Giacomo Delledonne

Subnational Constitutionalism: A Matter of Review

Which is the meaning of constitutional review for a proper assessment of subnational constitutionalism? The essay tries to answer this question by means of comparative analysis. To do so, it considers both federal systems (the United States and Germany) and regional or autonomic systems (Italy and Spain). The analysis of organs and procedures allows to draw some conclusions: the presence of a system of constitutional review at the subnational level is a crucial element for the development of an autonomous, well-grown subnational constitutional law. However, subnational constitutional courts tend to have a more complicated relation with legislative and executive bodies, as less guarantees of independence or court-overturning amendments show. Finally, subnational constitutional courts tend to develop a quite interesting case law, whose experimental features sometimes anticipate major judicial trends.

Financial Constitutions in the EU: From the Political to the Legal Constitution?

This study aims to analyse a recent, wide-ranging trend towards the constitutional entrenchment of balanced-budget clauses in national constitutions in the European Union. The article tries to answer this question: is this trend just pointing out the rise and triumph of a substantial approach to public-finance issues in constitutional law? Or is it also announcing a legalisation of financial constitutional law, an area of constitutional law which has traditionally been analysed in the framework of the relationship between the executive and the legislature?This paper considers recent debt-constraining constitutional reforms in the four most important Member States in the Eurozone and in Hungary. Furthermore, it deals more specifically with the enforceability of those clauses before constitutional courts and the possibility of derogations to the new constitutional schemes. In the end, these transformations will be assessed in the light of the debate about the features (and respective virtues) of a political and a legal understanding of constitutionalism.

Perfect and Imperfect Bicameralism: A Misleading Distinction?

Abstract The aim of this contribution is to make some points on the distinction between ‘perfect’ (or equal) and ‘imperfect’ (or unequal) bicameralism and its relevance to contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. The analysis starts with an assumption that this distinction is somehow under-theorised. The distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism, finally resulting in a clear prevalence of the latter, mainly focuses on two aspects: the exercise of legislative function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote. In spite of the unquestionable relevance of these two components to the activity of parliaments, these analyses are incomplete. The functions and competences of a given second chamber depend on the way it represents pluralism: the weight that each legal system attaches to the representative role of its own second chamber decisively shapes the perimeter of their functions. Important evidence for validating this claim comes from the procedures for passing constitutional amendments, in which second chambers, even in a number of ‘unequal’ bicameral systems, are put on equal footing with first chambers.