Giovanna Colombetti

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

In this paper we adopt Sterelnys (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, and developmental psychology), and develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world affectively.

The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and What the Iowa Gambling Task Does and Does not Show

Damasios somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a prominent neuroscientific hypothesis about the mechanisms implementing decision-making. This paper argues that, since its inception, the SMH has not been clearly formulated. It is possible to identify at least two different hypotheses, which make different predictions: SMH-G, which claims that somatic states generally implement preferences and are needed to make a decision; and SMH-S, which specifically claims that somatic states assist decision-making by anticipating the long-term outcomes of available options. This paper also argues that neither hypothesis is adequately supported empirically; the task originally proposed to test SMH is not a good test for SMH-S, and its results do not support SMH-G either. In addition, it is not clear how SMH-G could be empirically invalidated, given its general formulation. Suggestions are made that could help provide evidence for SMH-S, and make SMH-G more specific. 1. Introduction2. Two Hypotheses: Somatic Markers as Embodied Preferences, and as a Source of Farsightedness3. Lack of Evidence for Somatic Farsightedness4. Does Making Decisions Require Somatic Markers, and can it be Shown in the Laboratory?5. Conclusion Introduction Two Hypotheses: Somatic Markers as Embodied Preferences, and as a Source of Farsightedness Lack of Evidence for Somatic Farsightedness Does Making Decisions Require Somatic Markers, and can it be Shown in the Laboratory? Conclusion

Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience

Abstract How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction between foreground and background bodily feelings to characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity, as opposed to accounts that imply that absorption involves bodily inconspicuousness.

Bodily Feeling in Depersonalization: A Phenomenological Account:

This paper addresses the phenomenology of bodily feeling in depersonalization disorder. We argue that not all bodily feelings are intentional states that have the body or part of it as their object. We distinguish three broad categories of bodily feeling: noematic feeling, noetic feeling, and existential feeling. Then we show how an appreciation of the differences between them can contribute to an understanding of the depersonalization experience.

The Embodied and Situated Nature of Moods

In this paper I argue that it is misleading to regard the brain as the physical basis or “core machinery” of moods. First, empirical evidence shows that brain activity not only influences, but is in turn influenced by, physical activity taking place in other parts of the organism (such as the endocrine and immune systems). It is therefore not clear why the core machinery of moods ought to be restricted to the brain. I propose, instead, that moods should be conceived as embodied, i.e., their physical basis should be enlarged so as to comprise not just brain but also bodily processes. Second, I emphasise that moods are also situated in the world. By this I do not simply mean that moods are influenced by the world, but that they are complexly interrelated with it, in at least three different ways: they are shaped by cultural values and norms; they are materially and intersubjectively “scaffolded”; and they can even “experientially incorporate” parts of the world, i.e., include the experience of parts of the world as part of oneself.

Editorial: Affectivity Beyond the Skin

A growing number of researchers in cognitive science challenge the idea that we can understand the mind by just looking at the brain (Clark, 2008; Gallagher, 2005; Hurley, 1998; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011; Thompson, 2007). They argue that our psychological capacities are realized not just by our brain but also our bodies, as well as the complex ways these bodies interact with their material and social environments. For these “4E” approaches, our psychological capacities are ​embodied ​ , or realized by our physiology and agency; ​embedded ​ , or situated within environmental niches that support and constrain them; ​enacted ​ , or reflective of our first-person activities of sense-making and meaning-creation; and perhaps even ​extended ​ beyond the head by material and social resources around us.

Book review: Body memory, metaphor and movement: by Sabine C Koch, Thomas Fuchs, Michela Summa and Cornelia Müller (eds)

As the editors announce in the introduction, this volume brings together contributions from different disciplines on the phenomenon of body memory, understood as ‘the totality of the embodied subject’s dispositions, which allow the person to react to present situations and requirements on the basis of past experience’ (p. 2). The first part of the book presents contributions from phenomenology, the second part from cognitive science and the third part from ‘embodied therapies’, namely, therapeutic practices, which somehow include movement practices and different bodily techniques (such as Mindfulness, Authentic Movement, Dance/Movement Therapies, Focusing). This division reflects the threefold aim of the book: to clarify the phenomenon of body memory, to develop empirical approaches from an embodied perspective and to discuss the implications of this embodied perspective for the field of therapy. Some of the central questions that the book seeks to address are as follows: What is body memory? Is the concept of body memory a useful one? How can body memory be measured? When and how does body memory become explicit? How can therapists access body memory in order to efficiently treat individuals? We shall review each individual book section in turn to assess whether the volume successfully answers at least some of these questions.

Book review: Body memory, metaphor and movement

As the editors announce in the introduction, this volume brings together contributions from different disciplines on the phenomenon of body memory, understood as ‘the totality of the embodied subject’s dispositions, which allow the person to react to present situations and requirements on the basis of past experience’ (p. 2). The first part of the book presents contributions from phenomenology, the second part from cognitive science and the third part from ‘embodied therapies’, namely, therapeutic practices, which somehow include movement practices and different bodily techniques (such as Mindfulness, Authentic Movement, Dance/Movement Therapies, Focusing). This division reflects the threefold aim of the book: to clarify the phenomenon of body memory, to develop empirical approaches from an embodied perspective and to discuss the implications of this embodied perspective for the field of therapy. Some of the central questions that the book seeks to address are as follows: What is body memory? Is the concept of body memory a useful one? How can body memory be measured? When and how does body memory become explicit? How can therapists access body memory in order to efficiently treat individuals? We shall review each individual book section in turn to assess whether the volume successfully answers at least some of these questions.