Gregory D. Koblentz

Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses

Advances in science and technology, the rise of globalization, the emergence of new diseases, and the changing nature of conflict have increased the risks posed by naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. A growing acceptance of a broader definition of security since the end of the Cold War has facilitated the rise of biosecurity issues on the international security agenda. Developing strategies to counter biological threats is complicated by the lack of agreement on the definition of biosecurity, the diverse range of biological threats, and competing perspectives on the most pressing biological threats. A comprehensive definition of biosecurity that encompasses naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks can help to further research, analysis, and policymaking. Operationalizing this broad conception of biosecurity requires a taxonomy of biological threats based on a levels-of-analysis approach that identifies which types of actors are potential sources of biological threats and the groups most at risk from these threats. A biosecurity taxonomy can provide a common framework for the multidisciplinary research and analysis necessary to assess and manage these risks. It also has implications for how to prevent and respond to biological threats, as well as for the future of biosecurity research.

Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare

have become one of the key security issues of the twenty-arst century.1 Three factors that arst emerged in the 1990s have contributed to this phenomenon. First, revelations regarding the size, scope, and sophistication of the Soviet and Iraqi biological warfare programs focused renewed attention on the proliferation of these weapons.2 Second, the catastrophic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the anthrax letters sent to media outlets and Senate ofaces in the United States during the following month, demonstrated the desire of terrorists to cause massive casualties and heightened concern over their ability to employ biological weapons.3 Third, signiacant advances in the life sciences have increased concerns about how the biotechnology revolution could be exploited to develop new or improved biological weapons.4 These trends suggest that there is a greater need than ever to answer several fundamental questions about biological warfare: What is the nature of the threat? What are the potential strategic consequences of the proliferation of biological weapons? How ef-

Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN Terrorism

Since the mid-1990s, academic and policy communities have debated the risk posed by terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Three major schools of thought in the debate have emerged: the optimists, the pessimists, and the pragmatists. Although these three schools of thought draw on the same limited universe of data on CBRN terrorism, they arrive at strikingly different conclusions. Given the highly subjective process of CBRN terrorism risk assessment, this article analyzes the influence of mental shortcuts (called heuristics) and the systemic errors they create (called biases) on the risk assessment process. This article identifies and provides illustrative examples of a range of heuristics and biases that lead to the underestimation of risks, the overestimation of risks and, most importantly, those that degrade the quality of the debate about the level of risk. While these types of biases are commonly seen as affecting the publics perception of risk, such biases can also be found in risk assessments by experts. The article concludes with recommendations for improving the CBRN risk assessment process.

Tracing an Attack: The Promise and Pitfalls of Microbial Forensics

The investigation of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks in the United States gave a strong impetus to the new discipline of microbial forensics, which involves the use of sophisticated genetic, chemical and physical techniques to characterise a pathogen or toxin agent that has been used as a weapon. Microbial forensic evidence can assist in the process of attribution, or identifying the country, group, or individual responsible for a biological attack, in order to pursue legal prosecution or military retaliation. An effective attribution capability can also play an important role in deterring biological warfare and terrorism.

The four faces of microbial forensics.

The emerging field of microbial forensics played a major role in the investigation of the 2001 anthrax mailings and has been closely associated with the process of attribution, or identifying the perpetrator of a biological attack for purposes of criminal prosecution or military retaliation. Nevertheless, microbial forensics has other potential applications in intelligence, nonproliferation, and verification. This article describes the relevance of microbial forensics for a variety of law enforcement and national security missions, examines the obstacles to its broader use, and concludes with some policy recommendations.

Viral Warfare: The Security Implications of Cyber and Biological Weapons

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, two new threats have received increased attention: biological warfare (BW) and cyber warfare. While it may appear that these two threats have little in common, they share several characteristics that have significant implications for international security. This article examines the two modalities side-by-side to review these common characteristics. In light of these commonalities and due to the extensive experience and rich history of dealing with BW threats, strategies for enhancing cyber security could advance more quickly by drawing meaningful insights from the biological warfare experience, such as the prospect of developing constraining international norms.

The threat of pandemic influenza: why today is not 1918.

The specter of the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic, which killed an estimated 40-100 million people worldwide, hangs over analyses of and responses to the current pandemic of swine-origin novel influenza A (H1N1). There are four major differences between today and 1918 that reduce the likelihood that the current pandemic—or the next one—will be as deadly as the one in 1918. Today we have advance warning of the threat of a highly lethal influenza pandemic, we have a global human health surveillance and response system, we have new medical countermeasures, and there is no global conflict like World War I to act as an incubator and vector for a highly lethal influenza virus and an impediment to medical and public health responses to the pandemic.

A Critical Analysis of the Scientific and Commercial Rationales for the De Novo Synthesis of Horsepox Virus

This article evaluates the scientific and commercial rationales for the synthesis of horsepox virus. I find that the claimed benefits of using horsepox virus as a smallpox vaccine rest on a weak scientific foundation and an even weaker business case that this project will lead to a licensed medical countermeasure. ABSTRACT This article evaluates the scientific and commercial rationales for the synthesis of horsepox virus. I find that the claimed benefits of using horsepox virus as a smallpox vaccine rest on a weak scientific foundation and an even weaker business case that this project will lead to a licensed medical countermeasure. The combination of questionable benefits and known risks of this dual use research raises serious questions about the wisdom of undertaking research that could be used to recreate variola virus. This analysis also raises important questions about the propriety of a private company sponsoring such dual use research without appropriate oversight and highlights an important gap in United States dual use research regulations.

Dual-use research as a wicked problem.

The challenge of dual-use research in the life sciences emerged vividly in 2011 as scientists and policy-makers debated what to do about article manuscripts that described how to modify the H5N1 avian influenza virus so that it could spread between mammals (1, 2). Since H5N1 emerged in Southeast Asia in 2003, it has sickened 667 people and caused 393 human deaths, as well as the deaths of millions of domestic and wild birds (3). The virus has not, however, demonstrated the ability to engage in sustained human-to-human transmission. If a new strain of H5N1 emerged with that capability, and it retained a high level of virulence, it could cause a global pandemic. The experiments by Yoshihiro Kawaoka from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Ron Fouchier from Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands not only demonstrated that mammalian transmission of the virus was possible but also provided information on how to construct such a virus.

Strengthening Biosecurity in Iraq: Development of a National Biorisk Management System

Since 2004, the Republic of Iraq has undertaken a concerted effort to comply with all of its international obligations to prevent the proliferation and the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. A centerpiece of this effort is Iraq’s development of a National Biorisk Management System. The Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA), which is responsible for CBRN security and non-proliferation in Iraq, has played a key role in establishing this system. This article provides an overview of Iraq’s international non-proliferation commitments, describes the legal and organizational steps it has taken to implement these commitments, and examines current initiatives to strengthen Iraq’s biosecurity.