Giuseppe Eusepi

Tax Prices in a Democratic Polity: The Continuing Relevance of Antonio de Viti de Marco

While Antonio de Viti de Marco was a significant figure within the Italian school of public finance that flourished between 1880 and 1940, his theoretical framework also has relevance today. Contemporary theory largely adopts a sequential framework where states act to modify previously established market outcomes. In contrast, de Viti worked with a framework where political and market outcomes were established simultaneously because he regarded the state as an essential productive factor within society. At the same time, however, de Viti did not treat state activity as a particular form of market activity. While he extended the logic of market exchange to state activity, he recognized the need to theorize in light of significant differences in institutional arrangements between markets and states. Collective action was guided by tax prices and not market prices. De Viti’s formulation of tax prices demonstrates in turn the important place of constitutional arrangements in his theory of public finance.

States as Ecologies of Political Enterprises

This paper seeks to overcome an antinomy within the theory of political economy: while market outcomes are treated as resulting from polycentric competition, political outcomes are treated as resulting from hierarchic planning. We seek to overcome this antinomy by treating political outcomes as likewise resulting from polycentric competition, taking due account of relevant institutional differences. For example, a parliamentary assembly is treated as an extra-ordinary form of investment bank that intermediates between the sponsors of enterprises and those within the citizenry who have means to support those enterprises. What results is a theory in which political programs emerge in largely bottom-up fashion through complex networks of transactions. Much of the inspiration for this paper arises from the Italian School of Public Finance, particularly Mazzola, Montemartini, Pantaleoni and de Viti de Marco.

A profile of the Italian state Audit Court: An agent in search of a resolute principal

The Italian Court of Accounts has a long and well documented history, but its functions are limited and not clearly revealed from analysis of the historical record. However, the institutional background of the Italian case is vital for understanding the notion that an agent due to the function he has been assigned, is in search of his principal. This article offers historical and institutional documentation on which a theoretical analysis can be built.

Indebted State versus Intermediary State: Who Owes What to Whom?

Ratios of public debt to GDP are much discussed these days and questions concerning debt relative to taxation have long been explored by fiscal scholars. With respect to monarchical regimes, it seems reasonable to treat public debt as similar to personal debt, recognizing that a monarch is not an ordinary person. When public debt arises through parliamentary assemblies, however, the similarity of form between public and personal debt vanishes because a parliamentary assembly does not trade on its own account; to the contrary, it is a type of intermediary that brings together people who buy bonds and people who later pay the bondholders. In a republic there is no sovereign who is indebted to ruled subjects. The institutional framework of republican governance transforms public borrowing into a process of intermediation among citizens, which leads in turn to the alternative orientation toward public debt that this paper explores.

Polycentric Polity: Genuine vs. Spurious Federalism

Federalism is commonly described in contradictory fashion as involving both competition and decentralization. These descriptions may appear similar on the surface, but they emanate from contradictory analytical orientations. Competition entails a polycentric arrangement of competitors where there is no locus of control over the arrangement. In contrast, decentralization is a monocentric arrangement that involves a locus of control. To treat federalism as a method for decentralizing governments leads to a spurious form of federalism because the object that has been identified is not genuinely a competitively organized system of government. Genuine federalism requires a polycentric arrangement that is organized through openly competitive processes. In contrast, the spurious form of federalism allows hierarchy to trump open competition.

Who Shall Keep the Keepers Themselves? On the Moral Foundations of the Separation of Powers

Beyond Conventional Economics presents new original work from leading scholars on the interface between the individual and political and social institutions. The book offers a critique of the inadequacies of the conventional economic approach to politics and a state-of-the-art view of new paradigms challenging the dominant economic notion of the individual. A number of chapters also explore the limits of individually rational behaviour in political decision making – some by challenging the orthodox content of the idea of rationality, others by providing fresh views on the operation of political processes.

Beyond Conventional Economics

Beyond Conventional Economics presents new original work from leading scholars on the interface between the individual and political and social institutions. The book offers a critique of the inadequacies of the conventional economic approach to politics and a state-of-the-art view of new paradigms challenging the dominant economic notion of the individual. A number of chapters also explore the limits of individually rational behaviour in political decision making – some by challenging the orthodox content of the idea of rationality, others by providing fresh views on the operation of political processes.

Buchanan, Hobbes and contractarianism: the supply of rules?

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

The State as an Ecology of Political Enterprises

This paper seeks to overcome an antinomy within the theory of political economy: while market outcomes are treated as resulting from polycentric competition, political outcomes are treated as resulting from hierarchic planning. We seek to overcome this antinomy by treating political outcomes as likewise resulting from polycentric competition, taking due account of relevant institutional differences. For example, a parliamentary assembly is treated as a peculiar form of investment bank that intermediates between the sponsors of enterprises and those within the citizenry who have means to support those enterprises. What results is a theory in which political programs emerge in largely bottom-up fashion through complex networks of transactions. Much of the inspiration for this paper arises from the Italian School of Public Finance, particularly Ugo Mazzola, Giovanni Montemartine, Maffeo Pantaleoni, and, in more general terms, Antonio De Viti de Marco.

Changing Institutions in the European Union

This book makes a valuable, analytical contribution to recent debates on the ongoing institutional changes occurring within the European Union. It provides a comprehensive and diverse insight into a variety of areas, including in-depth studies of fiscal, monetary and voting issues, to help elucidate the current period of transitional change.