Gerard Russo

A cost-benefit analysis of voluntary routine HIV-antibody testing for hospital patients

The objectives of this paper are threefold: first, to develop a taxonomy of potential benefits from voluntary, routine HIV-antibody testing of hospital patients; second, to inform attending healthcare workers, hospital patients and policy makers of the potential benefits from such testing; and third, to make inferences about whether such testing is warranted by a cost-benefit criterion. Benefits stemming from information about a patients HIV serostatus accrue to: (1) healthcare workers if extra precautions reduce their HIV-exposure rate; (2) the patient if knowledge of HIV serostatus allows life-extending prophylactic treatment to be initiated; and (3) the patients sex partners if the patient is less likely to transmit HIV after undergoing HIV testing. Using recent estimates on the value of life, hospital-specific HIV-prevalence rates, the effectiveness of prophylactic treatment, rates of HIV exposure and conversion by healthcare workers, and reduction in high-risk sexual behaviors by seropositive patients, we estimate the benefits of testing as the value of statistical life saved. The opportunity cost of HIV testing is calculated as the reported cost of a standard HIV-test protocol with pre- and post-test counseling. Information about a patients HIV serostatus provides small expected benefits to healthcare workers (

Household health care facility utilization in the Philippines.

3.34) because the risk of HIV transmission is small; benefits to attending healthcare workers are insufficient to warrant routine HIV testing on a stand-alone basis even in high HIV-prevalence hospitals. However, an HIV-seropositive test result provides large expected benefits to the patient (

Optimal Commodity Taxation With Moral Hazard and Unobservable Outcomes

11,202) and to the patients sex partners (

A Second Look at the Cost of Mandatory Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus Testing for Healthcare Workers Performing Invasive Procedures

5271). Adding these nonrivalrous benefits, we find that routine, voluntary HIV-testing of hospital patients passes a cost-benefit test even in low HIV-prevalence hospitals. Four major qualifications of the cost-benefit analysis should be considered. (1) The benefits to some parties can only be achieved if the patients serostatus is disclosed to them. (2) The net benefits may be negative if HIV-testing induces riskier behavior. (3) The analysis does not incorporate the significant potential for third-parties (employers, insurers, healthcare workers) to use the test to impose costs on HIV-seropositive patients. (4) The sample of inpatients choosing voluntary HIV testing may not be representative of the overall hospital population. These unmeasured factors suggest that policymakers should exercise caution in implementing a voluntary HIV-testing program.

The Effect of Mandatory Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) on Health Insurance Coverage and Labor Force Utilization in Hawaii: Evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 1994-2004

This paper presents probit estimates of household utilization of health care facilities in the Philippines. Using household data from the 1987 National Health Survey and supply data from the Department of Health, separate probit equations are estimated for each of the four major types of facilities in the Philippines: Public hospitals, private hospitals, major rural health units and barangay (village) health stations. The probability that a household will utilize services from these facilities is estimated as a function of socioeconomic, demographic and supply variables. The results indicate substantial differences in utilization patterns by income class. Households in the highest income quartile are approximately twice as likely (0.451 versus 0.236) to utilize private hospital services vis-à-vis households in the lowest income quartile, ceteris paribus. The results also indicate substantial substitution between public and private. services. An increase in the availability of private hospital beds significantly reduces the probability that a household will utilize government facilities.

Condom Use in the Presence of HIV Risk: The Role of Economic and Epidemiological Variables

The optimal public insurance-taxation scheme is derived for a model with unobservable outcomes. If the government can only observe aggregate commodity expenditures, reimbursement insurance is constrained-efficient. However, two distortions accompany the reimbursement scheme. First, consumers are induced to take (forego) actions which increase (decrease) the likelihood of adverse outcomes (i.e., ex ante moral hazard). Second, reimbursement insurance creates a subsidy distortion (i.e., ex post moral hazard). Ex ante moral hazard calls for taxation (subsidization) of commodities which increase (decrease) the probability of adverse outcomes. The second distortion calls for taxation (subsidization) of commodities which are sufficiently strong complements to (substitutes for) the insured commodity. An example centered on cigarettes and medical insurance is presented.