Gregor Urbas

Protecting Children from Online Predators: The Use of Covert Investigation Techniques by Law Enforcement

As the range of cybercrimes expands, law enforcement agencies develop new strategies for their investigation. One method being adopted by police in some countries is to exploit the same anonymity that criminals use to operate online and engage with actual or potential suspects using assumed identities. For example, police investigating online child grooming may assume the identity of a child or young person and engage in chats or email or SMS communication with a suspect. In some situations they may take over the identity of a real child who has been contacted by a suspected child groomer, for example, if contacted by a concerned parent, but in others they may invent an entirely fictitious identity. Where this investigative technique results in arrest and prosecution, arguments about entrapment, or illegal/improper obtaining of evidence may arise. It is therefore important to clarify the legal basis on which such covert investigations may be conducted and to ensure that the substantive and procedural law that apply enable proper and effective law enforcement while at the same time guarding against improper manipulation of persons using electronic communications technologies. This article explores situations in which cybercrimes such as online child grooming can be covertly investigated and seeks to identify best practice for effective online law enforcement.

Regulating new forms of forensic DNA profiling under Australian legislation: familial matching and DNA phenotyping

Forensic DNA profiling uses ‘non-coding’ parts of the human genome to compare DNA profiles and establish links between individuals and crimes under investigation. In most situations, only a complete match between such profiles is significant. However, it is also possible to identify individuals through ‘familial matching’, for example, where a DNA database search yields a partial match with a suspect profile, suggesting that the suspect is a close relative of the person on the database. It has also become possible through ‘DNA phenotyping’ to analyse ‘coding’ parts of the human genome to produce a probabilistic assessment that the suspect is, for example, of a particular racial background, or has a particular hair or eye colour. Neither of these more novel techniques is mentioned in Australian forensic procedures legislation. This article argues that familial matching uses the traditional DNA profiling methodology and is no more invasive than established methods of investigation. However, DNA phenotyping employs a different methodology from traditional DNA profiling, and generates information beyond simply generating a means of identification. DNA phenotyping for externally visible traits should be permitted, but analysis for other traits, such as pathophysiology and psychopathology, should only be permitted if certain conditions are met.

Criminalising computer misconduct:Legal and philosophical concerns

Computer misconduct (hacking, fraud, privacy breaches, pornographydissemination etc.) has been a part of computing and electroniccommunication since its early development. The process ofcriminalisation (enactment of laws creating specific offencescovering these activities) has followed in a some what sporadic anduneven way, with notable discrepancies between jurisdictions bothinternationally and within countries. In Australia, there has beensome movement towards uniformity with the enactment of theCybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) and its equivalents in several States andTerritories. Internati onally, there is gradual convergence towardsmodels such as the Council of Europe¿s Convention onCybercrime. However, the philosophical concerns behind suchlegislation are not always clear or uniform. Interests sought to beprotected from computer misconduct range from traditional concernsof crim inal law (physical safety, personal property, public orderetc.) through to larger-scale and more abstract concerns (nationalinfrastructure security and system integrity). This paper assesseslegal and philosophical aspects of Australian and comparablecomputer crime legislation.

The prevalence of botnets in Taiwan and China

This paper discusses the prevalence of bot-infected computers in Taiwan and China and why bot-infected computers are so prevalent in Taiwan and China. Reports have shown that Taiwan and China are the top two countries in the Asia-Pacific and Japan (APJ) region where bot-infected computers are located. However, there is still little empirical study on the reasons why China and Taiwan rank so high in terms of bot-infected computers. Based on interview data collected in 2008 and 2009 in the Greater China area, this paper analyses the prevalence of bot-infected computers in Taiwan and China from five perspectives: technical perspective, user perspective, political perspective, cultural perspective and business perspective.

Cyber Criminals on Trial: The Prosecutor as Gatekeeper

Prosecuting Cyber Crime The extent of the prosecutors involvement with cyber crime will vary from one country to another depending upon the prosecutors role in the criminal justice system and on constitutional issues more generally. In civil law countries, the decision to begin an investigation may rest with the prosecutor, depending on whether coercive measures are necessary or special proceedings are required. Japanese prosecutors routinely direct investigations (Johnson 2002). Prosecutors also play a central investigative role in Korea and China (UNAFEI 1995). In the United States, especially at the federal level, prosecutors are involved well before a criminal charge is brought, and are often engaged in the planning, organisation and execution of criminal investigations. This early involvement tends to arise from constitutional restraints on criminal investigation that invite detailed and exacting prosecutorial oversight. The National District Attorneys Association, the peak body of all US prosecutors, has specified that the office of the prosecutor should review and approve all applications for search warrants, arrest warrants, and all applications for the use of electronic surveillance (National District Attorneys Association 1991, Standards 40.1–40.3). In Scotland, the office of the Procurator Fiscal has direct involvement with the investigation of offences from the outset. In Northern Ireland, prosecutors have traditionally been relatively ‘passive’ recipients of evidence collected and presented to them by police. This reflects the British tradition of prosecutorial independence, which favours a degree of insulation from the police and from executive government.