Glenn Palmer

The MID3 Data Set, 1993—2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description

Dealing with questions of war and peace and understanding the causes of interstate conflict is a primary goal of the field of international relations. In order to study interstate conflict in a rigorous manner, scholars have relied on established rules and procedures for gathering information into coherent data sets. Among those data sets is the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data. In this paper we first outline the data-collection process for the MID3 data. Second, we introduce two new data sets emerging from the project, “MID-I” and “MID-IP.” Third, we present relatively small changes in coding rules for the new MID3 data and some descriptive statistics. The statistics indicate that the MID3 data are remarkably similar to the MID2.1 version, varying in some minor and predictable ways.

Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute Outcomes

In a recent article, James Fearon advances an innovative approach to the study of interstate crises. He adds to the traditional view (that crisis outcomes are influenced by the balance of capability and the balance of resolve) the notion that domestic political audiences exert a strong influence over which state in a crisis is likely to achieve a successful outcome. His game-theoretic analysis yields a number of interesting hypotheses, which are tested in this study using data on militarized disputes, the structure of polities, and national capability. In general the results strongly support Fearons model, though we find that relative national capabilities do tend to affect the outcomes of crises. This study highlights the importance of combining formal models of political events with large-N empirical tests.

The MID4 dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, coding rules and description

Understanding the causes of interstate conflict continues to be a primary goal of the field of international relations. To that end, scholars continue to rely on large datasets of conflict in the international system. This paper introduces the latest iteration in the most widely used dataset on interstate conflicts, the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 4 data. In this paper we first outline the updated data-collection process for the MID4 data. Second, we present some minor changes and clarifications to the coding rules for the MID4 datasets, as well as pointing out how the MID coding procedures affect several notable “close call” cases. Third, we introduce updates to the existing MID datasets for the years 2002–2010 and provide descriptive statistics that allow comparisons of the newer MID data to prior versions. We also offer some best practices and point out several ways in which the new MID data can contribute to research in international conflict.

A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability

The authors present a model of substitutability that seeks to generalize beyond the restricted conditions and special case of realism. The derivations from the model lead to several hypotheses. First, if a states relative capabilities increase, resources given to all foreign policies should increase. Second, when the efficiency of one policy increases, resources given to other policies should decline. Third, when the relative salience for one good increases, resources devoted to policies that produce that good should increase, while resources devoted to policies that produce other goods should diminish. The authors use the model to guide an investigation of the effects of increased resources, new alliances, and more efficient existing alliances on the policies of conflict initiation and increases in military spending. The findings are inconsistent with realisms version of substitutability but can be explained by an n-good approach.

To Protect and to Serve

The consequences of alliance formation for other foreign policies of a state, including defense spending and the initiation of militarized disputes, are examined using a theory of foreign policy that is based on several assumptions. First, states pursue two goods-change (defending those aspects of the status quo that one likes) and maintenance (altering those aspects of the status quo that one dislikes)-through their foreign policies. Second, states select a portfolio of policies designed to produce the most preferred mix of the two goods. Third, all foreign policy behavior, including alliance involvement, requires resources. Fourth, states are rational in their allocation of resources. Together, these imply that an observed alliance must have been the most efficient mechanism available for acquiring the most desired and achievable foreign policy portfolio and have implications for the observation of foreign policy substitutability. The empirical implications of this implication are tested, and results support the model: states are more active in their foreign policies after adding to their alliance portfolios-they increase their rate of conflict initiation, the capital intensiveness of their military establishments, and their defense spending.

A two‐good theory of foreign policy: An application to dispute initiation and reciprocation

We develop a general theory of foreign policy based on the assumption that states pursue two goals: security, defined as the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the status quo, and proaction, defined as the ability to change the status quo in desirable ways. We also assume a relationship between state power and production advantages for security and proaction. The model produces specific hypotheses relating state power and changes in power with security‐ and proaction‐seeking behaviors. For instance, weak states gaining power are the most likely to engage in security‐seeking behavior while strong states gaining power are the most likely to seek proaction. We associate proaction‐seeking behavior with conflict initiation and security‐seeking behavior with conflict reciprocation and test several hypotheses using the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set. While hypotheses are generally supported, the evidence suggests that some modifications of the theory are in order.

Multiple Goals or Deterrence

The functions of international alliances are investigated by testing two models of state behavior with data drawn from nuclear and nonnuclear alliances since 1860. A diversity-of-goals model is based on Morrows assumption that states pursue two goals through their foreign policies: autonomy and security. The second is the Olson-Zeckhauser theory that alliances provide a collective good to their members. The diversity-of-goals model sees alliances as mechanisms for states to transfer desired foreign policy goals, so that different states join alliances for different reasons. Asymmetrical alliances are mutually preferred arrangements between or among states where different goals are traded and are more likely to work when punishment of defection is credibly threatened. Accordingly, the diversity-of-goals model should find support only in nonnuclear alliances. The Olson-Zeckhauser model should apply more to nuclear alliances. The statistical results support the hypotheses.

Security, autonomy and defense burdens: The effects of alliance membership in the 19th and 20th centuries

This paper investigates the effect of alliance membership on the defense burdens of major powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. We hypothesize that the reactions of states to alliance membership will be different in the pre‐nuclear and nuclear eras. Possession of nuclear weapons by allies makes the security provided by the alliance more akin to a collective good than is the case in the pre‐nuclear era. States join alliances for two reasons: security and autonomy. The effects of each of these concerns are identified. We include in our model such alliance‐level factors as the power equivalence of the allies and the number of states in the alliance. We also look at state‐level variables such as power position within the alliance. We conclude that the nuclear period generally operates as the free‐rider principle would posit, while models based on “complementarity of effort” are more applicable in the earlier period.

Deterrence, defense spending, and elasticity: Alliance contributions to the public good

There are two methods that are often used to determine the allocation process used by members of an alliance supplying the public good of deterrence. One investigates the cross‐sectional relationship between alliance members’ GNPs and their defense expenditures. This group‐level analysis normally assumes that income remains constant. The second centers on the interaction between the hegemonic state and the other allies. This paper presents a third method: an investigation of the relationship between size (as measured by GNP) and the income elasticity of defense spending. The paper determines the elasticity of defense spending for eighteen developed countries. It finds that smaller allies have greater elasticities than larger allies, and that alliance‐membership serves to lower the alliance members’ elasticity. The implications of these findings for the study of collective goods are discussed.

Social Revolution, the State, and War How Revolutions Affect War-Making Capacity and Interstate War Outcomes

Democracy has been the primary focus of our efforts to understand the impact of domestic institutions on processes of international conflict. In this article, we examine how a particular nondemocratic regime type, postrevolutionary states, affects military capabilities and war outcomes. Drawing on scholarship that conceptualizes revolutions as a unique class of modernizing events that result in stronger state structures, we argue that postrevolutionary states should be better able to mobilize populations and economic resources for military purposes. Tests performed on a comprehensive sample of twentieth-century states and interstate wars confirm our predictions: postrevolutionary states have larger, better funded militaries and achieve more successful war outcomes.