Gisela Böhm

Action tendencies and characteristics of environmental risks

It is assumed that the mental representation of the causal structure of environmental risks, i.e., the type of cause and the type of potential consequence, determines which sort of action tendencies are formed. We propose a model of risk evaluation that includes consequentialist and deontological judgments as well as specific emotions as mediators of action tendencies. Four hundred participants took part in an experiment which presented scenario information about environmental risks. The scenarios differed with respect to (a) causation (human vs. natural cause; single vs. aggregate causation), (b) consequence (harm to self vs. harm to other people vs. harm to nature), and (c) geographical distance (proximate vs. distant). Participants indicated how much they preferred each of 31 prospective behaviors. Factor analyses yielded five types of action tendencies: help, aggression, escape, political action, and self-focus. The causal structure of the risks was systematically related to action tendencies, e.g., environmental risks that are caused by humans, and in particular those caused by a single human agent, elicit aggressive action tendencies. The findings conform that the perceived causal structure of a specific risk determines whether the focus is upon consequentialist or deontological judgments, which, in turn, elicit specific types of action tendency, mediated by emotions.

Emotional reactions to environmental risks: Consequentialist versus ethical evaluation

Abstract Emotional reactions to environmental risks are investigated. Four types of emotion are distinguished: prospective (e.g. fear) and retrospective (e.g. sadness) consequence-based emotions, and other-related (e.g. anger) and self-related (e.g. guilt) ethics-based emotions. A study is presented in which various environmental risks were presented to participants. For each environmental risk, participants (a) rated the intensity of several consequence- and ethics-based emotions and (b) gave judgments pertaining to their evaluation of the causes and consequences of the risk as well as to its morality. The pattern of the emotion ratings confirms the distinction between the four emotion types and yields a configuration of the environmental risks that is structured according to their causation and impact. Except for retrospective consequence-based emotions, each emotion type can be predicted from specific cognitive judgments.

Consequences, morality, and time in environmental risk evaluation

Environmental risks pose a serious problem to individual and societal decision‐making, and the public debate is often characterized by a conflict between morally‐principled and technically oriented points of view. Drawing on previous work of Böhm and Pfister (2000), we propose a model on how environmental risks are cognitively represented and how risks are evaluated. The model suggests two evaluative pathways, evaluations of consequences and evaluation of moral considerations, each leading to a distinct set of emotions and action tendencies. Either one of these pathways may become dominant depending on the evaluative focus of the person, which, in turn, depends on the causal structure of the risk. An experimental study yields confirming evidence for this model. Furthermore, the influence of time perspective, that is, the delay of negative consequences caused by an environmental risk, is investigated. Contrary to the common assumption, only weak evidence for temporal discounting effects is found. It is concluded that environmental risks, due to their strong moral component, are partly immune to time perspective.

Heroes and villains of world history across cultures

Emergent properties of global political culture were examined using data from the World History Survey (WHS) involving 6,902 university students in 37 countries evaluating 40 figures from world history. Multidimensional scaling and factor analysis techniques found only limited forms of universality in evaluations across Western, Catholic/Orthodox, Muslim, and Asian country clusters. The highest consensus across cultures involved scientific innovators, with Einstein having the most positive evaluation overall. Peaceful humanitarians like Mother Theresa and Gandhi followed. There was much less cross-cultural consistency in the evaluation of negative figures, led by Hitler, Osama bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein. After more traditional empirical methods (e.g., factor analysis) failed to identify meaningful cross-cultural patterns, Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) was used to identify four global representational profiles: Secular and Religious Idealists were overwhelmingly prevalent in Christian countries, and Political Realists were common in Muslim and Asian countries. We discuss possible consequences and interpretations of these different representational profiles.

Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Meaning in the Evaluation of Events in World History?: Perceptions of Historical Calamities and Progress in Cross-Cultural Data From Thirty Societies

The universality versus culture specificity of quantitative evaluations (negative-positive) of 40 events in world history was addressed using World History Survey data collected from 5,800 university students in 30 countries/societies. Multidimensional scaling using generalized procrustean analysis indicated poor fit of data from the 30 countries to an overall mean configuration, indicating lack of universal agreement as to the associational meaning of events in world history. Hierarchical cluster analysis identified one Western and two non-Western country clusters for which adequate multidimensional fit was obtained after item deletions. A two-dimensional solution for the three country clusters was identified, where the primary dimension was historical calamities versus progress and a weak second dimension was modernity versus resistance to modernity. Factor analysis further reduced the item inventory to identify a single concept with structural equivalence across cultures, Historical Calamities, which included man-made and natural, intentional and unintentional, predominantly violent but also nonviolent calamities. Less robust factors were tentatively named as Historical Progress and Historical Resistance to Oppression. Historical Calamities and Historical Progress were at the individual level both significant and independent predictors of willingness to fight for one’s country in a hierarchical linear model that also identified significant country-level variation in these relationships. Consensus around calamity but disagreement as to what constitutes historical progress is discussed in relation to the political culture of nations and lay perceptions of history as catastrophe.

Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Meaning in the Evaluation of Events in World History?

The universality versus culture specificity of quantitative evaluations (negative-positive) of 40 events in world history was addressed using World History Survey data collected from 5,800 university students in 30 countries/societies. Multidimensional scaling using generalized procrustean analysis indicated poor fit of data from the 30 countries to an overall mean configuration, indicating lack of universal agreement as to the associational meaning of events in world history. Hierarchical cluster analysis identified one Western and two non-Western country clusters for which adequate multidimensional fit was obtained after item deletions. A two-dimensional solution for the three country clusters was identified, where the primary dimension was historical calamities versus progress and a weak second dimension was modernity versus resistance to modernity. Factor analysis further reduced the item inventory to identify a single concept with structural equivalence across cultures, Historical Calamities, which included man-made and natural, intentional and unintentional, predominantly violent but also nonviolent calamities. Less robust factors were tentatively named as Historical Progress and Historical Resistance to Oppression. Historical Calamities and Historical Progress were at the individual level both significant and independent predictors of willingness to fight for one’s country in a hierarchical linear model that also identified significant country-level variation in these relationships. Consensus around calamity but disagreement as to what constitutes historical progress is discussed in relation to the political culture of nations and lay perceptions of history as catastrophe.

Efficacy Trade-Offs in Individuals’ Support for Climate Change Policies

Using survey data, the authors developed an architecture of climate change beliefs in Norway and their correlation with support for policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. A strong majority of respondents believe that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and identify carbon dioxide emissions as a cause. Regression analysis shows that respondents recognize the effectiveness of direct actions that require difficult trade-offs, such as imposing a carbon tax. Yet, their voting intentions suggest a preference for policies that have at best an indirect effect on reducing climate change. Most respondents favor policy options that are generally good for the environment and cause no personal hardship. The disconnection between perceptions about the effectiveness of direct actions and support for less effective mitigation approaches may reflect the respondents’ collective distancing from the problem of climate change. This could be an important consideration in the design of communication strategies that promote emission abatement policies.

How people explain their own and others’ behavior: a theory of lay causal explanations

A theoretical model is proposed that specifies lay causal theories of behavior; and supporting experimental evidence is presented. The model’s basic assumption is that different types of behavior trigger different hypotheses concerning the types of causes that may have brought about the behavior. Seven categories are distinguished that are assumed to serve as both behavior types and explanation types: goals, dispositions, temporary states such as emotions, intentional actions, outcomes, events, and stimulus attributes. The model specifies inference rules that lay people use when explaining behavior (actions are caused by goals; goals are caused by higher order goals or temporary states; temporary states are caused by dispositions, stimulus attributes, or events; outcomes are caused by actions, temporary states, dispositions, stimulus attributes, or events; events are caused by dispositions or preceding events). Two experiments are reported. Experiment 1 showed that free-response explanations followed the assumed inference rules. Experiment 2 demonstrated that explanations which match the inference rules are generated faster and more frequently than non-matching explanations. Together, the findings support models that incorporate knowledge-based aspects into the process of causal explanation. The results are discussed with respect to their implications for different stages of this process, such as the activation of causal hypotheses and their subsequent selection, as well as with respect to social influences on this process.

When do past events require explanation? Insights from social psychology

Some past events incite more wonder about their causes than do others. For example, negative events require explanation more than positive events. We review social psychologists’ theoretical and empirical insights on what kinds of past events “beg explanation.” We draw on attribution theory that became popular among psychologists from the 1960s onward, on research on counterfactual reasoning, and on conversational and discursive critiques of attribution theory. We argue that factors predicting what is or is not perceived as requiring explanation are culturally and historically grounded, and that accordingly, what begs explanation varies between contexts and can change over time. Yet, drawing on the distinction between content and process, we argue that there are recognizable patterns across time and space. Specifically, we propose the relationship between events and background expectations as a rather stable predictor of what begs explanation—and as a level of analysis that can unite seemingly disparate approaches.

The perceiver’s social role and a risk’s causal structure as determinants of environmental risk evaluation

We present a dual-process risk perception model that integrates cognitive and emotional as well as consequentialist and deontological components by distinguishing between two modes of evaluative processing: (a) a consequentialist evaluation that focuses on potential consequences and (b) a deontological evaluation that focuses on moral values. Each of these two modes is assumed to trigger specific cognitive evaluations, specific emotions, and specific behavioral tendencies concerning a perceived risk. We conducted an experiment (N = 270) that tested whether the relative dominance of the two evaluative modes would depend on the causal structure of the environmental risk being evaluated and on the social role of the evaluator. Three types of causal structure were varied by providing scenario information: (a) anthropogenic risks that endanger only nature, (b) naturally caused risks with potential harmful consequences for humans, and (c) anthropogenic risks that may harm humans. Participants evaluated each scenario from the perspective of one of three social roles: mayor, expecting parent, and environmental activist. For each scenario, participants specified their focus and evaluated the event’s morality and perceived risk, the intensity of specific emotions, and their preferences for prospective behaviors. Results showed that the consequentialist evaluation was generally stronger than the deontological evaluation and was less affected by the experimental manipulations. The deontological evaluation was substantially affected by the risk’s causal structure. It was stronger for anthropogenic than for natural causation; risks caused by humans were associated with greater perceived moral blameworthiness, more intense morality-based emotions (e.g. outrage), and a stronger tendency to perform agent-related behaviors (e.g. aggression) than naturally occurring risks. The effect of the social role was less pronounced than that of the causal structure. Furthermore, the effect of an evaluative focus on behavior was fully mediated by emotions for deontological evaluations and partially mediated for consequentialist evaluations. The implications for environmental risk perception and communication are discussed.