Giulia Prelz Oltramonti

The political economy of a de facto state: the importance of local stakeholders in the case of Abkhazia

Between 1993 and 2008, the economy of Abkhazia was subjected to a multiplicity of internal and external influences. According to the authorities of the de facto state, its stunted growth was a consequence of what they branded as the ‘Georgian embargo’. However, not only was Russia as strong an influencing actor, but the picture is also skewed if local stakeholders are not taken into consideration. Far from being passive recipients or targets of external pressures, local elites shaped the Abkhaz economy, while financially and politically profiting from it. In this paper, this is shown by tracing the evolution of the Abkhaz economic development through time and underlining its spatial characteristics. Processes of isolation, progressive opening, economic transformation and trade are deconstructed to demonstrate the gap between practice and discourse, and to unveil the key role played by local stakeholders.Between 1993 and 2008, the economy of Abkhazia was subjected to a multiplicity of internal and external influences. According to the authorities of the de facto state, its stunted growth was a consequence of what they branded as the ‘Georgian embargo’. However, not only was Russia as strong an influencing actor, but the picture is also skewed if local stakeholders are not taken into consideration. Far from being passive recipients or targets of external pressures, local elites shaped the Abkhaz economy, while financially and politically profiting from it. In this paper, this is shown by tracing the evolution of the Abkhaz economic development through time and underlining its spatial characteristics. Processes of isolation, progressive opening, economic transformation and trade are deconstructed to demonstrate the gap between practice and discourse, and to unveil the key role played by local stakeholders.

Securing disenfranchisement through violence and isolation: the case of Georgians/Mingrelians in the district of Gali

This article explores the functions of the high levels of violence, insecurity and isolation that have characterised the Gali district of Abkhazia since the end of the 1992–1993 Abkhaz War. It traces their trajectories in a 20-year timeframe, explaining the demographic and economic peculiarities of the case. It argues that violence and isolation were used to deepen the economic, social and political disenfranchisement of the Georgian/Mingrelian population within Abkhazia, which in turn served wider economic and political goals.Abstract This article explores the functions of the high levels of violence, insecurity and isolation that have characterised the Gali district of Abkhazia since the end of the 1992–1993 Abkhaz War. It traces their trajectories in a 20-year timeframe, explaining the demographic and economic peculiarities of the case. It argues that violence and isolation were used to deepen the economic, social and political disenfranchisement of the Georgian/Mingrelian population within Abkhazia, which in turn served wider economic and political goals.

Trajectories of illegality and informality in conflict protraction: the Abkhaz-Georgian case

ABSTRACT This article explores how the protraction of conflict shapes the management of economic activities and, more specifically, the illegality/informality divide. Its main argument is that, in contexts of conflict protraction, informal activities are managed and criminalized by a range of actors in function of their capacity and their strategies to project their authority and sovereignty. It identifies an “informality/illegality divide” that runs largely parallel to the gap between de jure and de facto regulation of activities in areas affected by conflict protraction. This relationship between regulation and conflict protraction is then triangulated with the issues of disputed sovereignty and legal voids. These topics are explored against the backdrop of the Abkhaz-Georgian protracted conflict, analysing Georgian and Abkhaz (de facto) authorities’ stakes in processes of informality, illegality, regulation, and criminalization of a variety of economic activities.ABSTRACTThis article explores how the protraction of conflict shapes the management of economic activities and, more specifically, the illegality/informality divide. Its main argument is that, in contexts of conflict protraction, informal activities are managed and criminalized by a range of actors in function of their capacity and their strategies to project their authority and sovereignty. It identifies an “informality/illegality divide” that runs largely parallel to the gap between de jure and de facto regulation of activities in areas affected by conflict protraction. This relationship between regulation and conflict protraction is then triangulated with the issues of disputed sovereignty and legal voids. These topics are explored against the backdrop of the Abkhaz-Georgian protracted conflict, analysing Georgian and Abkhaz (de facto) authorities’ stakes in processes of informality, illegality, regulation, and criminalization of a variety of economic activities.

War Economies and Protracted Conflicts: The Cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

This chapter looks at the role of war economies in the protraction of conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the early 1990s to 2008. It mobilizes the existing literature on boundary activation, borderlands, sanctions and the transformation of war economies to map the complexity of the two cases, while relying on extensive fieldwork to elucidate the economies of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian protracted conflicts. As a result, it unveils some of the incentives in increasing or decreasing levels of violence and protracting or ending conflict.This dissertation explores the implications of borders and boundaries for how forcibly displaced young Georgians from Abkhazia understand issues of belonging and return. My theoretical framework draws from theories on home and belonging as well as theories on border and boundary making, and locates them in geographies of uncertainty – or riskscapes – areas characterized by conflict and/or inequality. Empirical data was collected through two sets of interviews in Zugdidi near the border to Abkhazia and a questionnaire survey in Zugdidi and the capital Tbilisi. These data have been analysed through both qualitative and quantitative methods. The young respondents providing material for this research do not constitute a homogenous group. Some of the respondents have family still living in Abkhazia or even partly grew up in the area; others have never been there. The primary goal of the Georgian government has been that the displaced population should return to their homes, and the government’s efforts for local integration has long been insufficient. Since no peace accords have been signed, a lack of security prevents a large-scale return. Notwithstanding increased border controls that have made it difficult to visit former homes, some young people still cross the de facto border. By doing this they contest both the Abkhazian de facto authorities and the border as a symbol of separation and differentiation, while claiming a right to belong in Abkhazia. Property and social relations in Abkhazia contribute to stronger connections and an imperative to return. On the other hand, experience of hardship in contemporary Abkhazia has resulted in some young people not considering return as a viable option. Youth who never visited Abkhazia depend mainly on other peoples’ memories and political discourse to create emotional bonds to the area their parents fled and to form their ideas of return. Results from the quantitative survey indicate that youth living in Tbilisi, closer to the political centre, to a higher extent intend to return than their peers in Zugdidi. Meanwhile young people’s experiences of everyday life in current dwellings in relative stability create emotional bonds to their present place of living. These experiences challenge both collective processes and experiences from Abkhazia when it comes to maintaining the desire to return. This research offers insights into the human consequences of war and conflict. More specifically, this dissertation sheds light on how young internally displaced persons (IDPs) are living in a borderland (in both temporal and spatial terms) characterized by uncertainty-- between the past and the future as well as between Georgia and Abkhazia. Practices of exclusion and segregation are constitutive of the borders and boundaries that permeate life experiences of the forcibly displaced youth. Furthermore, these borders and boundaries are situated in riskscapes of disputed belongings, which makes this borderland more or less stable for different groups of IDPs. This dissertation contributes to an increased understanding of how political aspirations and personal desire to return preserves instability and uncertainty as long as return is not possible.