Gregory S. Parnell

Air Force Cyberspace Investment Analysis

Space and cyberspace operations are primary missions within the U.S. Armed Forces. Air Force Space Command performs investment planning for Air Force space and cyberspace missions. The command has performed space investment planning for more than 15 years using multiobjective decision analysis to assess the value of space programs for military operations and an optimization model to maximize space capabilities subject to performance, budget, schedule, and programmatic constraints. Air Force cyberspace operations and investment planning were assigned to Air Force Space Command in 2009. We developed an improved cyberspace investment analysis method using decision analysis techniques to support investment planning for the Air Forces approximately

Engineering Resilience for Complex Systems

3.5 billion annual cyberspace investment. We developed four models to assess the value of Air Force cyberspace programs: a multiobjective decision analysis model for information technology infrastructure, a probability model to assess the capability to defend Air Force networks, a probability model to assess the capability to command and control cyberspace assets, and a probability model to assess the capability to perform cyberspace attacks when directed by national command authorities. The models were incorporated into the Air Force Space Command Integrated Planning Process and have been used for three years.

A Systems Engineering Perspective on the Revised Defense Acquisition System

In recent years there has been an increased need for resilience in complex military and civilian systems due to evolving adversarial and environmental threats. Engineered Resilient Systems (ERS) is a Department of Defense (DoD) program focusing on the effective and efficient design and development of complex engineered systems. These complex systems need to be resilient to threats throughout their life cycle. However, most current engineering resilience literature focuses on systems with a single function and a single measure. Today’s systems are becoming more complex, with multiple functions and measures involving critical trade-offs during early life cycle stages. This paper develops criteria for a framework to incorporate resilience into DoD analysis of alternatives (AoA). Using the criteria, this paper creates a framework for defining and evaluating complex engineered systems that consider many missions, scenarios, uncertainties, functions, and measures. Lastly, using the criteria and the framework, the current literature is shown to have gaps for incorporating resilience into DoD AoAs.

Comparison of Approaches for Adversary Modeling Decision Support for Counterterrorism

The U.S. Department of Defense DoD has recently revised the defense acquisition system to address suspected root causes hindering higher success rates. This article applies two systems thinking methodologies in a uniquely integrated fashion to provide an in-depth review and compelling interpretation of the revised defense acquisition system as put forth in January 7, 2015 DoDI 5000.02. Changes from the previous defense acquisition system are significant and may be cause for some cautious optimism in the United States. This article describes how the architects of the revised defense acquisition system have increased emphasis on systems engineering activities applied early in the lifecycle so that meaningful trade-offs between capability requirements and lifecycle costs can be explored as requirements are being written to ensure realistic program baselines are established such that associated lifecycle costs will likely fit within future budgets. Expressed as emerging systems engineering research questions, this article identifies several gaps that are likely to emerge as the defense acquisition community attempts to execute the new acquisition system.

Designing an OOTW decision support system for military planners

Intelligent adversaries are a fundamental component of terrorism risk analysis. Unlike natural and engineering hazards, intelligent adversaries adapt their behavior to the actions of the defender. They adapt to observed, perceived, and imputed likely future actions by those defending the system they are attempting to influence. Risk assessment models need to consider these potential adaptive behaviors to be able to provide accurate estimates of future risk from intelligent adversaries and appropriately support risk management decision making.

Organizational Decision Processes

The intelligence community must provide relevant, timely intelligence to support operations other than war (OOTW). Recently, OOTW have become an increasing challenge to military planners. The intelligence community does not know with certainty where or when future OOTW will occur, what the operations will involve, when they will occur, or how much advance warning will be provided. To prudently deal with these challenges, the US Armys National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) has developed a plan to systematically identify knowledge needs to support future OOTW. We present our preliminary knowledge hierarchy for the collection of intelligence information to help national security planners prepare for future OOTW. We developed a prototype to accept user input on alternative deployment locations and value assessments for criteria from the knowledge hierarchy to determine the best location. For a specific location, criteria receiving a score below a threshold generate a needed capability for the deploying unit. By analyzing locations that could serve as military areas of operations, the prototype answers the questions as to where to deploy and what to bring. This system represents the first attempt to use intelligence information in a decision support system that specifically addresses the needs of OOTW planners at multiple levels of command.