Gunter Graf

Health, justice and happiness during childhood

Health is certainly a valuable asset in the life of every human being and of particular relevance for a flourishing childhood. As empirical research concerning the social determinants of health shows, its distribution can, at least to a certain extent, be influenced by the way a society is arranged. Many philosophers now acknowledge that a fair distribution of health has to be a central part of a just society and they discuss to what extent a right to health can be justified. However, they do not typically distinguish between physical and mental health and neglect the special problems arising from these distinct, though related, perspectives. In this paper, we argue in favour of such a distinction and ask whether a minimally just society ought to include mental health among the goods that are to be distributed in a fair way among its children. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between mental health and happiness and ask whether making mental health a subject of justice implies that children are entitled not only to a healthy but also to a happy childhood. Despite the positive impact of happiness on the lives of children, we conclude that happiness cannot be incorporated into a functional theory of justice, since it does not fully meet the criteria of objectivity, measurability and influenceability.

Capabilities, Recognition and the Philosophical Evaluation of Poverty: A Discussion of Issues of Justification and the Role of Subjective Experiences

Both the capability and the recognition approach are influential and substantial theories in social philosophy. In this contribution, we outline their main assumptions in their assessment of poverty. The two approaches are set in relation to each other, focusing mainly on (a) their moral evaluation of poverty, (b) issues of justification of their central normative claims, and (c) the role that is attributed to subjective experiences, feelings and emotions in these theories. This comparison reveals that in spite of significant differences, both lead to the claim that poverty can never be adequately assessed without putting it into the context of a comprehensive ethical theory about the nature and function of societies. Drawing on this result, we conclude that the critical function of social philosophy plays an irreducible role in the study and understanding of poverty.

Poverty and freedom

The capability approach, which is closely connected to the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, is one possible theoretical framework that could be used to answer the question as to why poverty is a problem from a moral point of view. In this paper we will focus on the normative philosophical capability approach rather than the social scientific and descriptive perspective. We will show that the approach characterizes poverty mainly as a limitation of freedom and that it is precisely this aspect, from its point of view, that makes poverty morally significant. This insight shifts the discussion away from questions regarding specific capabilities or lists of them-questions treated extensively in the literature-to the more general level of what constitutes the normative core of the capability approach. But as we will also discuss and argue, the role of freedom alone does not give us a complete picture of poverty but only presents us with one aspect relevant to evaluating it. A further aspect which we consider has not been adequately recognized and taken into account by most capability theorists is the experience of disrespect and humiliation, or to put it differently, a lack of recognition.

The Subjective Experience of Poverty

Abstract What significance should the subjective experiences of poor people have in a normative philosophical critique of poverty? In this paper, we take up this question and answer it by looking at two different normative theories: the capability approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and the recognition approach of Axel Honneth. While Sen and Nussbaum are largely quite reluctant toward the role of subjective experiences of poor people, the recognition approach views them as central for its social critique of poverty. We will defend the thesis that a more inclusive view on the role of the subjects of suffering and injustice is needed, that such subjective experiences and the unique first-hand knowledge it produces cannot be substituted by objective criteria, while such criteria are needed to bolster – and in some cases also criticize – the poverty knowledge of poor people.

Körperstrafen als moralisches Übel

Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag wollen wir aus einer ethischen Perspektive dafur argumentieren, dass es moralisch verwerflich ist, Kinder mit Korperstrafen jeglicher Form zu zuchtigen, was ein starker Grund dafur ist, sie in allen Staaten auch rechtlich zu verbieten. Unsere ethische Argumentation fust also nicht schon selbst auf rechtlichen Vorgaben oder Traditionen in bestimmten Staaten wie Deutschland oder Osterreich, die die Korperstrafe verboten haben, sondern ist eine Argumentationsebene tiefer angesiedelt und kann in diesem Sinne auch eine auserlegistische Begrundung fur legistische Verbote abgeben. Wir werden vier Argumente vorbringen, die unsere Konklusion untermauern. Drei dieser Argumente beziehen sich spezifisch auf moralische Anspruche von Kindern, ein Argument bezieht sich auf gesellschaftliche Folgen der Korperstrafe (hier geht es also vor allem um unerwunschte Nebeneffekte). Korperstrafen verletzen die moralischen Anspruche von Kindern auf (a) die Unversehrtheit ihrer korperlichen Integritat, (b) auf Wohlergehen und Wohlentwickeln und (c) darauf, nicht erniedrigt zu werden. Korperstrafen schaffen (d) ein Klima der Gewalt in einer Gesellschaft, welches fur alle Gesellschaftsmitglieder – Kinder wie Erwachsene – moralisch schlecht ist. Schlagworter: Korperstrafe, Kinder, Ethik, korperliche Integritat ----- Corporal Punishment as a Moral Evil Abstract In this paper we will argue from an ethical perspective that all forms of corporal punishment of children are morally bad. Hence it should be illegal in all states. Our ethical reasoning is not based on certain laws or legal regulations of corporal punishment, for example in Germany or Austria, but aims to provide a moral basis for them. We will examine four arguments: corporal punishment violates childrens moral claims to (a) the protection of their bodily integrity, (b) their well-being and well-becoming, and (c) not to be humiliated. Furthermore, we show that corporal punishment (d) helps to create a societal climate of violence, which is for morally bad for everyone, children as well as adults. Keywords: Corporal Punishment, Children, Ethics, Bodily Integrity ----- Bibliographie: Schweiger, Gottfried/Graf, Gunter: Korperstrafen als moralisches Ubel, Diskurs Kindheits- und Jugendforschung, 1-2018, S. 39-53. https://doi.org/10.3224/diskurs.v13i1.04

Body and Sexuality

The chapter is concerned with children’s capability of sexuality as part of their bodily integrity. Since childhood sexuality is a highly contested and taboo issue, Graf and Schweiger first examine scientific knowledge about the sexual agency of children and its development. Then they focus on two different threats to children’s bodily integrity: the sexualization of childhood and sexual abuse. While the first one is situated on a societal and cultural level, dealing with such issues as the negative influence of the media, the ubiquitous availability of pornography, or the advertisement of unrealistic body ideals, the second issue of sexual abuse is located on the interpersonal level, although social factors are also important for its understanding and ethical critique.

Body and Eating

The chapter focuses on eating and nutrition. Graf and Schweiger describe the available evidence on childhood obesity and discuss its negative effects on the health, agency, and self-relations of affected children. They then turn to the family and the state as main agents of justice. At the centre of the second part of the section are eating disorders with a focus on anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, and binge-eating disorder, which have many harmful effects on the bodily integrity of children in all its dimensions. They discuss the social embedding of these conditions and address one agent of justice in more detail: the media.

Children’s Bodily Integrity: Justice and Child Well-Being in Affluent Societies

In this chapter, Graf and Schweiger present their normative framework, which is a (partial) theory of justice for children based on the capability approach. They are concerned with questions of children’s particularity, which differentiates them from adults, and thus examine childhood as a phase of development, in particular of autonomy, and increased vulnerability. Then they argue for certain modifications of the capability approach to fit better for children, and focus on the concept of developing capabilities for that task. Since bodily integrity is at the heart of this book, they further scrutinize this concept as a set of capabilities involving health, agency, and self-relations. Finally, they explore the concept of agents of justice for children and how responsibilities can be attributed to them, based on various grounds.

Body and Violence

In this chapter Graf and Schweiger turn their attention to the issue of violence, and focus on physical abuse, which occurs mainly within the family, and violence between peers, with a special focus on bullying at school. They argue that both are problematic, often not primarily because of the physical injuries but because of the effects on the children’s agency and self-relations. Abuse and other forms of violence have a negative impact on the self-trust and self-esteem of children and set in motion a cycle of anxiety and fear, which can lead to internalizing and externalizing behaviours.

Conclusions: Ethical Policies for Safeguarding Children

In the final chapter, Graf and Schweiger draw seven conclusions based on their research and findings. They argue that justice-based and justice-oriented policy making faces several difficulties because of disagreement about ethical arguments as well as uncertainties in the empirical evidence. The different dimensions of children’s capability of bodily integrity and the different and changing threats that children face demand a multifaceted and multilateral approach to their protection, which must encompass the parents and the state. Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge that children’s bodily integrity is only one dimension which is important for their well-being and well-becoming. The protection of bodily integrity is thus one piece of the puzzle.