Gjalt de Jong

Which Entrepreneurs Bribe and What Do They Get from it? Exploratory Evidence from Vietnam

This article investigates whether bribery in emerging economies matters and whether such bribery has a diminishing return to performance. Bribery allows entrepreneurs to develop and foster a network of informal relationships with public officials, and reap the accompanying benefits; but it may also have disadvantages, such as an inefficient allocation of resources. The relationship between bribery and performance was estimated using unique data derived from a survey of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs. We controlled for various entrepreneurial, organizational, and industrial characteristics. The exploratory results provide support for a hill–shaped non–monotonic relationship between bribery and revenues.

The institutional arrangements of innovation: Antecedents and performance effects of trust in high-tech alliances

In this study we investigate the institutional arrangements of innovation processes in high‐tech alliances, focusing on the role of trust. A major strength of the research is the opportunity to address antecedents as well as performance effects of trust. The antecedents of interorganizational trust include a shared past, detailed interfirm contracts, relational openness and mutual dependence. We control for the size and cooperative culture of the focal firm and the knowledge value of the partner firm. Data from a field study of 391 Dutch firms in high‐tech industries generally support the research model. The results provide convincing evidence to support the value of interorganizational trust in durable business relationships that strive for the development of new technological knowledge.

NETWORK INTERACTIONS AND MUTUAL DEPENDENCE: A TEST IN THE CAR INDUSTRY

By engaging in specific investments a firm may develop a unique competence value for its partner, which makes the partners mutually dependent. This may neutralize any hold-up risk of an opportunistic partner that is tempted to exploit the dependence and appropriate a greater share of the value added in the relation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate such mechanisms of mutual dependence. The analysis builds on previous theoretical and empirical research by the authors. It is based on an integration of transaction cost economics with the resource (competence, capabilities) view and a social exchange view, from a dynamic perspective. The paper asks the following: How do competencies develop in interaction between firms? The social exchange view brings in trust as an important dimension of governance. The research question asks how risks of mutual dependence between firms may be mitigated without either hierarchical or legal control. Five hypotheses concerning such mechanisms of mutual dependence are tested on data from the car industry.

Randstad’s business model of innovation: Results from an exploratory study in the temporary staffing industry

Summary Official statistics suggest that European service corporations seem to be ignoring the importance of R&D and innovation activities. It is worthwhile to look at whether and how European service companies innovate in order to reap the associated benefits. In this article, we will introduce the Randstad model of corporate service innovation, showing how their particular innovation strategy, structure and decision–making processes help to develop learning capabilities that have fostered this company’s long–term competitive advantage. And what lessons are to be learned from the Randstad example that could assist the implementation of the model in other organizations.

The Causal Structure of Long-Term Supply Relationships

1 Introduction.- 1.1 Scope and Purpose.- 1.2 Overview of Theory.- 1.3 Overview of Empirical Results.- 2 Theoretical Background.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 Transaction Cost Economics.- 2.3 Limitations of Transaction Cost Economics.- 2.4 Competencies.- 2.5 Relational Features.- 2.5.1 Commitment.- 2.5.2 Trust.- 2.6 Conclusions.- 3 The Theoretical Model.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Definitions and Related Research.- 3.3 The Theoretical Model.- 3.3.1 Asset Specificity.- 3.3.2 Uncertainty.- 3.3.3 Value of the Partner.- 3.3.4 Commitment.- 3.3.5 Trust.- 3.4 Conclusions.- 4 Methods and Data.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 A LISREL Approach.- 4.2.1 Models, Methods and Matrices.- 4.2.2 Model-Fit and Model-Modification.- 4.3 The Samples.- 4.4 Operationalization.- 4.5 Conclusions.- 5 Empirical Results.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 The United States.- 5.2.1 Measurement Models.- 5.2.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.3 Japan.- 5.3.1 Measurement Models.- 5.3.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.4 Europe.- 5.4.1 Measurement Models.- 5.4.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.5 Conclusions.- 6 An International Comparison.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 The Convergence of Long-Term Supply Relationships.- 6.2.1 A First Perspective on the Convergence.- 6.2.2 The United States versus Japan.- 6.2.3 The United States versus Europe.- 6.2.4 Japan versus Europe.- 6.3 The Third Way.- 6.4 Causal Loops.- 6.5 Conclusions.- 6.5.1 Point of Departure.- 6.5.2 Convergence within the Triad.- 6.5.3 Explaining the Convergence.- 6.5.4 Limitations and Further Research.- Appendix A Constructs, Items And Scales.

The evolution of higher education rules: evidence for an ecology of law

Politicians have displayed a keen interest in the build-up of regulations and bureaucracies for quite some time now. A case in point is the Netherlands. The second Balkenende cabinet, though, vowed to downsize the number of rules as one of its main policy initiatives. Evaluating the success of such a policy requires the measurement of changes in rule volumes. Doing so is no easy task. Using higher education legislation as a case study, this article attempts to chart and explain developments in regulation volumes for the period 1986—2004. For the time being, there appears to be no evidence that rule levels are on the decline — in fact, the reverse is the case. We also provide evidence for a so-called ecology of law, suggesting that the rules-breed-rules mechanism is difficult to put to a halt.Politicians have displayed a keen interest in the build-up of regulations and bureaucracies for quite some time now. A case in point is the Netherlands. The second Balkenende cabinet, though, vowed to downsize the number of rules as one of its main policy initiatives. Evaluating the success of such a policy requires the measurement of changes in rule volumes. Doing so is no easy task. Using higher education legislation as a case study, this article attempts to chart and explain developments in regulation volumes for the period 1986—2004. For the time being, there appears to be no evidence that rule levels are on the decline — in fact, the reverse is the case. We also provide evidence for a so-called ecology of law, suggesting that the rules-breed-rules mechanism is difficult to put to a halt.

The content and role of formal contracts in high-tech alliances

Abstract In this study we investigate the governance structure of innovation processes in high-tech alliances, focusing on the content and role of formal contracts. The design of a formal agreement is one of the most important strategic decisions for alliance partners. Drawing upon transaction cost arguments and social exchange theory, we study the determinants of contractual detail of collaborative agreements in the Dutch high tech industry. The findings confirm important roles for transactional and relational characteristics. We also show that contracts have multiple functions: they are important to safeguard risks but are also used to co-ordinate alliance activities and show commitment; or to safeguard external contingencies. Each of these different dimensions has unique antecedents.

Firms and corruption

Corruption is not a new topic, but it has increasingly become a central policy issue around the world. Many countries, international organizations, business networks and firms have pursued anticorruption campaigns. Nonetheless, corruption persists. Although the (empirical) literature on corruption and (economic) performance at the country level has been relatively well developed, a firm�?level perspective remains a relatively underexplored area of research. The papers in this issue break new ground both by advancing our theoretical understanding of firm�?level corruption and by introducing new and promissory research methods and empirical achievements. In this introduction, we provide the points of departure for the special issue and present the contributions and added value before introducing the individual papers. We end by offering conclusions for our new field of research.

The Impact of Personal Relationships on Bribery Incidence in Transition Economies

Prior work on corruption has largely overlooked personal relationships as an essential determinant of bribery incidence in transition economies. In these countries, relationships with public officials are instrumental in enabling transactions and lowering transaction costs, due to incoherent and ever-changing business regulations. Our study examines the impact of personal relationships on bribery incidence in Vietnam, finding that relationships with central government officials decreases the likelihood of bribery, while relationships with local government officials increases the likelihood of bribery. The results provide convincing support for the alleged importance of public-private relationships in contemporary transition economies.

Public Trust in Business: Roles of third parties in trust repair: lessons from high-tech alliances for public trust

The relationship between organizations and their stakeholders has become increasingly problematic due to breaches of trust. This trust problem is at the heart of the recent financial crisis in which individuals and whole societies were shown to be highly dependent on large corporations. For example, banks have control over savings, mortgages, and pensions, while – individually and often even collectively – affected stakeholders have no means of control over these parties.