Gereon Wolters

Mach and Einstein, or, Clearing Troubled Waters in the History of Science ∗

In this paper I would like to analyze the relationship between Mach and Einstein. Ernst Mach was born in 1838 and died in 1916 aged seventy-eight. The last eighteen years of his life were heavily overshadowed by the consequences of a stroke which occurred in 1898, i.e., seven years before Einstein’s annus mirabilis. Mach suffered paralysis on the right side of his body, heavy speech impairment, and had a painful bladder condition which required him to be catheterized at least twice-a-day. In addition, he suffered from a severe sleeping disorder, neuralgia, and the sometimes severe consequences of frequent falls. The reason for mentioning Mach’s poor state of health is that it has much to do with his relationship to Einstein, or, for that matter, to relativity theory.

Globalized Parochialism: Consequences of English as Lingua Franca in Philosophy of Science

In recent decades, English has become the uncontestable lingua franca of philosophy of science and of most other areas of philosophy and of the humanities. To have a lingua franca produces enormous benefits for the entire scientific community. The price for those benefits, however, is paid almost exclusively by non-native speakers of English (NoNES). Section 1 identifies three asymmetries that individual NoNES researchers encounter: ‘publication asymmetry’, ‘resources asymmetry’, and ‘team asymmetry’. Section 2 deals with ‘globalized parochialism asymmetry’: thanks to English being a lingua franca, a special (‘parochial’) perspective, mostly US and British, is being globalized and is replacing European topics and approaches. This has serious consequences for history of philosophy as well as for philosophical theory: thinkers of the past tend to be dealt with on the global level at best only if and insofar they are translated into English. Similarly, the theoretical agenda of globalized philosophy of science is set by—mostly American—native English speakers (NES). This way, interesting and important topics and approaches from the European continent are marginalized or completely ignored in the world of globalized parochialism. In my view, the structural asymmetry and even unfairness on the global level between NES and NoNES cannot be eliminated but only attenuated.

Orientierungswissen als Humanressource

In der „Begrundung fur die Studie“ (s. Teil I) wird Humankapital als „das in ausgebildeten und lernfahigen Individuen reprasentierte okonomische Leistungspotential einer Bevolkerung“ definiert. Humankapital wird dabei als ein uberwiegend „rivales“, d.h. mit seinen Tragern1 verschwindendes Gut betrachtet. Zu den Humanressourcen werden aber auch „nicht-rivale“, d.h. relativ dauerhaft und nicht individuengebunden in Organisationsstrukturen und Traditionen inkorporierte Kenntnisse, Einstellungen und Fertigkeiten gerechnet.

Phenomenalism, Relativity and Atoms: Rehabilitating Ernst Mach's Philosophy of Science

Publisher Summary Machs phenomenalism is not an integral part of his philosophy of science and as a result Machs philosophy of science can be acceptable to those who reject his phenomenalism. This chapter discusses the view that Machs philosophy of science failed because Mach rejected two decisive theories of modern physics, the theory of relativity and the atomic theory. With respect to the theory of relativity, it can be proved that the relevant texts published under Machs name were forgeries. As far as the theory of atoms is concerned, the chapter shows that in the last years of his life, Mach probably even came to believe in the existence of atoms.

Clash of Cultures? German Philosophers of Science and the Great War (1914-1918)

Not all German scholars served in the armed forces in the Great War; many of them fought through their writings and speeches. Among philosophers, too, we find a fair number of war propagandists. This paper deals with the nascent subdiscipline of the philosophy of science, drawing on correspondence and diaries. The most important young philosophers of science (the oldest was 33) either reacted with naïve enthusiasm (Rudolf Carnap, at least initially), or opposed the war (Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenbach), or were completely apolitical and preoccupied with themselves (Hugo Dingler). The only war propagandist was Heinrich Scholz. During the war, however, Scholz was still a theologian, who switched to the philosophy of science only after the war – after reading the Principia Mathematica of the pacifist-inclined Bertrand Russell. Among the German scholars of the time, we find a feeling of being collectively humiliated by the rest of the world. This presumed humiliation they took as justification for war. I see alarming parallels to sentiments with scholars in present day Russia and in large parts of the Islamic World.

Ethical Limits of Science, Especially Economics

I give (I) conceptual clarifications relevant for our argumentation: facts versus norms/values, ethical pluralism versus ethical relativism, moral norms versus juridical norms. It is shown that ethical norms are justified using the principle of universalization: ethical arguments may use only principles to which supposedly everybody could give assent. I then (II) deal with ethical limits to the freedom of science imposed from outside, i.e. legislation (e.g. restrictions on experiments on animals or humans), or (III) imposed from inside, i.e. science itself (e.g. research moratoria, measures to prevent corruption). I then (IV) turn to economics, showing that the leading neoclassical economical theory is among the causes for the enduring financial and economic crisis. I defend three theses: (1) Neoclassical economics has unethically sold itself as safely explaining and predicting as physics. (2) The models of neoclassical economy are based on value-laden ideological beliefs about free markets and economical agents that are sold as value-free science. (3) Neoclassical experimentation that involves whole countries and societies (like the completely failed “Chile experiment”) is immoral. I. Conceptual Introduction In times of Latin as lingua franca of science and philosophy, our topic today would have been limites scientiae ethici. Those of you who have had the good luck to have learned Latin at school might immediately ask: is the genitive scientiae a genetivus subjectivus or objectivus? Or, put differently, does the title ask for ethical limits that are internal to the process of science, i.e. ethical limits of science, or, are Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-358052 2 we inquiring, whether ethical limits should be imposed on science from outside, i.e. ethical limits to science. The short answer is: both. We will see that, on the one hand, the process itself of conducting science often raises ethical questions, and that the application of results of science, on the other, may pose ethical problems. The typical addressee of the internal ethical problems is the scientist himor herself, while the typical addressee of the consequential problems is the society or the lawgiving bodies, respectively. On the basis of this distinction the title of the paper would better read as: “Ethical Limits of and to Science”. Ethics seems to be a topic philosophers, and sometimes also theologians, deal with in a professional way. We might ask, why doesn’t one leave to the scientists and doctors themselves the reasoned answer to ethical questions that arise in their respective disciplines? The answer that scientists and physicians often find difficult to accept is that scientific or medical competence is categorically different from ethical competence. Scientific competence relates to the facts of the world and delivers descriptive results, while ethical competence relates to norms and values and delivers evaluative and normative results. In short, science tells us what there is, while ethics tells us, what we should do, or which things we should value. This doesn’t exclude that a scientist or doctor may give valuable ethical guidelines. But in doing this they do not make use of their scientific or therapeutic but rather of their philosophical competence. Such competence, however, often is badly missing. The degree of confidence of scientists and doctors in their ethical arguments is often negatively proportional to their quality. This we find, of course, also in philosophy and elsewhere, and not only when it comes to the ethics of science. In standard philosophical parlance, there is an important difference between “ethics” and “morals”. “Morals” relate to actually existing rules or norms of conduct of persons or groups. It does not matter whether those rules are “good” or “bad”. Thus, one speaks, for example, of the morals of the Mafia, or of the investment banking elite of bank X, and at the same time of the morals of the Catholic Church, or rural Lutheran communities in Northern Finland. What these examples have in common and what distinguishes them from “ethics” is their lack of universal justification. Sure, the moral rules of the Catholic Church are intended to further the common good,

Hempel, Carl Gustav (1905–97)

Carl Gustav Hempel was a leading figure of the logicoempiricist movement, originating in the 1920s in Vienna and Berlin. He is particularly famous for his work on scientific explanation that led to the ‘Hempel–Oppenheim model’ of scientific explanation and his work on concept formation in empirical science. Hempel, furthermore, connected his methodological ideas with the thesis of the unity of science, according to which there holds the same methodology both in the natural and in the social sciences. In his later work, Hempel opened up to T. S. Kuhn’s historic-pragmatic conception of science.

Homo Sapiens und Homo Faber : epistemische und technische Rationalität in Antike und Gegenwart : Festschrift für Jürgen Mittelstraß

Scientific knowledge is gained through active intervention in Nature; in order to become homo sapiens, (wo)man must at the same time be homo faber. Following the philosophical work of Jurgen Mittelstrass, the papers presented in this volume justify this thesis and differentiate it in both its historical and its systematic dimension (including its practical philosophical implications).

Mesmer in a Mountain Bar: Anthropological Difference, Butts, and Mesmerism

I am not sure whether Bob Butts at the present time would still prefer to be a taxi driver rather than a philosopher. That twenty years after this confession he still prefers bars and mountains to philosophical seminars and conferences, is something I believe I can present as a confirmed fact on the basis of extensive, pleasant experiences shared at such places. Among Butt’s favorite mountains are certainly the Swiss Alps, which Albrecht von Haller (1708–1777) praised in his great poem, “The Alps”. I hope I am not being too partial to the flatter foothills when I say that in the last decade our friend of the mountains has grown very fond, too, of this part of the country.3 Especially that magic triangle between Constance with its lake, Wildhaus in Toggenburg with the simple wooden house where Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) was born and grew up, and Zurich with the Kronenhalle, where James Joyce used to keep his beer from getting flat.