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Dive into the research topics where Gunes Acar is active.

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Featured researches published by Gunes Acar.


computer and communications security | 2013

FPDetective: dusting the web for fingerprinters

Gunes Acar; Marc Juarez; Nick Nikiforakis; Claudia Diaz; Seda F. Gürses; Frank Piessens; Bart Preneel

In the modern web, the browser has emerged as the vehicle of choice, which users are to trust, customize, and use, to access a wealth of information and online services. However, recent studies show that the browser can also be used to invisibly fingerprint the user: a practice that may have serious privacy and security implications. In this paper, we report on the design, implementation and deployment of FPDetective, a framework for the detection and analysis of web-based fingerprinters. Instead of relying on information about known fingerprinters or third-party-tracking blacklists, FPDetective focuses on the detection of the fingerprinting itself. By applying our framework with a focus on font detection practices, we were able to conduct a large scale analysis of the million most popular websites of the Internet, and discovered that the adoption of fingerprinting is much higher than previous studies had estimated. Moreover, we analyze two countermeasures that have been proposed to defend against fingerprinting and find weaknesses in them that might be exploited to bypass their protection. Finally, based on our findings, we discuss the current understanding of fingerprinting and how it is related to Personally Identifiable Information, showing that there needs to be a change in the way users, companies and legislators engage with fingerprinting.


computer and communications security | 2014

A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks

Marc Juarez; Sadia Afroz; Gunes Acar; Claudia Diaz; Rachel Greenstadt

Recent studies on Website Fingerprinting (WF) claim to have found highly effective attacks on Tor. However, these studies make assumptions about user settings, adversary capabilities, and the nature of the Web that do not necessarily hold in practical scenarios. The following study critically evaluates these assumptions by conducting the attack where the assumptions do not hold. We show that certain variables, for example, users browsing habits, differences in location and version of Tor Browser Bundle, that are usually omitted from the current WF model have a significant impact on the efficacy of the attack. We also empirically show how prior work succumbs to the base rate fallacy in the open-world scenario. We address this problem by augmenting our classification method with a verification step. We conclude that even though this approach reduces the number of false positives over 63\%, it does not completely solve the problem, which remains an open issue for WF attacks.


Revised Selected Papers of the 10th International Workshop on Data Privacy Management, and Security Assurance - Volume 9481 | 2015

The Leaking Battery

Łukasz Olejnik; Gunes Acar; Claude Castelluccia; Claudia Diaz

We highlight privacy risks associated with the HTML5 Battery Status API. We put special focus on its implementation in the Firefox browser. Our study shows that websites can discover the capacity of users’ batteries by exploiting the high precision readouts provided by Firefox on Linux. The capacity of the battery, as well as its level, expose a fingerprintable surface that can be used to track web users in short time intervals. Our analysis shows that the risk is much higher for old or used batteries with reduced capacities, as the battery capacity may potentially serve as a tracking identifier. The fingerprintable surface of the API could be drastically reduced without any loss in the API’s functionality by reducing the precision of the readings. We propose minor modifications to Battery Status API and its implementation in the Firefox browser to address the privacy issues presented in the study. Our bug report for Firefox was accepted and a fix is deployed.


IEEE Spectrum | 2014

Browse at your own risk

Nick Nikiforakis; Gunes Acar

The paper states that even without cookies, fingerprinting lets advertisers track your every online move. In the past, clearing cookies after each session or selecting your browsers “Do Not Track” setting could prevent third-party tracking. But the advent of browser fingerprinting makes it very difficult to prevent others from monitoring your online activities. The diagram at right outlines how an online advertising network can track the sites you visit using fingerprinting.


financial cryptography | 2016

Leaky Birds: Exploiting Mobile Application Traffic for Surveillance

Eline Vanrykel; Gunes Acar; Michael Herrmann; Claudia Diaz

Over the last decade, mobile devices and mobile applications have become pervasive in their usage. Although many privacy risks associated with mobile applications have been investigated, prior work mainly focuses on the collection of user information by application developers and advertisers. Inspired by the Snowden revelations, we study the ways mobile applications enable mass surveillance by sending unique identifiers over unencrypted connections. Applying passive network fingerprinting, we show how a passive network adversary can improve his ability to target mobile users’ traffic.


financial cryptography | 2015

Purchase Details Leaked to PayPal

Sören Preibusch; Thomas Peetz; Gunes Acar; Bettina Berendt

We describe a new form of online tracking: explicit, yet unnecessary leakage of personal information and detailed shopping habits from online merchants to payment providers. In contrast to Web tracking, online shops make it impossible for their customers to avoid this proliferation of their data. We record and analyse leakage patterns for N = 881 US Web shops sampled from Web users’ actual online purchase sessions. More than half of the sites shared product names and details with PayPal, allowing the payment provider to build up comprehensive consumption profiles across the sites consumers buy from, subscribe to, or donate to. In addition, PayPal forwards customers’ shopping details to Omniture, a third-party data aggregator with an even larger tracking reach. Leakage to PayPal is commonplace across product categories and includes details of medication or sex toys. We provide recommendations for merchants.


computer and communications security | 2017

How Unique is Your .onion?: An Analysis of the Fingerprintability of Tor Onion Services

Rebekah Overdorf; Mark Juarez; Gunes Acar; Rachel Greenstadt; Claudia Diaz

Recent studies have shown that Tor onion (hidden) service websites are particularly vulnerable to website fingerprinting attacks due to their limited number and sensitive nature. In this work we present a multi-level feature analysis of onion site fingerprintability, considering three state-of-the-art website fingerprinting methods and 482 Tor onion services, making this the largest analysis of this kind completed on onion services to date. Prior studies typically report average performance results for a given website fingerprinting method or countermeasure. We investigate which sites are more or less vulnerable to fingerprinting and which features make them so. We find that there is a high variability in the rate at which sites are classified (and misclassified) by these attacks, implying that average performance figures may not be informative of the risks that website fingerprinting attacks pose to particular sites. We analyze the features exploited by the different website fingerprinting methods and discuss what makes onion service sites more or less easily identifiable, both in terms of their traffic traces as well as their webpage design. We study misclassifications to understand how onion services sites can be redesigned to be less vulnerable to website fingerprinting attacks. Our results also inform the design of website fingerprinting countermeasures and their evaluation considering disparate impact across sites.


computer and communications security | 2014

The Web Never Forgets: Persistent Tracking Mechanisms in the Wild

Gunes Acar; Christian Eubank; Steven Englehardt; Marc Juarez; Arvind Narayanan; Claudia Diaz


Electronic Commerce Research and Applications | 2016

Shopping for privacy

Sören Preibusch; Thomas Peetz; Gunes Acar; Bettina Berendt


DPM/QASA@ESORICS | 2015

The Leaking Battery - A Privacy Analysis of the HTML5 Battery Status API.

Lukasz Olejnik; Gunes Acar; Claude Castelluccia; Claudia Diaz

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Claudia Diaz

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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Bettina Berendt

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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Marc Juarez

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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Thomas Peetz

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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Bart Preneel

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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Eline Vanrykel

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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Frank Piessens

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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