Gordon H. McCormick

Security and coordination in a clandestine organization

We develop a model of an underground organization. The model is designed to highlight the tradeoff between the operational capacity and operational security of clandestine groups. The underground in this paper is defined by a collection of individual cells that are united by a network of internal communications. The attributes of this network, we show, have important implications for the vitality of an underground group in the face of regime efforts to identify and target its component cells. We examine the implications of various network designs for group performance in the short run, and the implications the groups short run performance will have for its operational prospects in the long run. In the final section of the paper, we discuss the conditions under which a conflict between a regime and an underground organization will reach three alternative equilibria. The results of this paper will be useful to those interested in both the design and dismemberment of clandestine organizations.

Things fall apart: the endgame dynamics of internal wars

Abstract Most internal wars end on the battlefield. Only a small percentage end at the negotiating table. While significant attention has been paid to how internal wars begin and how they evolve, relatively little attention has been paid to how they are concluded. What research has been done on this subject, furthermore, has focused almost exclusively on the problems that stand in the way of achieving a negotiated outcome, not on how these conflicts are so frequently resolved by force. This article examines the dynamics of the endgame struggle and the quite different ways in which states and insurgencies ‘win’ and ‘lose’ internal wars. We explore this topic theoretically and empirically in the first part of the article and examine the formal logic of the endgame in the second part, explaining how and why these endings follow a predictable pattern.

Things come together: symbolic violence and guerrilla mobilisation

Abstract Nascent insurgencies often face an opening mobilisation dilemma that can cripple their ability to grow into a mature threat to the state. The source of this dilemma lies in the fact that the great majority of people who are prepared to support an insurgency in principle are only willing to do so conditionally, depending not only on the costs and benefits of their alternatives but the probabilities they assign to each sides success. At the outset of such conflicts, when the emerging group is very small, the probability that the insurgency will be successful is low and the probability that it will fail is high. The expected costs of participation are correspondingly high, and the expected benefits of supporting the opposition are low. Why would anyone join such an undertaking? We examine how armed opposition groups resolve this dilemma through the use of symbolic violence and the manipulation of violent images. If successful, they transform their generated images into facts to achieve a self-sustaining mobilisation programme.

The Logic of Warlord Politics

Abstract This article offers an initial framework for a future theory of warlord politics using a simple game theoretic approach. We address the topic abstractly rather than empirically to develop a set of testable propositions across the wide range of warlord regimes. We discuss the reciprocal military and economic foundations of warlord domination, the structural logic of warlord politics, the stability of warlord regimes, and the circumstances that can be expected to lead to the formation and dissolution of warlord coalitions. We offer a conceptual introduction to these topics and lay the groundwork for a more systematic treatment of these and related themes in subsequent work.

A composite game of hide and seek

We consider a ‘manhunting’ game in which one player, the Hider, chooses one of several cells to hide and a second player, the Seeker, distributes his resources among the several cells. The cells differ in their characteristics: it may be easier to hide in some cells, or there may be a lower probability of betrayal in others, etc. The Hider’s survival probability depends on the characteristics of the cell chosen, as well as on the amount of resources which the Seeker expends in that cell. The Hider may need to carry out some activity while in his cell. If so, the activity creates a signal which can help the Seeker to locate the Hider. The Seeker must of course try to distinguish between the noise due to the activity and random “white” noise. We obtain a complete analytic solution for the case without signals. Simulation is used to develop good strategies for the case with signals.

MANHUNTING — A SIMPLE SEARCH GAME

We consider a search game in which a hider chooses to hide in any one of many cells. A searcher looks in any of the cells. The probability of finding the hider depends (a) on the characteristics of the cell, and (b) on whether the searcher looks in the right cell. It is possible that the hider may be found even if the searcher looks in the wrong cell. In one variant, the searcher wishes to maximize the probability of capture; in the other, the searcher wishes to minimize the expected time to capture. We show that the game can be solved by an easy algorithm, which allows for the manual solution of games with (of the order of) one hundred cells in a relatively short time. Some examples are given.

Terrorists and Sponsors. An Inquiry into Trust and Double-Crossing

We consider the conditions that lead to the dissolution of state-terrorist coalitions. While such coalitions have well known advantages, they also have structural weaknesses that are largely ignored in the literature on the state sponsorship of terrorism. Each player in the coalition has interests that are only partially shared and, in some cases, at odds with those of its partner. Long term cooperation must be based on mutual advantage and mutual trust, both of which are subject to change over time.We examine the conditions that are needed to begin and maintain a cooperative strategy and the circumstances that lead a state and a terrorist group to leave the coalition and double-cross its partner. Equilibrium strategies for both players are defined and interpreted.

Ernesto (Che) Guevara: The Last “Heroic” Guerrilla

ABSTRACT We take the opportunity presented by the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Che Guevara to reexamine his life and revolutionary program and the legacy he left behind. Attention is given to the formative influences that led to his introduction to Fidel Castro and his involvement in the Cuban revolution. We take a close look at the stylized theory of revolution that emerged from this experience, his reflective writings on the subject, and his subsequent attempts to generalize and apply his revolutionary model in the Congo and Bolivia. This model is critically interpreted and evaluated through the lense of his eleven month Bolivian campaign. We conclude by examining the ‘paradox’ of Che Guevara. He was a failed guerrilla who remains an iconic symbol of the revolutionary Left. He was an authentic true believer who dreamed that it might be possible to one day forge a utopian society of ‘new men’ and yet, fifty years after his death, his revolutionary project is farther away from being realized than ever. His heroic image, in the meantime, has evolved to become one of the most successful capitalist brands in history.