Guillermo L. Ordoñez

The Currency Union Effect on Trade: Early Evidence from Emu

In this paper we estimate the early effect of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on trade. We use a panel data set that includes the most recent information on bilateral trade for 22 developed countries from 1992 through 2002. During this period 12 European countries formally entered into a currency union. This is a unique event that allows us to study the effect of currency union among a relatively homogeneous group of industrial countries. Controlling for a host of other factors, we find that the effect of EMU on bilateral trade between member countries ranges between 5 and 10 percent, when compared to trade between all other pairs of countries, and between 9 and 20 percent, when compared to trade among non-EMU countries. In addition, we find no evidence of trade diversion. If anything, our results suggest that monetary union increases trade not just with EMU countries, but also with the rest of the world.

Financial Liberalization: Does It Pay to Join the Party?

Financial liberalization is a highly controversial policy. Despite the fact that almost all the regions of the world have undergone liberalization of their financial markets, its effect on the performance of different economic sectors remains a question. In our research, we find that financial liberalization reduces the cost of capital, boosting the relative growth rates of economic sectors that for technological reasons rely heavily on external (to the firm) finance. This result, however, depends on the quality of institutions supporting credit markets. The effects of financial liberalization are more notable in countries that have and enforce regulations to protect property rights. In this sense, the answer to the question in the title of the paper is not clear-cut. The impact of financial liberalization on growth depends on underlying institutional factors.

The Supply and Demand for Safe Assets

There is a demand for safe assets, either government bonds or private substitutes, for use as collateral. Government bonds are safe assets, given the governments power to tax, but their supply is driven by fiscal considerations, and does not necessarily meet the private demand for safe assets. Unlike the government, the private sector cannot produce riskless collateral. When the private sector reaches its limit (the quality of private collateral), government bonds are net wealth, up to the governments own limits (taxation capacity). The economy is fragile to the extent that privately-produced safe assets are relied upon. In a crisis, government bonds can replace private assets that do not sustain borrowing anymore, raising welfare.

Good Booms, Bad Booms

Credit booms usually precede financial crises. However, some credit booms end in a crisis (bad booms) and other booms do not (good booms). We document that, while all booms start with an increase in the growth of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), such growth falls much faster subsequently for bad booms. We then develop a simple framework to explain this. Firms finance investment opportunities with short-term collateralized debt. If agents do not produce information about the collateral quality, a credit boom develops, accommodating firms with lower quality projects and increasing the incentives of lenders to acquire information about the collateral, eventually triggering a crisis. When the quality of investment opportunities also grow, the credit boom may not end in a crisis because there is a gradual adoption of low quality projects, but those projects are also of better quality, not inducing information about collateral.Credit Booms are not rare; some end in a crisis (bad booms) while others do not (good booms). We document that credit booms start with an increase in productivity growth, which subsequently falls faster during bad booms. We develop a model in which crises happen when credit booms change to an information regime with careful examination of collateral. As this examination is more valuable when collateral backs projects with low productivity, crises are more likely during booms that display productivity declines. We test the main predictions of the model and identify a component of productivity that is behind crises.

Political Booms, Financial Crises

We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments’ popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism.

Debt: Deleveraging or Default

We study a dynamic model of collateralized credit markets with asymmetric information, which allows for a rich set of signaling strategies based on the path of debt and repayment. Whether credit history reveals private information about credit quality depends on the degree of uncertainty in collateral value. When uncertainty is low, good borrowers fully and costlessly separate by deleveraging, that is borrowing a sufficiently high amount such that subsequent repayment reveals the presence of unobservable income. When uncertainty is higher, good borrowers pay an adverse selection cost through a higher interest rate because bad borrowers could default, and asymmetric information is not always resolved.