come to agree on a single expectation corresponding to the efficient markets hypothesis. We establish conditions where agreement on a unique forecast is stable, but also show that persistent heterogeneous expectations can arise if those conditions do not hold. The critical element is the degree of curvature in payoff weighting functions agents use to value forecasting performance. We illustrate our results in the context of an asset pricing model where a martingale solution competes with the fundamental solution for agents’ attention.

Firm Efficiency, Advertising and Profitability: Theory and Evidence

This paper presents a linear-city model where firms compete on price and levels of advertising, which affects the perceived utility of products. More cost efficient firms extend their advantage with more advertising, which leads to higher profits, if advertising is sufficiently effective. We test this relationship using a unique S&P sample. Our empirical results indicate a positive relationship between profits and levels of advertising for all model specifications.