Gordon Tullock

Efficient Rent Seeking

MOST of the papers in this volume* implicitly or explicitly assume that rent-seeking activity discounts the entire rent to be derived. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily true; the reality is much more complicated. The problem here is that the average cost and marginal cost are not necessarily identical.

An empirical analysis of cross-national economic growth, 1951–1980

Abstract Using pooled cross-section/time-series data on 113 countries, we investigate empirical regularities in post-war economic growth. We find that coefficient values vary widely across identifiable groups of countries, with evidence supporting the convergence hypothesis apparent only in the OECD country sample. Among other results, we find that the growth of government consumption is significantly negatively correlated with the economic growth in three of four subsamples, including the OECD, and that political repression is negatively correlated with growth in Africa and Central and South America.

The economics of special privilege and rent seeking

I Why Is the Rent-Seeking Industry So Small?.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Rents, Ignorance, and Ideology.- 3 The Cost of Rent Seeking: A Metaphysical Problem.- 4 Efficient Rent Seeking, Diseconomies of Scale, Public Goods, and Morality.- II Random Thoughts on Rent Seeking.- 5 Rent Seeking: The Problem of Definition.- 6 Rent Seeking and the Market.- 7 Strategic Behavior, Mixed Strategies, and the Defects of the Nash Equilibrium.- 8 Rent Seeking and Transfers.- 9 Rent Seeking and Tax Reform.- 10 Concluding Thoughts.

Why so much stability

One of Duncan Blacks (1958) more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely. This very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others, and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work. Without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected. This is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is. If we look at the real world, however, we observe not only is there no endless cycling, but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time. Thus, theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact, but actually in sharp conflict. It is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at, does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting. In some cases, however, this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time. It does not dominate all other outcomes, but is retained merely because of its particular history. There are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature. We will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning. I should, however, warn the reader that my own previous work, including joint work with Buchanan, will play a major role here. This may simply reflect egotism, but I think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems. Much recent Public Choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling. The reason, presumably, is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two-dimensional diagram. We shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling, and then turn to more complex logrolling problems. With respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur, there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature,

A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices

This paper describes and elaborates a process first discovered by Edward H. Clarke that motivates individuals to reveal their true preferences for public goods. The essence of the process is that each individual is offered a chance to change the outcome that would occur without his vote by paying a special charge equal to the net cost to others that results from including his vote in the decision. Because the special charge on any one person is not paid to any other person, a very small budget surplus results. Applications to both discrete and continuous decisions are illustrated.

The transitional gains trap

Many government programs which appear to be designed to help some particular industry or group do not seem to be succeeding. The explanation offered here is that the program, when inaugurated, generated transitional gains for the individuals or companies in the industry, but that these have been fully capitalized, with the result that the people in the industry now are doing no better than normal. On the other hand, the termination of the particular scheme would, in general, lead to large losses for the entrenched interests.

The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem

Aggregation of preferences, 256. — The paradox of voting and its significance, 257. — Voting in a simple model, 258. — Some complications, 260. — Unimportance of the paradox, 263. — Voting in a more realistic model, 264. — Conclusion, 270.

The logic of the law

Professor Tullock shows what happens when, abandoning the traditional view of civil and criminal law as an extension of moral philosophy, concepts and procedures of modern welfare economics are applied to our legal system.

Publication Decisions and Tests of Significance—A Comment

Abstract The custom of only publishing research when it reaches a certain degree of significance is likely to lead to errors, not through repetition of the same experiments, but over many different experiments.

Back to the bog

My role in connection with the efficient rent-seeking model (Tullock 1980) is, I think, a rather ill-omened one. I began the discussion by inventing a model with an apparent paradox. The market does not clear even with free entry and competition. There have been a number of efforts to deal with this problem (Corcoran, 1984; I commented on it in the same issue, pp. 95–98). Corcoran and Karels (1985) and Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) are further efforts to solve the problem.