Giacomo Calzolari

On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified Monopolist

We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a regulated service while also operating in a competitive, unregulated sector. If the firm conducts its activities in the two markets jointly, it enjoys economies of scope whose size is the firm’s private information, unknown either to the regulator or to the rival firms. We characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the competitors. Although joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies, it also entails private information, so that regulation is less efficient and the unregulated market too may be adversely affected. Nevertheless, we show that allowing the firm to integrate productions is (socially) desirable, unless joint production is characterized by dis-economies of scope.

Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts

We study the effects of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (i.e., discounts conditioned on the share a firm receives of the customers total purchases) in an adverse selection model where firms supply differentiated products and compete in non-linear prices. We show that exclusive contracts intensify the competition among the firms, increasing consumer surplus, improving efficiency, and reducing profits. Firms would gain if these contracts were prohibited, but are caught in a prisoners dilemma if they are permitted. In this latter case, allowing firms to offer also market-share discounts unambiguously weakens competition, reducing efficiency and harming consumers. However, starting from a situation where exclusive contracts are prohibited, the effect of market-share discounts (which include exclusive contracts as a limiting case) is ambiguous.

Sequential contracting with multiple principals

This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and non-cooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals observe neither the mechanisms offered upstream nor the decisions taken in these mechanisms, then all PBE outcomes can be characterized through pure-strategy profiles in which the principals offer menus of contracts and delegate to the agent the choice of the contractual terms. We then show that, in most cases of interest for applications, the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes is further facilitated by the fact that the principals can be restricted to offer incentive-compatible extended direct mechanisms in which the agent reports the endogenous payoff-relevant decisions contracted upstream in addition to his exogenous private information. Finally we show how the aforementioned results must be adjusted to accommodate alternative assumptions about the observability of upstream histories and/or the timing of contracting examined in the literature.

Procurement Contracting Stategies

Quality and suppliers performance are essential for procurement. This Paper analyses these important issues from two perspectives. The first part deals with the topic of contracting. It describes the features of some common types of contracts that the buyer may choose according to the circumstances of the procurement. The central issue is how the procurer should choose and then design the contract to optimally balance the trade-off between incentives to limit the contractors supply cost and the flexibility to ex-post adaptation to potential unforeseen events. When important characteristics of the supply cannot be easily described in - and enforced within - the contract, the procurer must use other tools to ensure successful procurement. The second part of the Paper deals with this important problem, also known as non-contractible quality. The part provides indications about the methods the procurer may use to obtain adequate quality and customer satisfaction and illustrates which method seems to fit better in the specific procurement context.

Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation

This paper examines the equivalence among price-modifying and quantity-fixing international trade policies in a differential game. We employ two well-known capital accumulation dynamics for firms, due to Nerlove and Arrow and to Ramsey, respectively. We show that, in both cases, open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria coincide. Under the former accumulation the tariff-quota equivalence holds, while, in general, it does not under the latter. Moreover, in the Ramsey model, the country setting the trade policy (weakly) prefers a quantity-equivalent import quota to the adoption of the tariff. These results are not a consequence of the equilibrium concept we adopt (with and without market power), but directly follow from the interplay between market power and the properties of accumulation dynamics.

Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade

Abstract We study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects. Such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes. We show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because of scientific uncertainty. A free-riding effect is identified, implying more conservative behavior by countries. We also study the role of producers (lobbies) in providing valuable information, finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the ‘traditional’ good. Moreover, lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting.

Tariffs Vs. Quotas in a Trade Model with Capital Accumulation 1

Abstract The equivalence of price-modifying and quantity-fixing trade policies is investigated in a differential game. Two capital accumulation rules are employed, by Nerlove and Arrow and by Ramsey, respectively. In both cases, open-loop and closed-loop equilibria coincide and the domestic price equivalence holds at the subgame perfect equilibrium.

On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency

We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.

Regulating a Multi-Utility Firm

We study the regulation of a utility firm which is active in a competitive unregulated sector as well. If the firm jointly operates its activities in the two markets, it enjoys economies of scope, whose size is the firm’s private information and is unknown to the regulator and the rival firms. We jointly characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity competition) and also optimal regulation. Accounting for the several effects of regulation on the unregulated market, we show the existence of an informational externality, in that regulation provides useful information to the rival firms. Although joint operation of multi-utility’s activities generates scope economies, it also brings about private information to the multi-utility, so that regulation is less efficient and also the unregulated market may be negatively affected. Nevertheless, we show that letting the multi-utility integrate productions is (socially) desirable, unless joint production is instead characterized by dis-economies of scope.

Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision

Supervision of multinational banks (MNBs) by national supervisors suffers from coordination failures. We show that supranational supervision solves this problem, and decreases the expected costs of a MNBs default, taking its organizational structure as given. However, the MNB strategically adjusts its structure to the new supervisory framework. It converts its subsidiary into a branch, or conversely, with a view to reducing supervisory monitoring. We identify the cases in which this endogenous reaction leads to unintended consequences, such as higher costs to the deposit insurance fund, lower welfare, or closure of the MNBs foreign unit. Current reforms of MNB supervision should thus take into account that MNBs adapt their organizational structures to changes in supervision.