Gerald Chan

Sudpolitik: the political economy of Taiwan's trade with Southeast Asia

Abstract In December 1993 the Taiwan government adopted a policy called nanjin zhengce or sudpolitik, a policy aimed at diverting part of Taiwans trade and investment flows from China to Southeast Asia. This paper addresses the following questions: what is sudpolitik? why adopt such a policy? what are the economic, political, and strategic considerations in the pursuit of this policy? which countries are its specific targets? how do the countries directly affected by this policy respond to it? The paper also discusses the issue of Taiwans aid in connection with sudpolitik. While the effectiveness of the policy is far from clear at present, the paper concludes with four observations: Taiwans trade and aid are beginning to intertwine; Taiwans diplomacy is largely economically or commercially led; Taiwan has achieved some positive results in improving its relations with Southeast Asian countries; and, Taiwan has reached a new stage in its economic development whereby it needs to invest overseas in order ...

‘Three Chinas’ and international organizations after 1997

This article analyzes the effects of the transfer of Hong Kongs sovereignty to China in 1997 on the participation of Hong Kong and Taiwan in international organizations. It identifies the conditions under which China tolerates co‐existence with Taiwan as members of eleven intergovernmental organizations as of 1996. It concludes with two observations: one, international organizations are not monolithic entities; two, although China has overwhelming influence over Hong Kongs participation in these organizations, it depends also on how the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government is going to manage its relations with China.

Power: The Centrepiece

Power is the cornerstone of Chinese politics. Chinese politicians and diplomats are often recognised as masters of power politics, having inherited a well-spring of experience of power play over the millenniums.2 Chinese society is organised in a hierarchical order, more so in traditional China than in modern times, with codes of conduct regulating personal relationships within an extended family, as well as among one’s peers, and in relation to one’s juniors and seniors. Even ordinary Chinese realise the importance of power and exercise it in their daily lives. The Chinese understanding of the concept of power is close to the Western orthodox meaning of power as ‘an authoritative allocation of values’ or ‘who gets what, when and how’. The exercise of power, however, differs substantially (see Chapter 5).

Levels of Analysis: The Inter-state Level

One fruitful way to understand Chinese analyses of IR is through the use of levels of analysis, which range from the individual level to the global level. Depending on the degree of sophistication and the focus of a particular analysis, many levels can be pitched between these two.

Modernisation: Requirements for Development

Modernisation as a national goal or programme to achieve a ‘strongnation’ status has played an influential part in China’s state-building since the country came into substantive contact with the outside world, from the invasion of Western imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century to the current effort to develop the country’s economy. To a greater or lesser extent during the past century or so, modernisation has affected many facets of China’s domestic life as well as its international relations.

Marxism: Political Legitimacy

Marxism as an ideology was imposed by China’s revolutionary leaders on the state of China, and has been reinforced through power control and mass indoctrination while insulating as far as possible the country and its people from the outside world. Since the adoption of the open-door policy in late 1978, Marxist influence on Chinese society has witnessed a steady decline. However, the CCP is still in firm control of the state machinery and Marxist principles are emphasised, although the Party has to adjust to real situation by reinterpreting socialism as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’.

Postscript Theorising Chinese Perspectives: Periphery as Centre

In the Preface I have explained the deliberate use of the word ‘perspectives’ rather than the word ‘theory’ in the title of this book. In trying to present a coherent picture of the various perspectives, views, and aspects, I have endeavoured to build a body of knowledge about Chinese International Relations. In other words, I have tried to theorise, and my theorising has been based on an analysis of the current literature and events rather than on some grand theory or ideology.

Towards an IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics

In a book review in Millennium in 1995, Steve Smith lamented the lack of our knowledge of the state of international studies beyond the Anglo-American sphere. He said, ‘Many readers... will doubtless feel somewhat embarrassed, as I did, about knowing so little about what was being done outside a small geographical area.’3 Ken Booth held a similar view when he said in 1995 that ‘International political theory has largely been Western ideology.... The West did not want a different theoretical future because it was dominating the practical present.’4 Indeed, back in the 1960s, Stanley Hoffman pointed out that the discipline of IR was ‘born and raised in America’ and dominated by the United States because of its ‘political preeminence’.5

Units of Analysis: The State

Both Chinese and Western scholars of IR agree that there is a large number of actors in world politics, states and international organisations (IOs) being the more important ones. Beyond that, they differ in their respective recognition of the importance of other actors. Scholars in the West place more emphasis on individuals, social and interest groups, and multi-national corporations, while Chinese scholars, at least those in the traditional school, stress the importance of such units as political parties (as a class) and national liberation movements.2

Culture: Historical Legacies

A cultural explanation of international relations is necessary but difficult. It is necessary because what we think affects our behaviour and how we behave affects the perception and behaviour of others. This is true of interpersonal as well as international relations. As Bertrand Badie, a French IR specialist, argues, ‘people’s motivation and behaviour are linked to their values, and their values are defined by culture’.2 It is difficult because of the amorphous nature of culture itself. As pointed out by Yosef Lapid, ‘cultures and identities are emergent and constructed (rather than fixed and natural), contested and polymorphic (rather than unitary and singular), and interactive and process-like (rather than static and essence-like)’.3 Hence it would be difficult, if not impossible, to subject culture and its relations with IR to a vigorous positivist test.