Gerry van Klinken

INDONESIAN POLITICS IN 2008: THE AMBIGUITIES OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

Abstract The ‘normal’ politics of 2008, in between the big electoral events of 2004 and 2009, illustrated the ambiguities of democratic change. Hung gubernatorial elections in North Maluku and South Sulawesi led local elites to ask Jakarta to intervene. A long campaign of demonstrations and violent intimidation by fundamentalist groups against the unorthodox Islamic group Ahmadiyah persuaded the government to impose a semi-ban on the group. At the same time, a senior intelligence officer was put on trial over the 2004 murder of the human rights activist Munir. And the Corruption Eradication Commission continued to arrest powerful people for corruption, although these arrests also began to stimulate increasingly organised resistance. All in all, politics in 2008 demonstrated an openness, and even a willingness to learn, that augurs well for the future.

The Contentious Politics of Anti-Muslim Scapegoating in Myanmar

ABSTRACT Recent anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar cannot be understood primarily as a spontaneous outburst of religious feeling among the general population. Rather it was a shocking repertoire deployed by a semi-organised social movement with clear political goals, which overlapped with those of Myanmar’s military elite. In this article we trace the history of contention that saw key collective actors emerge who staged violent events and then framed them for the public. Elite competitive strategies leading to the 2015 election shaped its rhythm. A new regional player, the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, initiated the violence. When the ruling elite failed to condemn it, a monk-led, apparently popular, chauvinistic movement expanded rapidly throughout Myanmar. Asserting the Rakhine violence as an existential threat to the Burmese nation, a moral panic effectively created a crisis where none existed. The movement then routinised itself into a de facto pro-regime, anti-National League for Democracy, theocratic political party favouring President Thein Sein’s re-election. While maintaining broad ties (but not chains of command) to military elites, it enjoyed a degree of autonomy not seen before under military rule. It ultimately failed to influence voter behaviour significantly, but the new salience of anti-Muslim chauvinism portends future conflict in the fledgling democracy.

THE BATTLE FOR HISTORY AFTER SUHARTO: Beyond Sacred Dates, Great Men, and Legal Milestones

Historical discourse has become an important aspect of post-Suharto Indonesian politics. The nationalist instrumentalization of the past, always strong in Indonesia, took on a martial aspect under the New Order. Even today, the establishment remains reluctant to abandon it. But new visions of history have arisen out of the widespread protests against the New Order. Some preserve the form of a martial nationalist historiography, but displace it to the regions (especially Aceh and Papua), thus turning it against Jakarta. Others, both at a national and a local level, embrace more societal historiographies in which the state and national unity are not idealized, and in which internal conflict is not taboo.

Big states and little independence movements

Abstract The violence military-backed militias perpetrated on the East Timorese in 1999 illustrates the fundamental character of the Indonesian state: it is not merely non-democratic but also highly centralized. Both these characteristics were imprinted on the state by its late nineteenth century colonial origins. Efforts to both democratize and decentralize the state during the post-independence 1950s were undone by key state elites led by the military under Suharto. However, the separation of East Timor from Indonesia indicates a victory for the local that may well become a trend around Indonesia. While East Timor never legally belonged to the Indonesian state, its independence movement was driven by grievances that are shared by many other communities throughout Indonesias periphery. Central state elites view these local movements in terms of “breakdown,” but at the local level they are seen as hopeful alternatives. It is not necessary to romanticize all local movements—elements of them are xenophobic, violent, and corrupt. But these elements are usually balanced by responsible and non-violent groups inspired by the search for a state that serves more human ends.

Three books on Papua

Review of:Pieter Drooglever, An act of free choice; Decolonisation and the right to self-determination in West Papua. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009, xviii + 854 pp. ISBN 9781851687152. Price: GBP 125.00 (hardback).Esther Heidbuchel, The West Papua conflict in Indonesia; Actors, issues and approaches. Wettenberg: Johannes Herrmann, 2007, iii + 223 pp. ISBN 9783937983103. Price: EUR 20.00 (paperback).Muridan S. Widjojo, Adriana Elisabeth, Amiruddin, Cahyo Pamungkas, and Rosita Dewi, Papua road map; Negotiating the past, improving the present and securing the future. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2010, xxxiii + 211 pp. ISBN 9789794617403. Paperback.

Why was there no Javanese Galileo

The Dutch being scientific and colonial, this chapter poses two questions about the scientific interests of their colonial subjects in Java. First, did the Javanese have an evidence-based science of the natural world in 1808? Second, if not—and it seems they did not—then why not?