George Rabinowitz

A Directional Theory of Issue Voting

From Stokess (1963) early critique on, it has been clear to empirical researchers that the traditional spatial theory of elections is seriously flawed. Yet fully a quarter century later, that theory remains the dominant paradigm for understanding mass-elite linkage in politics. We present an alternative spatial theory of elections that we argue has greater empirical verisimilitude. Based on the ideas of symbolic politics, the directional theory assumes that most people have a diffuse preference for a certain direction of policy-making and that people vary in the intensity with which they hold those preferences. We test the two competing theories at the individual level with National Election Study data and find the directional theory more strongly supported than the traditional spatial theory. We then develop the implications of the directional theory for candidate behavior and assess the predictions in light of evidence from the U.S. Congress.

Political Sophistication and Models of Issue Voting

Does political sophistication influence the way in which voters use issues in evaluating parties and candidates? We consider two models of mass-elite linkage: the traditional spatial model, which conceives of issues as continua of policy options, and the directional model, which conceives of issues as simple dichotomies. The traditional model is more cognitively demanding and is the implicit model of journalists and political elites. We would expect, therefore, that better educated and more politically involved voters would rely on it, while less sophisticated voters would follow the directional paradigm. We investigate this hypothesis with survey data from the 1988 presidential election in the United States and the 1989 parliamentary election in Norway. The results show that at all levels of sophistication and in both countries, voters generally follow the directional model.

On Attempting to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model: Sometimes the Patient Just Can't Be Helped

In a recent article, Westholm (1997) critiques the directional theory of issue voting and seeks to rehabilitate the proximity model. He contends that the theories must be assessed by how well they predict choice, and that in choice-based tests the proximity model is superior. Both of these contentions are wrong. Westholms empirical results are artifacts of his use of an issue index. Once different issues are allowed to have different impact, directional theory outperforms proximity theory in predicting vote (which Westholm does not analyze) and thermometer differences (which he does). Further, the whole premise of choice-based testing is flawed, because the tests can only be performed on underspecified models that lack verisimilitude. Rather than choice, evaluation is the appropriate focus for theory testing. Both theories predict evaluation, and comparisons based on evaluation are analytically robust. We conclude by discussing the power of the theories to explain real politics.

New Players in an Old Game Party Strategy in Multiparty Systems

This article compares two spatial models of party competition: (a) the traditional proximity model and (b) the directional model of voter choice. The article first lays out the differences between the two models in multiparty systems. The traditional proximity model makes no clear prediction about the spatial structure of political parties; the directional model predicts that optimal placement for parties will be along the circumference of a circle at a moderate distance from the center. Both theories have implications for overtime strategy and the success of new political parties. Traditional proximity theory emphasizes movement toward a location with high density of voters, while directional theory emphasizes the importance of a distinct directional strategy. The authors examine the Norwegian political system from 1969-1985 and the Swedish system from 1979-1982 and find the directional theory more strongly supported.

Solving the paradox of nonconvergence: valence, position, and direction in democratic politics

Abstract One of the paradoxes of democratic politics is that in two-party electoral systems parties do not usually converge, although standard theories of party competition suggest they will. In this article we introduce the idea that electoral competition includes valence as well as position issues. This has a striking effect on party strategy, producing party divergence under both the traditional spatial model and the directional model. In addition, the presence of valence issues implies moderation for advantaged parties in directional competition.

The Power of the States in U.S. Presidential Elections

The Electoral College is a uniquely American political institution, yet its impact on both the power of the American states and the relative power of citizens living in different states is not well understood. Game theorists have broached the state power problem exclusively in terms of the size of each of the states. Empirical investigators have been less systematic, basing their analyses solely on which states have been close in a single election. In this paper we present a model of state power which combines the idea of the pivotal player from game theory with an empirical model of state voting. In doing so we provide a theoretically derived and empirically meaningful assessment of state power in presidential elections. We then trace the implications of the power of the states for the relative power of individual voters, finding large disparities between voters from different states.

THE DYNAMICS OF STRUCTURAL REALIGNMENT

G overnments render decisions on how resources and values are allocated in a society. In the United States, Congress is the institution in which most of the key allocating decisions are made. To the extent the U.S. political system is integrated, the coalitions that form around the issues debated in Congress should be reflected in the coalitions that support presidential candidates and those that support the major political parties. We formulate a spatial theory of political change in which new ideological cleavages appear in congressional behavior and presidential elections and gradually reorganize the mass party base. The theory leads us explicitly to consider the question of realignment and to specify conditions under which the parties will lose support from voters.

Sophistry versus Science: On Further Efforts to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model

There are three principal grounds for comparing directional and proximity theory-their predictions of evaluation, choice, and party system structure. When the theories have been compared on each of these criteria, the results have favored directional theory. Westholms defense of the proximity model relies on replacing the formal models he purports to be testing with analytic models that incorporate subjective party placements. Subjective placements violate the assumptions of both theories and are known to have a proximity bias. Further, Westholm focuses exclusively on predictions of choice, rejecting other grounds for comparing the theories. In our response, we show that the test Westholm devises does not put proximity theory at risk. Even in an entirely directional world, a world in which proximity theory is irrelevant to behavior, Westholms test will still favor the proximity model. The fact that Westholm pays homage to the idea of falsifiability, and yet produces only this evidence in support of the proximity model, testifies to the power of directional theory for explaining this Norwegian case, and to the gulf between rhetoric and reality in Westholms defense.

Ideology and candidate evaluation

How does the expressed political ideology of voters influence their evaluation of presidential candidates? The classic answer to this question is provided by the spatial theory of electoral choice in which utility for a candidate is a function of the proximity between the voter and candidate positions on the liberal-conservative continuum. We have argued elsewhere that spatial theory, while intellectually appealing, is inadequate as an empirical model of mass behavior. We have developed a directional theory of issue voting that we believe provides a more realistic accounting of how specific policy issues influence utility for a candidate. Directional theory is based on the view that for most voters issues are understood as a dichotomous choice between two alternative positions. While ideology is widely understood as a continuum of positions, the directional model can be applied to the relationship between ideology and candidate evaluation. In this paper we compare the two theories using National Election Study data from 1972 to 1988. The results tend to favor the directional model over the traditional proximity model. We conclude by briefly tracing out the implications of this finding.

A Procedure for Ordering Object Pairs Consistent with the Multidimensional Unfolding Model.

A procedure for ordering object (stimulus) pairs based on individual preference ratings is described. The basic assumption is that individual responses are consistent with a nonmetric multidimensional unfolding model. The method requires data where a numerical response is independently generated for each individual-object pair. In conjunction with a nonmetric multidimensional scaling procedure, it provides a vehicle for recovering meaningful object configurations.