Gideon Doron

Ideology and Privatization Policy in Israel

In this paper we explore the impact of economic ideologies on one important area of policy. We compare the periods of 1968–77 (Labor) and 1978–87 (Likud) to determine whether differences in the stated economic ideologies of the Likud and Labor parties are reflected in their privatization policy. Furthermore, we examine whether there are differences in the techniques used to privatize by the Labor and the Likud parties. Although Labor and Likud policymakers may both choose privatization as a policy, different political environments and political bases may affect such choices. We explore the impact of these differences on the design of the specific privatization techniques selected, assess whether differences in the techniques exist, and attempt to account for such differences. Our analysis reveals that both Labor and Likud parties undertook similar privatization policies. The empirical findings contradict the hypothesis that ideological differences between the two large parties in Israel will be reflected in significant variation in privatization policy. There arc no significant differences between the two parties in number, type, or implementation of privatization policy. We find evidence that an important factor for all Israeli governments is budgetary pressure, operationalized as a deficit variable. We also find some difference between parties in the implementation of privatization, with Labor demonstrating a greater propensity to sell complete enterprises, and Likud engaging in more partial sales of state assets. We argue that this difference results from the differing ability of each party to negotiate with Israels largest labor union. The fact that there were no significant differences in the number of actions taken by Likud and Labor administrations suggests that there are other barriers to this process. Two explanations for this process are indicated.

The Politics of Mass Communication in Israel

Since Israels independence in 1948, three changes have occurred in the relationship between the Israeli state and its citizens. These changes are reflected in the countrys communication map. During the first phase of nation building, the nonliberal state had a monopoly over the means and content of mass communication. In the 1980s and early and middle 1990s, privatized means of communication were formed, permitting the market to affect public preferences. As we approach the end of the 1990s, the map may be altered again by a proposal for a new multicultural model. The article traces conceptually and historically the multifaceted nature of the interactions that have taken place between politics and communication in Israel.

Bonding and Bridging Associational Social Capital and the Financial Performance of Local Authorities in Israel

Abstract This study explores whether bridging and bonding social capital differ in their impacts on government performance at the local level and the extent to which these impacts vary between localities exhibiting differing socioeconomic resources. The study is based on an analysis of 256 local authorities in Israel. The findings show that bridging and bonding social capital do differ in their respective effects on government performance and that the nature of the relationship of each type of capital with government performance varies by the communitys socioeconomic profile. Poor communities with high densities of bridging social capital were characterized by lower deficits as a percentage of total municipal budgets, more accurate expenditure forecasts and greater spending on services per capita.

Assessing the Electoral Reform of 1992 and Its Impact on the Elections of 1996 and 1999

IN MAY OF 1999, ISRAELI voters went to the polls and elected Ehud Barak as Prime Minister. Barak defeated the incumbent Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu. The 1999 election was the second election conducted after the fundamental reform made to the electoral system in I1992. The 1996 election was the first election that allowed Israelis to vote directly for the office of Prime Minister. In that election Binyamin Netanyahu defeated the incumbent Prime Minister, Shimon Peres. Prior to 1996, the electorate voted only for the 120-member legislative body, known as the Knesset. All seats in the Knesset were awarded in direct proportion to votes earned in the national election; therefore, the country was essentially one electoral district that elected 20o representatives. Had one party received a majority, the leader of that party would have been elected Prime Minister by the Knesset. However, this never occurred; rather, what happened in all previous elections was that the President, after consulting with leaders of the different parties, invited the leader of the most viable party to form a coalition government with other parties. Once a legislative majority was attained in that way, the leader of the coalition would be made Prime Minister.,

High-tech nation: the future of the Israeli polity

On 22 November 2010 the Lebanese government recycled an old tactic: blame Israel for internal problems. A televised message announced that Israel infiltrated all means of communication utilized in this country, and tapped everybody’s telephone conversations, plugging into theirmessages so as to incriminate all those who could potentially be blamed (i.e. the Islamist Hezbollah and Syria) for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005. In order to, presumably, add credibility to the announcement, the Lebanese government mentioned that the personnel of leading Israeli high-tech company Check Point, which consists of several ex-intelligence officers from unit 8200, were involved in the electronic infiltration. Interestingly, on the very same day, clips from Iranian national television showed leading scientists of the Iranian nuclear project admitting that the delay in the progress of their project was caused by a computer worm installed by the Israelis. The content of the reports mentioned above may or may not be true, but because they are placed in public contexts some people may believe in them. People in Lebanon and in Iran, as well as in other places, can read in open sources the following information about Israel. A country of just over 7 million people, it attracted in 2008 alone close to

Establishing a Constitutional Court? An alternative political culture approach – the Israeli case

2 billion in venture capital, equivalent to the capital raised by the UK’s 61 million citizens or the 145 million people living in Germany and France combined. Israeli high-tech companies are extremely diversified and include computers, security, communications, medical devices, clean-tech, biotech and more. Israel attracts two times more venture capital investments per person than the US and 30 times more than Europe. People in Lebanon and in Iran can also read that at the beginning of 2009 some 63 Israeli companies were listed in Nasdaq, more than those of any other foreign country. Just for comparison, Check Point Software Technologies, the company mentioned on Lebanese TV, has a market capitalization of

Three ‘Travelling’ Models of Politics and the Mass Media in the Context of Israeli National Security

7 billion, and still is not the largest Israeli high-tech company. The purpose of the articles included in this volume is to shed light and focus on the developments and potential implications of one important dimension of

Between the quality of the environment and the quality of the performances in Israeli local government

Abstract In the beginning of January 2002, the Israeli parliament (The Knesset) rejected a proposal that had been filed two years earlier advocating the establishment of a constitutional court of law. This article explains the legislative process in Israel and places it within the framework of the political-public dialogue about establishing a special constitutional court of law, outside the legal system, which would function solely as a critic of constitutional issues. The central claim we shall present stresses the role of the major divisions that exist in Israeli society, and the existence of an alternative political culture. These two factors, combined with the existing institutional structure, make it hard for the political system to cope with issues that require a change in public policy. Due to this phenomenon, the public has taken pro-active steps involving increased petitions to the high court that may help in the process of public decision-making or force the politicians to alter the existing institutional structure.

Introduction: the many faces of Israel's political economy

Consider the following situation. A reporter who has joined a fighting unit on a combat mission, as so many did during the 2003–2004 war in Iraq, learns from informants that her unit is about to fall into a deadly ambush. What should she do? Tell the unit’s commander about the ambush and save lives? Or be professional: Keep the information to herself and thus protect her sources for a first-hand news item, a ‘scoop’ to be published the next morning that will gain her fame and glory? Most rational people would no doubt opt for the first possibility. For the majority, the value of saving human lives surpasses the value of maintaining professional integrity, at least in such extreme cases. This personal dilemma captures in a nutshell the essence of political relations with the media in the context of national security. To simplify conceptualization of the argument presented in this paper, politics and the mass media are treated here as two distinct entities despite their entanglement in everyday life. Starting with this premise, three conceptual models or archetypes, each based on a specific type of relation maintained between the two entities, are presented here. The first model, the political control model, entails political control of the media. The messages transmitted reflect the preferences of specific politicians or political actors and are frequently authored by them. Within this model, the mass media represent an instrument to be utilized by the political sphere, but especially by leading decision-makers, to disseminate their platforms and reinforce their positions. The second model, the market or regulatory model, is diametric in its disposition. According to this model, political and policy preferences are formed and influenced by shifts in public attitudes as they find expression in the written and electronic media. The media operate according to market principles; the political system responds in due course. Direct relations between the systems are, in principle, minimal, with political organs resembling traffic controllers whose role is essentially confined

How to Coerce a Multi-Dimensional System into a Undimensional Frame: Israel's 1996 Electoral Change

According to the current Local Authorities Act in Israel 2000, once the municipal government fails to function financially, the Ministry of the Interior should intervene to appoint a professional team to help the municipality recover from its crisis. This law contains no wording ordering the local authorities to provide any local services. In the absence of a clear demand from the central government to provide certain public goods at the local level, what motivates the heads of local authorities to provide such goods? Given that local environmental issues are mostly identified as local services, and that peoples satisfaction with the quality of the local environmental services is an effective predictor for the re-election of an incumbent head in almost all Israeli municipalities, the way local authorities deal with these services constitutes a case study with which to examine their incentive for providing local services. This study seeks to explain the empirical nature of the major political motivations of the heads of local authorities for providing environmental services. The environmental and sustainability literature offers economic and civic motivations as an answer to this question. In contrast, this article suggests public choice theory as an alternative answer to this question.