Gunter Gebauer

The quartet theory of human emotions: An integrative and neurofunctional model

Despite an explosion of research in the affective sciences during the last few decades, interdisciplinary theories of human emotions are lacking. Here we present a neurobiological theory of emotions that includes emotions which are uniquely human (such as complex moral emotions), considers the role of language for emotions, advances the understanding of neural correlates of attachment-related emotions, and integrates emotion theories from different disciplines. We propose that four classes of emotions originate from four neuroanatomically distinct cerebral systems. These emotional core systems constitute a quartet of affect systems: the brainstem-, diencephalon-, hippocampus-, and orbitofrontal-centred affect systems. The affect systems were increasingly differentiated during the course of evolution, and each of these systems generates a specific class of affects (e.g., ascending activation, pain/pleasure, attachment-related affects, and moral affects). The affect systems interact with each other, and activity of the affect systems has effects on - and interacts with - biological systems denoted here as emotional effector systems. These effector systems include motor systems (which produce actions, action tendencies, and motoric expression of emotion), peripheral physiological arousal, as well as attentional and memory systems. Activity of affect systems and effector systems is synthesized into an emotion percept (pre-verbal subjective feeling), which can be transformed (or reconfigured) into a symbolic code such as language. Moreover, conscious cognitive appraisal (involving rational thought, logic, and usually language) can regulate, modulate, and partly initiate, activity of affect systems and effector systems. Our emotion theory integrates psychological, neurobiological, sociological, anthropological, and psycholinguistic perspectives on emotions in an interdisciplinary manner, aiming to advance the understanding of human emotions and their neural correlates.

„Leistung“ als Aktion und Präsentation

ZusammenfassungenDie sprachanalytische Untersuchung des Begriffs „Leistung“ führt zu der Konzeption einer „Philosophie der Leistung“ als einer Theorienormativer Aussagen über „Leistung“. Handlungen werden anhand bestimmter Kriterien als „Leistungen“ identifiziert; es kommt daher der Präsentation dieser Aktionen als „Leistungen“ Bedeutung zu: Eine „Leistung“ besteht immer aus einer „Aktions-“ und einer „Präsentations-Leistung“. Insbesondere die „Präsentations-Leistung“ erfüllt eine entscheidende Funktion bei der Konstitution von „Identität“, wie in einer Fortführung vonGoffmans Theorie gezeigt wird. Die rationale Explikation des Vorwurfs der „manipulierten Leistung“ besteht darin, daß die Zeichenmenge der „Aktions-Leistungen“ von Spitzensportlern nicht hinreicht, um „Präsentations-Leistungen“ zu vollbringen, die stattdessen von Massenmedien und Individuen übernommen werden; die mögliche Konstitution einer originalen „Identität“ durch den Sport bleibt aus.SummariesThe linguistic analysis of the concept of “performance” leads towards a conception of a “philosophy of performance” which takes the form of a theory consisting of normative statements on “performance”. Actions are regarded as “performances” if they fulfil certain criteria; the presentation of these actions as performances becomes meaningful: performance always consists of both action and presentation. In particular the presentation-aspect of performance fulfils a decisive function in constituting one’s identity. This has been demonstrated on the basis ofGoffmans theory. If one explicates rationally the criticism of a “manipulated performance” one discovers that amount of information in the action-performances of top sportsmen does not suffice to fulfil a presentation-performance. This is taken over instead by the mass-media and the individual. There is no possibility to constitute original identity through sport.RésumésL’analyse linguistique de l’emploi du concept de „performance“ nous conduit à concevoir une „philosophie de la performance“ comme étant une théorie despropositions normatives au sujet de la performance. A l’aide de certains critères on identifie des actions avec la performance; pour cette raison la présentation de ces actions en tant que „performance“ est d’une grande importance: toute performance se compose de sonaction et de saprésentation. C’est en particulier la „présentation de la performance“ qui joue un rôle décisif lors de la constitution de l’„identité“ ce qui est démontré à partir de la théorie deGoffman. L’explication rationnelle du reproche d’avoir manipulé la performance consiste dans le fait que l’ensemble des signes des „actions de performance“ réalisées par d’excellents sportifs se révèle comme insuffisant afin d’accomplir des „présentations de performance“; celles-ci sont reprises par des individus influents et par la presse, la radio et la télévision; la constitution possible d’une identité originale à l’aide du sport ne s’accomplit pas.

After the “Death of Man”: From Philosophical Anthropology to Historical Anthropology

The first part of the article (§§ 1-3) illustrates the critical relation the authors establish with the leading figures of philosophical anthropology in terms of their engagement with “world-openness” (Weltoffenheit). This notion cannot be reduced to the objectivity that confronts man as a spiritual being, as in Max Scheler, but rather makes it possible to grasp the limits of distancing objectification; in Arnold Gehlen, the coercion to action derived from the indeterminacy of man’s relation with the world is not sufficient to comprehend the role of culture for the constitution of the human animal itself; and with the biological means utilized by Helmuth Plessner it is not possible to account entirely for the human capacity to establish relations by means of society. Historical anthropology, as the second part (§§ 4-5) of the article shows, aims to respond to such deficiencies by bringing to light the numerous historical and cultural forms of openness to a plurality of worlds. Freeing itself of any abstract and binding anthropological norm that claims to define the essence of man, historical anthropology investigates human structures and phenomena through a series of transdisciplinary studies centering on themes such as the body, ritual, mimesis and the performative dimension in its entirety, performance and performativity.

Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Natur

ZusammenfassungenDie Behauptung, der Sport und die Leibeserziehung trügen zu einer Befreiung der Natur des Körpers bei, wird kritisch diskutiert. Als Urheber dieser Behauptung kann J.-J. Rousseau gelten. In seinem Werk impliziert die Befreiung eine Wiederherstellung der Ursprungsnatur des Menschen. Rousseaus Erziehungsprogramm gibt den Weg an, wie die von der Gesellschaft unterdrückte Natur befreit werden soll. Wie aber läßt sich erkennen, welche die Natur der zu erziehenden Individuen ist? Die Begründung, die Rousseau dem Erziehungsprogramm in seinem Werk gibt, zeigt, daß die Ursprungsnatur des Körpers eine romanhafte Imagination ist. Der in der Erziehung „befreite“ Körper ist nichts anderes als die Verwirklichung eines Bildungsprogramms, dessen Ziel und Richtung vom Erzieher festgelegt werden. Indem der Erzieher vorgibt, das Individuum zu befreien, übt er Macht über dieses aus. Die Machtausübung erscheint nicht als repressiv, sondern wirkt über die Bestärkung von Körper-Phantasien, die das Individuum von seiner Sinnlichkeit entfernen.SummariesThe assertion that sports and physical education contribute to a freeing of the nature of the body has been critically discussed. J.-J. Rousseau may be seen as the originator of this assertion, which contains implicitlywithin it the notion that such a freeing would be the re-creation of the original nature of mankind. Rousseau’s educational program shows the way to the liberation of the human nature which society has repressed. But how do we establish what the nature is, to which the individual is to be educated? Rousseau’s own justification of his educational program betrays the original nature of the body as the product of a npvelistic imagination. The body to be “liberated” by education is nothing other than the realization of an educational program whose goals and guidelines are set by the educator. While the educator claims to liberate the individual, he actually exerts power over him. This exertion of power appears not as repression but as the strengthening of fantasies about the body which actually tend to alienate the individual from his own sensed reality.

The Interaction Between Rules and Habitus

The use of language is capable of adapting to the extremely diverse situations of a game and of responding adequately to each one, a capacity that can be understood with reference to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Language-games begin to occupy a central place in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. From primitive language-games he moves on to more complex forms that function with the help of “paradigms”. Even the more complicated uses of language remain tied to the body’s practical use. Wittgenstein looks at rule-following in the language games as a “technique” that has its origins in the body, structured by social practice. The final problem of this chapter is the question of how the factual existence of regular actions can give rise to the normative concept of rules.

The Practice of Philosophy

The point of departure of the book is the transition from the Tractatus to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. During the decade from 1919 to 1929, Wittgenstein kept silence in the realm of philosophy and turned his attention to practical activities. He worked as a teacher and architect. When he started to write again, he missed no opportunity to distance himself from academic philosophy, an attitude Gebauer analyzes as a critique of the “scholastic point of view” (Austin, Bourdieu): Philosophy can no longer be understood as the mind’s engagement with problems that are treated exclusively in a mental sphere. Wittgenstein wants to open up a view of the ordinary and simultaneously acquire the capacity to recognize the wondrousness of everyday practices.

The Turn to Anthropology

The focus of this chapter is on the first years after Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge (in 1929). His discussions with Piero Sraffa deepened his interest in the material reality of human practice. In the use of gestures, Wittgenstein sees the world and the body as pre-structured by an order of existing practices. Thus, even before human beings learn ordinary language, they develop a regulated use of their bodies. Together with the structuring practices, this forms the precondition for following rules. Language use is conceived of as an operating with words, but in contrast to material practice, it is governed by a “grammar” that is independent of actions. Grammatical rules are capable of generating their own uses and thus give rise to new meanings.

Materialism and Belief

In this chapter, Gebauer applies Bourdieu’s notion of habitus to Wittgenstein’s concepts of “life-form” and “certainty”. Not only is the human being contained in the rule-structured world; the world is also contained in acting human beings in the sense that each one possesses a specific life-form. By adopting a life-form, people also adopt a whole network of certainties. In Wittgenstein’s discussion of these concepts, it is clear that his thought is not oriented toward epistemological knowledge of the world but toward the individual subject’s relationship with herself. In the grammatical form of the first person, language creates an interchange through which the unexpressed bodily reactions can enter into the language-game.

From Seeing to Practice

In his work as an architect, Wittgenstein gained important insights that would lead him to a new philosophical thinking. They are contained in the notes originally published in the Wiener Ausgabe, which are of inestimable value for understanding the path leading to the Philosophical Investigations. His new orientation is centered around practical human action and the spatial dimension of thought. The human body, movements, and actions now come into play. In Wittgenstein’s new way of doing philosophy, one can see that his architectural work seems to have developed a spatial and object-oriented engagement with things in the world. In this chapter of this book, Gebauer shows how Wittgenstein integrated the physical space of action into his thinking, and how he incorporated the self into this world.

Wittgenstein’s Pictures

In his last writings, Wittgenstein proposes a solution to the question of how language is able to grasp inner experiences and to be understood by other persons. His key concept for the language-games of feelings is that of primitive reactions. An injured person feels pain; at the same time his behavior is part of the pain and is a picture of his pain. In the Last Writings, Wittgenstein integrates his concepts of feeling, picture, and seeing-as into a coherent conception. His discussion of aspect-seeing is interpreted in relation to his lifelong ethical struggle for a good life. For Wittgenstein, the possibility of changing aspects when examining his own personality seems to bring a sense of calm to his restless investigations.