Gregg B. Johnson

Mandates, Powers, and Policies

Elections provide a mandate to pursue a set of policies. Party label provides a concise ideological cue for voters to choose among candidates, and research on industrial democracies verifies a link between the parties voters elect and subsequent policy outcomes. The combination of inchoate party systems and economic vulnerability elsewhere may weaken the link between voter choice and policy. When examining economic policies in Latin America, there is some controversy as to whether governments carried out “reform by surprise”—promising one thing during a campaign while implementing another in office. We test whether the ideological reputations of executives’ and legislators’ parties explain whether they adopt market-oriented policies. We find that the future behavior of presidential candidates is difficult for voters to predict. However, the ideological reputation of legislators is a reliable predictor of policy outcomes, and the relationship is clarified by the prospects of collective action by legislative delegations.

A Blue Tide in the Golden State: Ballot Propositions, Population Change, and Party Identification in California

Party identification is notoriously “sticky,” yet over the last three decades the California electorate has changed tremendously. A once red state has become one of the most reliable Democratic strongholds in the nation. What explains this change? One common explanation rests with population shifts and macropartisan trends. Another claims the combination of a rapidly expanding Latino electorate and a series of high-profile anti-immigrant ballot initiatives supported by the state’s Republicans drove partisan change in California. Building off of previous research, we seek to reconcile the differential impacts of these factors on the state’s Latinos and non-Hispanic Whites. Our analyses partially confirm and clarify previous findings regarding Latino partisan change, while directly challenging findings regarding partisan change among non-Hispanic Whites.

Divisive Primaries and Incumbent General Election Performance: Prospects and Costs in U.S. House Races

Do divisive primaries hurt incumbents? If so, does the electoral calendar condition their effects? Potential challengers are predatory and estimate their electoral chances before running against an incumbent, meaning electoral prospects influence both primary divisiveness and general election performance. However, divisive primaries may waste precious campaign resources and damage the primary winner’s reputation. The evidence suggests that although divisive primaries generally hurt incumbents and help challengers as electoral prospects theory predicts, these effects wane and eventually disappear the closer the primary is to the general election.

Committee Property Rights, Executive Dominance, and Political Parties in Latin American Legislatures

Motivated by theories of congressional committees in the US context, and building on the growing body of work focusing on the institutional features of legislatures in Latin American presidential systems, this paper explores two previously overlooked aspects of committee politics. Using comparative data from three Latin American countries, it examines the strategic and jurisdictional dynamics in which chamber leaders assign bills to committees and then investigate the factors affecting presidential and partisan success within committees. In general, the authors find that committees have strong property rights and that characteristics of both bills and bill initiators strongly influence the survival of legislation in committee. The results shed light on the effects of institutional design on the policy process in presidential systems.