Gregory D. Hess

How Much Does Violence Tax Trade

We investigate the empirical effect of violence, as compared to other trade impediments, on trade flows. Our analysis is based on a panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 1999, which brings together information from the Rose data set, the iterate data set for terrorist events, and data sets of external and internal conflict. We explore these data with traditional and theoretical gravity models. We calculate that, for a given country year, the presence of terrorism together with internal and external conflict is equivalent to as much as a 30% tariff on trade. This is larger than estimated tariff-equivalent costs of border and language barriers and tariff-equivalent reduction through generalized systems of preference and WTO participation.

Are Higher Levels of Inflation Less Predictable? A State-Dependent Conditional Heteroscedasticity Approach

Milton Friedman proposed that there is a positive relationship between inflation and uncertainty about the future path of inflation. In contrast to previous studies of this hypothesis, we find strong statistical evidence that higher levels of inflation are less predictable, although innovations in inflation are somewhat better predictors of future volatility than the actual level of inflation. We argue that previous failures to find an inflation-uncertainty relationship are due to two factors. First, none of the previous work directly tested Friedmans hypothesis by including the level of inflation in the model of the conditional variance. Second, these studies also used symmetric models, which appears inconsistent with Friedmans hypothesis. Our results are robust to different sample periods and to assumptions about the presence of a unit root in inflation. To test the inflation-uncertainty hypothesis, we use state-dependent models (SDMs) of conditional moments to estimate the time-varying conditional v...

The Temporal Links between Conflict and Economic Activity

Data from 152 countries from 1950 to 1992 are used to estimate the joint determination of external conflict, internal conflict, and the business cycle. Results show that the occurrence of a recession alone will significantly increase the probability of internal conflict, and when combined with the occurrence of an external conflict, recessions will further increase the probability of internal conflict. These results are obtained from estimates of a Markov probability model in which transitions between states of peace and conflict influence each other and the state of the economy. Strong evidence emerges that the internal conflict, external conflict, and the state of the economy are not independent of one another. The results suggest that recessions can provide the spark for increased probabilities of internal and external conflict, which in turn raise the probability of recessions. Such dynamics are suggestive of a poverty-conflict trap-like environment.

War And Democracy

We present a general equilibrium model of conflict to investigate whether the prevalence of democracy is sufficient to foster the perpetual peace hypothesized by Immanuel Kant and whether the world would necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt democratic institutions. Our exploration suggests that neither hypothesis is true. The desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable economic performance to hold on to power generates an incentive to initiate conflict and salvage their position—with some probability. An equilibrium with positive war frequency is sustained even if all nations were to adopt representative democratic institutions and even in the absence of an appropriative motive for war.

Measuring and Comparing Business-Cycle Features

Since the extensive work by Burns and Mitchell, many economists have interpreted economic fluctuations in terms of business-cycle phases. Given this, we argue that, in addition to usual model-selection criteria currently used in the profession, the adequacy of a univariate macroeconomic time series model should be based on its ability to replicate two important business-cycle features of the U.S. data—duration and amplitude. We propose several checks for whether univariate statistical models generate business-cycle features observed in U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and find that many popular nonlinear models for the log of real GDP are no better at replicating the duration and amplitude features of the data than a simple ARIMA(1, 1, 0).

Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What's Love Got to Do with it?

When markets are incomplete, individuals may choose to marry to diversify their labor income risk. Love, however, can complicate the picture. If love is fleeting or the resolution of agents’ income uncertainty occurs predominantly later in life, then marriages with good economic matches last longer. In contrast, if love is persistent and the resolution of uncertainty to agents’ income occurs early, then marriages with good economic matches are more likely to be caught short with too little love to save a marriage. Consequently, once married, the partners will be more likely to divorce. Evidence is provided to distinguish between these alternative scenarios.

Is the Political Business Cycle for Real

This paper constructs and examines a macroeconomic model which combines features from both real and political business cycle models. We augment a standard real business cycle tax model by allowing for varying levels of government partisanship and competence in order to replicate two important empirical regularities: First, that on average the economy expands early under Democratic Presidents and contracts early under Republican Presidents. Second, that Presidents whose parties successfully retain the presidency have stronger than average growth in the second half of their terms. The model generates both of these features that conform to U.S. Post World War II data.

Politics and exchange rate forecasts

Standard exchange rate models perform poorly in out-of-sample forecasting when compared to the random walk model. We posit part of the poor performance of these models may be due to omission of political factors. We test this hypothesis by including political variables that capture party-specific, election-specific and candidate-specific characteristics. Surprisingly, we find our political model outperforms the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting at one to twelve month horizons for the pound/dollar, mark/dollar, pound/mark and the trade-weighted dollar, mark, and pound exchange rates.

Asymmetric persistence in GDP? A deeper look at depth

If economic time series behave asymmetrically, then an interpretation of economic fluctuations based on linear time series models could be misleading. Beaudry and Koop (1993) recently argued that for post war U.S. GDP data there exists a statistically significant difference in persistence between negative and positive shocks. Their finding, if true, would be quite interesting since it would bring a new perspective to the literature on business cycle, which has been dominated by two conflicting views: the trend-reverting view of Blanchard (1981) and the permanent view of Campbell and Mankiw (1987). The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the evidence of asymmetric persistence of GDP by analyzing the statistical properties of BKs test. In particular, we show there are two pitfalls for this test: First, the t-statistic for testing asymmetry in persistence does not have a conventional interpretation. Second, a highly significant t-value may come from sources different from asymmetry. Using international data, we also explore the robustness of the BK result across the G-7 countries and find that the evidence is quite varied. Moreover, there appears to be no simple explanation for why countries display similar types of asymmetric behavior.

From (No) Butter to Guns? Understanding the Economic Role in Transnational Terrorism

This paper provides a comprehensive study into the economic determinants of transnational terrorism and the role that development plays in fostering a more peaceful world. We analyze models of conflict resolution to investigate the relative importance of economic development on domestic and transnational terrorism. We construct an original database from 1968-2003 for 179 countries in order to examine which economic factors influence the propensity to be affected by transnational terrorist activities. We also compare these results to a sub-sample from 1998-2003 on domestic terrorism. We find that economic development is associated with higher incidents of transnational terrorism, especially in higher income countries. However, when considering lower income countries, economic progress is actually negatively related to transnational terrorism.